

China Default Review 2024:

Trough Before The Third Wave

S&P Global
Ratings

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What Changed In 2023



The Second Default Wave Has Just Passed

- **Sample:** We examined all bond defaults in China since 2015 in the offshore markets (100 cases, 400 U.S. dollar bonds), and in the onshore markets (261 cases, 697 Chinese renminbi (RMB) bonds).
- First wave: In 2015-2019, industrials and commodity firms led defaults from 2018, with 4x more cases than the next highest sector.
- Second wave: In 2020-2024, real estate led defaults from 2021, with 2.4x more cases than the next highest sector.
- Events: Evergrande triggered a wave of distress from mid-2021; two years later Country Garden showed the crisis wasn't over.
- Offshore: Default rates fell to 1.3% in 2023 from a 6.7% peak in 2022. In 1Q24, the default rate dropped further to a 0.3% trough.
- Onshore: Default rates peaked for non-property at 1.2% in 2019, and for property at 9.9% in 2022. In 1Q24, both fell to nearly zero.
- Impact of defaults reduced as average defaulter size fell to RMB6.8 bil. in 2023, and RMB2.3 bil. in 1Q24, from RMB9.3 bil. in 2022.

Growth, Policies, And Financing May Drive The Third Wave

- **Sectors:** In 2023, defaults fell in most sectors except for tech services, consumers, and retail. This highlights the vulnerabilities to slowing growth.
- **Offshore** corporate bonds due this year (US\$92 bil.) is less than 2023 (US\$111 bil.) and 2025 (US\$104 bil.), local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) and consumer sectors have more due and more refinancing needs.
- **Onshore** corporate bonds due will peak this year at RMB8 tril., more than 2023 (RMB5.1 tril.) and 2025 (RMB6.2 tril.), driven by LGFVs (RMB3.5 tril.), capital goods (RMB0.75 tril.), and power sectors (RMB0.74 tril.).
- Financing: Firms became even more reliant on banks in 2023. Bond issuance remains low, particularly for lower-rated firms.
- Market access: Net issuance has been consistently negative for private firms since 2021, and for weaker LGFVs since mid-2022.
- Policies: Drove the two default waves so far (2018: overcapacity, asset management, 2021: "three red lines").
- Next: The policies aimed to rein in excessive leverage. More policies with similar aims, scale, and effects may lead to the next wave.
- **Trend:** Default rate normalization toward global levels is reversing as systemic concerns led to directives against bond defaults, weakening market discipline.

Sample Overview: First Wave Industrials, Second Wave Property

- We examined all bond defaults in China since 2015 in the offshore and onshore markets.
- 2015-2019: Six default cases offshore, 74 onshore; industrial/commodity led the first wave from 2018 (4x more vs. next highest sector).
- 2020-2024: 59 default cases offshore, 49 onshore; real estate led the second wave from 2021 (2.4x more vs. next highest sector).

			Offshore							Onshore			
			2015-2	2019	2020-20	24YTD				2015-2	2019	2020-20	24YTD
No. of bonds	No. of issuers	Amt. bil. US\$	No. of bonds	No. of issuers	No. of bonds	No. of issuers	No. of bonds	No. of issuers	Amt. bil. RMB	No. of bonds	No. of issuers	No. of bonds	No. of issuers
400	100	167	37	21	363	79	697	261	1163	296	153	401	108
324	61	140	5	2	319	59	212	58	470	18	9	194	49
76	39	27	32	19	44	20	485	203	693	278	144	207	59
3	1	1	1	1	2	0	31	11	96	19	9	12	2
21	13	7	13	8	8	6	56	23	90	20	12	36	11
25	11	9	14	6	11	5	242	94	322	159	74	83	20
27	14	10	4	4	23	9	156	75	185	80	49	76	36
359	89	150	31	20	328	70	583	218	914	246	125	337	93
41	11	16	6	1	35	9	114	43	249	50	28	64	15
15	3	6	0	0	15	2	41	15	115	23	10	18	5
26	8	10	6	1	20	7	73	28	134	27	18	46	10
	bonds 400 324 76 3 21 25 27 359 41	bonds issuers 400 100 324 61 76 39 3 1 21 13 25 11 27 14 359 89 41 11 15 3	bonds issuers bil. US\$ 400 100 167 324 61 140 76 39 27 3 1 1 21 13 7 25 11 9 27 14 10 359 89 150 41 11 16 15 3 6	No. of bonds No. of issuers Amt. bil. US\$ No. of bonds 400 100 167 37 324 61 140 5 76 39 27 32 3 1 1 1 21 13 7 13 25 11 9 14 27 14 10 4 359 89 150 31 41 11 16 6 15 3 6 0	No. of bonds No. of issuers Amt. bil. US\$ No. of bonds No. of issuers 400 100 167 37 21 324 61 140 5 2 76 39 27 32 19 3 1 1 1 1 21 13 7 13 8 25 11 9 14 6 27 14 10 4 4 359 89 150 31 20 41 11 16 6 1 15 3 6 0 0	No. of bonds No. of issuers Amt. bil. US\$ No. of bonds No. of issuers No. of bonds No. of bonds No. of bonds 400 100 167 37 21 363 324 61 140 5 2 319 76 39 27 32 19 44 3 1 1 1 1 2 21 13 7 13 8 8 25 11 9 14 6 11 27 14 10 4 4 23 359 89 150 31 20 328 41 11 16 6 1 35 15 3 6 0 0 15	No. of bonds No. of issuers Amt. bil. US\$ No. of bonds No. of bon	No. of bonds No. of issuers Amt. bil. US\$ No. of bonds No. of issuers No. of bonds No. of bonds No. of issuers No. of bonds No. of bonds No. of issuers No. of bonds No.	No. of bonds No. of issuers Amt. bil. US\$ No. of bonds No. of bonds No. of issuers No. of issuers No. of issuers No. of bonds No. of issuers No. of bonds No. of issuers No	No. of bonds No. of bonds Amt. bonds No. of bonds </td <td>No. of bonds No. of bonds Amt. bil. US\$ No. of bonds Amt. bil. RMB No. of bonds Amt. bil. RMB No. of bonds No. of bonds No. of bonds No. of bonds Amt. bil. RMB No. of bonds No. of bonds No. of bonds Amt. bil. RMB No. of bonds No. of b</td> <td>No. of bonds No. of issuers Amt. bil. US\$ No. of bonds No. of issuers No. of bonds No. of issuers No. of bonds No. of bonds<</td> <td>No. of bonds Am. bond bonds Am. bonds bonds No. of bonds No. of bonds issuers <</td>	No. of bonds No. of bonds Amt. bil. US\$ No. of bonds Amt. bil. RMB No. of bonds Amt. bil. RMB No. of bonds No. of bonds No. of bonds No. of bonds Amt. bil. RMB No. of bonds No. of bonds No. of bonds Amt. bil. RMB No. of bonds No. of b	No. of bonds No. of issuers Amt. bil. US\$ No. of bonds No. of issuers No. of bonds No. of issuers No. of bonds No. of bonds<	No. of bonds Am. bond bonds Am. bonds bonds No. of bonds No. of bonds issuers <

Data ranged from Jan. 1, 2015 to Mar. 20, 2024, includes defaulted bonds of all nonfinancial Greater China corporates in the offshore U.S. dollar bond market and China domestic bond market. Defaults are failures to pay interest or principal in full and on time, including maturity extension and other distressed restructurings. Defaulted amount is the defaulted bonds for offshore, and is the defaulters' bonds outstanding on the date of first default for onshore. Amt.--Amount. Infra-Infrastructure. TMT--Technology, media, and telecommunication. Sources: Wind, Bloomberg, company and court releases, media sources, S&P Global Ratings.



Large Distress Events: Two Years Marked By Evergrande And Country Garden

The latest wave was triggered by the unprecedented series of large distress events after Evergrande from mid-2021. More than two years later, Country Garden showed that the crisis was not fully over.

Issuer*	First distress event date	SOE/ POE	Sector	Bonds off/onshore (Bil. US\$/RMB)
Henan Energy	1/5/2021	SOE	Chemicals	0.0 / 25
Ch Fortune Ld	1/13/2021	POE	Real Estate	4.6 / 56.1
GCL New Energy	1/30/2021	POE	Power	0.5 / 0.0
CQ Energy	3/1/2021	SOE	Power	0.5 / 0.5
Languang	5/24/2021	POE	Real Estate	1.1 / 12
Evergrande	6/7/2021	POE	Real Estate	20.7 / 55.9
Suning	6/16/2021	POE	Consmr. Prod.	0.6 / 28.4
Tus Hldgs	6/24/2021	SOE	Real Estate	1.0 / 0.0
Sinic	9/18/2021	POE	Real Estate	0.7 / 1.8
Jushenghua	9/23/2021	POE	Conglom.	0.0 / 11.7
Fantasia	10/4/2021	POE	Real Estate	4.0 / 6.4
Xinyuan	10/8/2021	POE	Real Estate	0.8 / 3.0
Moland	10/25/2021	POE	Real Estate	1.3 / 1.0
Kaisa	11/4/2021	POE	Real Estate	12.2 / 1.5
Aoyuan	11/12/2021	POE	Real Estate	3.2 / 8.6
Yango	11/17/2021	POE	Real Estate	3.6 / 22.0
Shimao	1/6/2022	POE	Real Estate	5.7 / 27.6
Guangzhou R&F	1/11/2022	POE	Real Estate	4.9 / 14.7
Shinsun	1/18/2022	POE	Real Estate	0.7 / 0.5
DaFa	1/18/2022	POE	Real Estate	0.6 / 0.0
Yuzhou	1/23/2022	POE	Real Estate	5.7 / 6.9
Ch S City	2/11/2022	POE	Real Estate	1.6 / 2.0
Jingrui	3/4/2022	POE	Real Estate	1.4 / 1.9


Issuer*	First distress event date	SOE/ POE	Sector	Bonds off/onshore (Bil. US\$/RMB)
Zhenro	3/11/2022	POE	Real Estate	3.6 / 5.8
Logan	3/19/2022	POE	Real Estate	3.9 / 20.6
Lanzhou LGFV	3/21/2022	SOE	Cons. & Infra.	0.3 / 12.9
Redco	3/22/2022	POE	Real Estate	1.0 / 0.0
Sunac	4/1/2022	POE	Real Estate	7.7 / 16.7
Dangdai	4/3/2022	POE	Consmr. Prod.	0.7 / 11.2
E-House	4/18/2022	POE	Real Estate	0.6 / 0.0
Jiayuan	4/30/2022	POE	Real Estate	1.4 / 4.3
Zhongliang	5/16/2022	POE	Real Estate	1.1 / 0.3
Jinke	5/30/2022	POE	Real Estate	0.3 / 15.4
Zhongnan	6/2/2022	POE	Real Estate	0.5 / 6.5
Greenland	6/16/2022	SOE	Real Estate	3.9 / 3.9
Ronshine	7/4/2022	POE	Real Estate	2.3 / 10.8
Powerlong	7/13/2022	POE	Real Estate	2.2 / 8.3
Redsun	8/12/2022	POE	Real Estate	1.5 / 0.0
Times	9/8/2022	POE	Real Estate	2.7 / 12.0
KWG	9/9/2022	POE	Real Estate	4.1 / 4.5
CIFI	10/8/2022	POE	Real Estate	4.6 / 12.9
Sino-Ocean Cap	10/21/2022	SOE	Financial Srv.	0.8/0.3
Red Star Macalline	11/7/2022	POE	Real Estate	0.3 / 15.5
Central Ch RE	4/18/2023	POE	Real Estate	1.9 / 0
Country Garden	9/1/2023	POE	Real Estate	9.9 / 5.6
Sino-Ocean	9/1/2023	SOE	Real Estate	3.9 / 23.4

Data as of Dec. 31, 2023. First distress event date: first date the issuer reportedly restructured or outright failed to pay any of its offshore or domestic obligations. Bonds off/onshore: bonds outstanding onshore or offshore on the first distress event date. *See Names Abbreviation List in Appendix for full names. Consmr. Prod.--Consumer products. Conglom.--Conglomerate. Cons. & Infra.--Construction and infrastructure. Financial Srv.--Financial services. S Source: Wind, Bloomberg, S&P Global Ratings.



Offshore Defaults: Peak to Trough Over The Last Two Years

- Offshore default rates fell to 1.3% in 2023 from the 6.7% peak in 2022, while the amount dropped to US\$37 bil. from US\$64 bil.
- Default rate for the property sector fell to 5.6% in 2023 from 27.8% in 2022, while non-property fell to 0.3% from 0.4%.
- In 1Q24, default rates dropped further to 0.3%, or US\$7 bil., as both property and non-property fell, likely reaching the trough.




Data as of Mar. 31, 2024, includes all nonfinancial Greater China corporates in the offshore U.S.-dollar bond market. Defaults are failures to pay interest or principal in full and on time, including maturity extension and other distressed restructurings. Defaulted amount includes only the defaulted bond (i.e., not other debt by the same issuer). Number of defaulters is the number of first-time defaulted issuers. Source: Bloomberg, S&P Global Ratings.




Onshore Defaults: Policies Drove Two Waves So Far, May Also Drive The Third

- Onshore default rates peaked for non-property in 2019 at 1.2% and for property in 2022 at 9.9%. In 1Q24, both fell to nearly zero.
- Defaults became less impactful as average defaulter size fell to RMB 6.8 bil. in 2023 and RMB2.3 bil. in 1Q24, from RMB9.3 bil. in 2022.
- As policies drove two default waves so far (2018: overcapacity, asset management; 2021: three red lines), may also drive the third.


Defaulters fell for both POEs and SOEs



Two waves of defaults since 2015



Defaults are sliding




Data as of Mar.19, 2024, includes all non-financial corporates in China's domestic bond market. Defaults are failures to pay interest or principal in full and on time, including maturity extension and other distressed restructurings. Default amount is defaulters' bonds outstanding on the date of first default, number of defaulters is the number of first-time defaulted issuers. Market is total bonds outstanding or number of issuers in the market at the beginning of the year. Source: Wind, S&P Global Ratings.



Defaults Fell in Real Estate But Rose In Tech Services, Consumers, Retail


In 2023, defaults fell in most sectors except for tech services, consumers, and retail, flags vulnerabilities to slowing growth.



Data as of Dec. 31, 2023, includes all non-financial corporates in China's domestic bond market. Inv hldg--Investment holding company. Media & ent--Media and entertainment. Defaults are failures to pay interest or principal in full and on time, including maturity extension and other distressed restructurings. Number of defaulters is the number of first-time defaulter during the year divided by the number of issuers in sector at the beginning of the year. Source: Wind, S&P Global Ratings.



What's Next In 2024?




Offshore Maturities: Less Due, But More Refi Needs For LGFVs, Consumers

- Offshore corporate bonds coming due this year (US\$92 bil.) is less than both 2023 (US\$111 bil.) and 2025 (US\$104 bil.).
- Real estate has US\$34 bil. maturing in 2024, much of which may undergo restructuring since most developers are in distress.
- LGFVs have the next most bonds due (US\$20 bil.) and consumer sectors the third (US\$ 12bil.), hence more refinancing needs.

Less offshore corporate bonds are maturing this year...

...Property, LGFVs and consumers have the most



Data as of Jan. 01, 2024. Maturing, includes only nonfinancial Greater China corporates bonds listed in the offshore U.S.-dollar and Euro- bond markets, excluding those with maturity less than one year, amount issued less than US\$100 million, and certificates of deposit. Source: Bloomberg, S&P Global Ratings.



Onshore Maturities: More Due, More Refi Needs For LGFVs, Cap. Goods, Power


- Onshore corporate bonds due will peak this year at RMB8 tril., more than both 2023 (RMB5.1 tril.) and 2025 (RMB6.2 tril.).
- This is largely driven by LGFVs, which, at RMB 3.5 tril., will account for nearly half of corporate bonds due this year.
- Capital goods (RMB757 bil.) and power sectors (RMB738 bil.) have the second- and third-most refinancing needs, respectively.

Onshore corporate bonds due will peak this year...

8 8.0 6.2 5.1 4 2

2024

...LGFVs, capital goods and powers have the most



Data as of Jan. 01, 2024. Maturing, includes all non-financial corporate bonds in China's domestic bond market. E&C--Engineering & construction. Source: Wind, S&P Global Ratings.

2025




2023


Financing: More Reliance On Banks, Low Bond Issuance For Lower Rated

- Firms became even more reliant on banks in 2023--loans rose to 88% of financing from 86%, as bonds fell to 8% from 11%.
- This may normalize in 2024, as bond issuance grew 24% year over year in Jan. and Feb., while loans fell 12%.
- However, bond issuance remains relatively low, particularly for lower-rated firms, which have shown little to negative net issuance.

Chinese firms became more reliant on banks in 2023...



...Particularly for the lower-rated



Data as of Feb. 29, 2024, includes all non-financial corporates in China's domestic bond market. Shadow financing includes trust loans, entrusted loans and undiscounted bank bills of acceptance. Net bond issuance = issuance amount of bonds - redemption amount of bonds. Issue ratings by domestic rating agencies, issuer ratings are unavailable. Corp.--Corporates. Source: People's Bank of China, Wind, S&P Global Ratings.




Market Access: Weakened For Private Firms And Weaker LGFVs

- Net issuance of privately owned firms has been negative for most months since 2021.
- Among LGFVs (c. 38% of SOE issuances), higher-rated firms (domestic 'AAA' and 'AA+') have been able to issue, but in lower volumes.
- Net issuance by weaker LGFVs (below domestic 'AA+') became consistently negative since 2022, curtailed by tightened regulation.

POEs net issuance mostly negative since 2021...

■S0F ■ P0F 1.000 800 600 400 (Bil. RMB) 200 (200)(400)(600)Jan-20 May-20 Sep-20 May-22 Jan-24 Jan-23 May-23 May-21 Sep-21

...LGFVs' net issuance also negative or down to a trickle




Data as of Feb. 29, 2024, includes all non-financial corporates in China's domestic bond market. Net bond issuance = issuance amount of bonds - redemption amount of bonds. Issue ratings by domestic rating agencies, issuer ratings are used if issue ratings are unavailable. SOE—State-owned enterprises. POE—Privately owned enterprises. Source: Wind, S&P Global Ratings.




Next Wave: Policies May Again Drive The Next Cycle

- The two default waves began with policies on overcapacity and asset management (2018) and real estate ("three red lines," 2021).
- The policies aimed to rein in excessive debt leverage; both led to significant contractions in "shadow" or capital market financing.
- More policies with similar aims, scale, and effects on corporates may lead to the next wave of defaults.

Policies, Contractions, And Default Waves



Market Access An Issue After The Second Wave




Data as of Apr. 15, 2024. Shadow financing includes trust loans, entrusted loans and undiscounted bank bills of acceptance. Capital market financing includes corporates bond issuance and corporates A share issuances. YoY--Year on year. Sources: Wind, S&P Global Ratings.



Trend: Rates Diverge From Global Levels, Weakening Market Discipline

- Historically, corporate bond default rates in China have been abnormally low vs. global markets; particularly during COVID-hit 2020.
- This began to change as more defaults were allowed to occur since 2014, pushing default rates to "normalize" toward global levels.
- The trend reversed in recent years, as systemic risk concerns led to directives against bond defaults, weakening market discipline.


China's abnormally low corporate default rates to normalize to global levels as market develops



Data as of Dec. 31, 2023. Default rates are calculated by Gividing the number of first-time defaulted issuers of credit bonds by the number of issuers at the beginning of the year. China onshore bonds are not rated by S&P Global Ratings. 2023 numbers are derived from number of defaulter in 2023 and outstanding issuer in 2022. Source: Wind, S&P Global Ratings.



Appendix



Defaults in 2023 And The First Quarter Of 2024

- Defaults in 2023 and 2024 remain largely property developers, as the second sector downturn from mid-2023 takes its toll.
- There were few large property defaults, as most large private developers already defaulted in the years prior.
- Most non-property defaults were small in scale, with limited to no impact on bond markets onshore and offshore.

Issuer	Default date on/offshore	SOE/ POE	Sector	Bonds off/onshore (Bil. US\$/RMB)
Yincheng International Holding Co. Ltd.	3/7/2023	POE	Real Estate	0.2/0.0
Central China Real Estate Ltd.	4/18/2023	POE	Real Estate	1.9/0.0
Xu Hui Group Co. Ltd.	5/29/2023	POE	Real Estate	0.0/12.9
Jingrui Real Estate (Group) Co. Ltd.	5/31/2023	POE	Real Estate	0.0/1.9
China Maple Leaf Educational Systems Ltd.	6/27/2023	POE	Consumer	0.1/0.0
Sino-Ocean Group Holding Ltd.	8/4/2023	SOE	Real Estate	3.9/21.4
Country Garden Holdings Co. Ltd.	9/1/2023	POE	Real Estate	9.9/5.6
Zensun Enterprises Ltd.	9/13/2023	POE	Real Estate	0.3/0.0
Country Garden Real Estate Group Co. Ltd.	9/25/2023	POE	Real Estate	0.0/16.4
China SCE Group Holdings Ltd.	11/9/2023	POE	Real Estate	1.8/0.0
Jiangsu Zhongnan Construction Group Co. Ltd.	11/22/2023	POE	Real Estate	0.0/5.1
Guangzhou Fineland Real Estate Development Co. Ltd.	12/4/2023	POE	Real Estate	0.0/0.9
GOME Appliance Co. Ltd.	12/21/2023	POE	Consumer	0.0/0.3
Better Life Investment Group Co. Ltd.	12/29/2023	POE	Retail	0.0/1.3
Greenland Holding Group Co. Ltd.	1/8/2024	SOE	Real Estate	0.0/3.8
XJ International Holdings Co. Ltd.	3/2/2024	POE	Consumer	0.3/0.0
Souyute Group Co. Ltd.	3/12/2024	POE	Consumer	0.0/0.8
Radiance Holdings Group Co. Ltd.	3/20/2024	POE	Real Estate	0.3/0.0

Data ranged from Jan. 1, 2023 to Mar. 20, 2024. Default date is the first date the issuer reportedly restructured or outright failed to pay any of its offshore or domestic obligations. Bonds off/onshore: bonds outstanding onshore or offshore on the default date. Source: Wind, Bloomberg, S&P Global Ratings.



Debt Restructurings: Just Starting, More To Come

Most recent distress cases are just entering full restructuring. More will come in 2024 in this precedent-setting year.

Issuer*	First distress event date	First bond/loan restructure date	Audit firm change date	First audited results post- distress event
Henan Energy	1/5/2021	B: 1/5/21		4/30/21
Ch Fortune Ld	1/13/2021	L: 1/21/21		4/30/21
GCL New Eergy	1/30/2021	B: 6/11/21	7/14/21	4/21/21
CQ Energy	3/1/2021	B: 11/17/21		
Languang	5/24/2021			
Evergrande	6/7/2021	L: 8/12/21	1/16/23	8/16/23
Suning	6/16/2021	B: 6/16/21		
Tus Hldgs	6/24/2021	B: 8/5/21		10/28/22
Sinic	9/18/2021		12/17/21	
Jushenghua	9/23/2021	B: 9/23/21	5/13/22	7/26/22
Fantasia	10/4/2021	B: 11/25/21	7/11/22	8/25/23
Xinyuan	10/8/2021	B: 10/14/21	10/12/21	3/8/22
Moland	10/25/2021	B: 7/5/22		12/29/22
Kaisa	11/4/2021		6/27/22	3/9/23
Aoyuan	11/12/2021	L: 11/30/21	1/25/22	7/27/23
Yango	11/17/2021	B: 11/17/21		4/30/22
Shimao	1/6/2022	L: 1/17/22	3/24/22	9/20/23
Guangzhou R&F	1/11/2022	B: 1/11/21	4/29/22	8/18/22
Shinsun	1/18/2022	B: 1/18/22	6/23/23	5/23/22
DaFa	1/18/2022	B: 1/18/22	6/16/23	4/28/22
Yuzhou	1/23/2022	B: 1/23/22	2/25/22	4/21/22
Ch S City	2/11/2022	B: 2/11/22		7/26/22
Jingrui	3/4/2022	B: 3/4/22	5/31/22	4/12/23

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Issuer*	First distress event date	First bond/loan restructure date	Audit firm change date	First audited results post- distress event
Zhenro	3/11/2022	B: 3/11/22		4/25/22
Logan	3/19/2022	B: 3/19/22	5/11/22	9/9/22
Lanzhou LGFV	3/21/2022	L: 6/15/22		
Redco	3/22/2022	B: 3/22/22	7/25/23	4/27/22
Sunac	4/1/2022	B: 4/1/22	6/28/22	12/22/22
Dangdai	4/3/2022	B: 5/2/22		
E-House	4/18/2022	B: 11/23/23	7/20/22	11/29/22
Jiayuan	4/30/2022	B: 7/15/22		
Zhongliang	5/16/2022	B: 5/16/22		3/30/23
Jinke	5/30/2022	B: 5/30/22		4/29/23
Zhongnan	6/2/2022	B: 6/2/22		4/25/23
Greenland	6/16/2022	B: 6/16/22		3/31/23
Ronshine	7/4/2022	B: 7/4/22	3/18/22	3/31/23
Powerlong	7/13/2022	B: 7/13/22	3/24/22	3/30/23
Redsun	8/12/2022			3/30/23
Times	9/8/2022	B: 9/8/22		3/31/23
KWG	9/9/2022	B: 9/9/22	12/27/23	3/31/23
CIFI	10/8/2022		5/16/23	11/3/23
Sino-Ocean Cap	10/21/2022	B: 10/21/22		
Red Star Macalline	11/7/2022	B: 11/7/22	2/1/23	3/31/23
Central Ch RE	4/18/2023	B: 4/18/23		4/21/23
Country Garden	9/1/2023	B: 9/1/23		
Sino-Ocean Hldg	9/1/2023	B: 9/1/23		

Data as of Feb. 29, 2024, includes names with defaulted and restructured loans/bonds since 2021. First distress event date is the first date the company reportedly restructured or outright defaulted on its domestic or offshore obligations. B--Bonds. L--Loans. Source: Media, company announcement, S&P Global Ratings.



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- China Default Review 2023: Where's The Next Wave?, Apr. 13, 2023

Names Abbreviation List

Short name	Full name
Henan Energy	Henan Energy and Chemical Industry Group Co. Ltd.
Ch Fortune Ld	China Fortune Land Development Co. Ltd.
GCL New Eergy	GCL New Energy Holdings Ltd.
CQ Energy	Chongqing Energy Investment Group Co. Ltd.
Languang	Sichuan Languang Development Co. Ltd.
Evergrande	China Evergrande Group
Suning	Suning Appliance Group Co. Ltd.
Tus Hldgs	Tus-Holdings Co. Ltd.
Sinic	Sinic Holdings Group Co. Ltd.
Jushenghua	Shenzhen Jushenghua Co. Ltd.
Fantasia	Fantasia Holdings Group Co. Ltd.
Xinyuan	Xinyuan Real Estate Co. Ltd.
Moland	Modern Land China Co. Ltd.
Kaisa	Kaisa Group Holdings Ltd.
Aoyuan	China Aoyuan Group Ltd.
Yango	Yango Group Co. Ltd.
Shimao	Shimao Group Holdings Ltd.
Guangzhou R&F	Guangzhou R&F Properties Co. Ltd.
Shinsun	Shinsun Holdings Group Co. Ltd.
DaFa	DaFa Properties Group Ltd.
Yuzhou	Yuzhou Group Holdings Co. Ltd.
Ch S City	China South City Holdings Ltd.
Jingrui	Jingrui Holdings Ltd.

Short name	Full name
Zhenro	Zhenro Properties Group Ltd.
Logan	Logan Group Co. Ltd.
Lanzhou LGFV	Lanzhou City Development Investment Co. Ltd.
Redco	Redco Properties Group Ltd.
Sunac	Sunac China Holdings Ltd.
Dangdai	Wuhan Dangdai Science & Technology Industries (Group) Co. Ltd.
E-House	E-House (China) Enterprise Holdings Ltd.
Jiayuan	Jiayuan International Group Ltd.
Zhongliang	Zhongliang Holdings Group Co. Ltd.
Jinke	Jinke Property Group Co. Ltd.
Zhongnan	Jiangsu Zhongnan Construction Group Co. Ltd.
Greenland	Greenland Holding Group Co. Ltd.
Ronshine	Ronshine China Holdings Ltd.
Powerlong	Powerlong Real Estate Holdings Ltd.
Redsun	Redsun Properties Group Ltd.
Times	Times China Holdings Ltd.
KWG	KWG Group Holdings Ltd.
CIFI	CIFI Holdings Group Co. Ltd.
Sino-Ocean Cap	Sino-Ocean Capital Holding Ltd.
Red Star Macalline	Red Star Macalline Holdings Group Co. Ltd.
Central Ch RE	Central China Real Estate Ltd.
Country Garden	Country Garden Holdings Co. Ltd.
Sino-Ocean Hldg	Sino-Ocean Group Holding Ltd.



Abbreviations Used In This Report

- RMB--Chinese renminbi.
- 1Q--First Quarter.
- SOE--State-owned enterprise.
- POE--Privately owned enterprise.
- Gov.--Government.
- YTD--Year to date.
- LGFV--Local government financing vehicles.
- Bil.--Billion.
- Tril.--Trillion.
- LRG--Local and regional government.



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