This report does not constitute a rating action.
Key Takeaways
- Driven by China, we project emerging market (EM) subnational borrowing will reach nearly $1.4 trillion in 2024, from the peak in 2023 of $1.5 trillion.
- Chinese local and regional governments' (LRGs) net borrowing has probably peaked but will remain high as it faces mounting macroeconomic pressure, and potential pressure from key state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
- EMs will account for roughly half of total subnational debt stock in 2024, of which 94% is from China and India. We expect this will continue to propel global borrowing volume.
- Outside of China and India, EM borrowers continue to face persistent institutional, market, and macroeconomic barriers to financing growth.
S&P Global Ratings projects the gross borrowing of subnational governments in EMs will drift down over the next two years by roughly $250 million to $300 million by 2025, after borrowing more in 2023 than the previous peak at the height of the pandemic. In 2024, gross EM borrowing will start to decline but remain above pre-pandemic levels in nominal and real terms (see chart 1).
Despite the expected slowdown, still-large fiscal deficits in China and India will likely keep annual gross EM subnational borrowing at just below US$1.4 trillion in 2024. That's still higher than in both 2021 and 2022, although the real value will reach a level nearly on par with 2016.
Chart 1
The peak in gross borrowing in 2023 was mainly due to the issuance of Chinese yuan (CNY) 1.4 trillion (US$197 billion) in special bonds on behalf of local government financing vehicles (LGFV) debt repayments (which we consider as tax-supported debt of LRGs), as well as by high refinancing of Chinese debt due to an increase in debt maturities. Gross borrowing also increased in 2023 in EM Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) in the last year of capital grants from the EU 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework, while Latin America surprised to the upside, especially given higher borrowing in Brazil and Mexico.
Most local EM governments continue to face both internal and external constraints on access to credit. China and India are the notable exceptions due to their deep domestic capital markets.
Chinese LRGs' Still Dominate EM Subnational Borrowing, While In India It Is Set To Keep Growing
Net borrowing in China--generally accounting for 85% of total EM LRG borrowing--will remain sizable in 2024 and 2025 (see chart 2), bolstered by the country's fiscal-led investment strategy to counter macroeconomic pressures, which relies heavily on LRGs. Nonetheless, we expect a progressive deceleration in net borrowing vis-à-vis the historical high in 2023 because high and uneven indebtedness of Chinese LRGs and an economic slowdown has prompted China's central government to become more customizing in granting new borrowing quotas for provinces. The more indebted LRGs are likely to see constrained new borrowing quotas but may receive additional special financing allowances to diffuse local SOE debt risks. Further measures to balance financial risks and fiscal stimulus will follow in 2024, in our view.
Chart 2
The debt burden of Chinese LRGs is among the highest share in EMs (only surpassed by Jordan with debt equivalent to 179% of revenue in 2023), and we expect it will reach 173% of operating revenue in 2024 before slightly falling in 2025. We believe Chinese LRGs will rely more on direct borrowing than borrowing through key SOEs to finance infrastructure projects going forward, although we expect the governments' new issuance quota will be reduced next year because of declining room for debt expansion (see "China's Fiscal Bid To Stanch Local SOE Debt Risk," Nov. 2, 2023). This means selected high-risk regions will likely see diminishing project pipelines in a bid to control debt growth.
A new wave of Chinese LRG special issuances for swapping hidden debts by highly indebted SOEs signals China's policy objective to contain spillover risks at SOEs, including LGFVs. LGFV is a loosely defined but widely used term, referring to SOEs that used to undertake funding for their government owners. The scale of these new swaps (Chinese renminbi [RMB] 1.4 trillion for 2023, and expected RMB1 trillion for 2024) is relatively small compared with the LRGs' direct debt; however, a combination of still large new financing, elevated refinancing in 2023 and 2024, and additional borrowing by LRGs to support the liquidity of LGFVs facing upcoming maturities will keep upward pressure on LRGs' debt through 2025.
Meanwhile, we expect Indian LRGs will continue increasing net borrowing and debt to hover at around 160% of operating revenue in the next two years. We anticipate that the strong economic growth last year will carry over to 2024, resulting in real GDP growth of 6.4%. This will likely lead to buoyant revenue increases for Indian states. However, glaring infrastructure needs and a large share of the additional costs that Indian states incurred through the pandemic have become structural. States' revenue will continue to be woefully insufficient to cover the higher spending, leading to more net borrowing. That said, the Reserve Bank of India provides a de facto guarantee of states' debt, which supports their access to markets despite already high indebtedness.
Chinese governments fully finance their fiscal deficit through bonds, although their debt is almost exclusively purchased by onshore investors, mainly banks. LRGs have been issuing bonds exclusively in local currency, and tier-one governments designated based on Chinese governmental fiscal hierarchy are the only authorized issuers in their respective regions. In India, too, LRG debt is held primarily by onshore investors despite recent changes to the rules allowing nonresidents to purchase LRG bonds.
Borrowing Will Decrease In Other EMs And Will Almost Entirely Be For Refinancing
We estimate that subnational gross borrowing in the rest of the EMs covered (excluding China and India) peaked in 2023 at US$36 billion, driven by increased borrowing in Latin America, especially in Brazil and Mexico, as well as in EM EMEA as the EU 20142020 multiannual financial framework ended in 2023. The EU program provides capital grants, but countries borrow as well to prefinance (and are then reimbursed by grants) or to cofinance those projects. We expect total borrowing will decline from 2024 onward to US$28 billion by 2025, mainly from the effect of lower borrowing needs in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, while it would remain flat in Latin America and Asia-Pacific (APAC) (other than China and India).
Generally, we foresee net borrowing (excluding refinancing) approaching a minimum 5% of total borrowing in 2024 and 2025 (from an average of 20% in 2020-2023) as LRGs look to rein in spending to weather a period of slower growth, still-elevated inflation, and hardened credit market conditions (see chart 3). Still, risks to the forecast remain as heightened geopolitical uncertainty could raise costs, while election-year dynamics for a large number of LRGs could lead to higher-than-estimated spending.
Chart 3
In other EM EMEA countries that cannot rely on EU funding to cofinance investments in infrastructure, such as Serbia, borrowing may continue to increase. In Pakistan, Turkiye, and Ukraine, weakening sovereign credit conditions, including macroeconomic and institutional instability, could further restrict LRGs' access to financing. Ultimately, this could force policymakers to choose between drawing down liquidity or forgoing investments needed for growth.
We expect Latin American gross borrowing to remain flat after peaking in 2023, largely from Brazil and Mexico. In Brazil, higher borrowing is due to narrower fiscal space in 2023 that moderately constrained LRGs capacity to execute capital expenditure (capex), coupled with changes in the central government's ratings rules that will allow more local entities, especially smaller municipalities, to access guaranteed debt. We expect these higher borrowing levels will remain in 2024-2025.
In Mexico, despite a relatively evolved domestic debt market, we expect LRGs' gross borrowing to increase only modestly over the next two years. Apart from refinancing existing debt, which they continue to do on favorable terms, Mexican LRGs have remained reluctant to borrow additional debt despite increasing infrastructure needs. This compounds a steep decline in infrastructure investment that is underpinned by poor capital execution and other structural and institutional limitations. Overall, we expect mid- and long-term financial planning to remain constrained by political cycles, and growth-related investment to decline.
Argentine LRGs' net borrowing will remain very low in 2024 and 2025 mainly because of lack of market access. Pressures from the implementation of the sovereign's economic policy--such as transfer cuts--will have to be absorbed by LRGs, most of which are currently implementing fiscal adjustment measures. If national policies lead to acute pressure on provinces' liquidity or debt repayment capacity--for example, through another sharp currency devaluation--we could see another spike in debt restructuring as in 2021.
Meanwhile, borrowing in EM APAC (excluding China and India) has remained very low due to relatively underdeveloped domestic debt markets and low investor appetite. In Africa, we expect balanced fiscal accounts in Morocco, Nigeria, and South Africa with borrowing remaining mostly flat, despite high capital expenditure needs. We attribute this to a combination of weak financial management, historically weak capital execution, and thin domestic debt markets.
Chart 4
Inflation And Moderating Borrowing Will Generally Ease Debt Burdens
Excluding Jordan, China, and India, we expect the debt burden of the rest of the EM countries to slightly decrease on average in the next two years. In line with our previous forecast, the downward trend in the debt burden reflects stronger revenues, often explained by inflation dynamics. In the case of Jordan, we estimate that the debt burden would increase sharply as debt stock almost doubles from 2022 to 2025, reaching 250% of operating revenue, mostly to finance capital spending for transportation in the capital city.
Chart 5
Argentine provinces' debt profiles won't benefit as much from high inflation, given the large share of outstanding debt in U.S. dollars or U.S. dollar-linked issuances. Rapid currency depreciation will continue to put a floor on debt levels in peso terms, even as revenues increase and market access remains limited. In Brazil, by contrast, we forecast debt burdens will continue to decline from their 2016 peak, despite an uptick in LRGs overall borrowing in recent years. Amortizations have outpaced new borrowing, leading to declining debt burdens overall.
Chart 6
Rate Increases Haven't Meaningfully Constrained Debt Servicing Yet
Rising interest rates haven't yet substantially affected the debt service carrying charges of EM LRGs. From 2021 to 2025, we project the weighted average interest burden for EM LRGs will increase to 5.2% of revenue from 3.6%. Excluding China and India, the increase is even smaller: to 1.42% of revenue from 1.05%. This reflects the comparatively low debt burdens of many EM LRGs.
Higher-for-longer interest rates could mean that LRGs' interest burdens rise as debt rolls over, although we don't expect debt-servicing costs to become a meaningful constraint on fiscal performance or borrowing in most places, except where debt is denominated in foreign currency. Even where variable-rate debt is a considerable portion of indebtedness in some countries (such as roughly 95% in Mexico and 100% in Brazil), the relatively low debt burden of most EM subnational governments minimizes the risk of a spike in debt-servicing costs.
LRGs in Argentina and Turkiye are the most exposed to currency risk. There, 75% and 50% of LRG debt, respectively, is denominated in foreign currency, and Argentine provinces in particular have seen their debt servicing costs increase rapidly with the devaluation of the peso.
For much of the rest of EM LRGs, debt burdens and carrying charges remain low in 2024, suggesting underutilized capacity to finance growth (see chart 7). A range of institutional and practical constraints may explain LRGs unwillingness (or inability) to borrow. Jordan is an exception, with about 20% of debt service to revenues following the recent hike in debt.
Chart 7
Bank Loans Are the Primary Source of Financing For EM LRGs, Outside China and India
In many cases, local currency capital markets remain relatively undeveloped, even in countries where LRGs are permitted to issue debt instruments. Banks and multilaterals often fill in the gaps in these markets. Across most EMs, LRGs rely primarily on bank loans to finance themselves, while capital market debt is a relatively small portion of the debt stock (see chart 8).
Chart 8
Even where EM LRGs can issue debt in financial markets, they may face a number of other barriers. Institutional constraints, administrative and political hurdles, and limited financial transparency and accountability can all weigh on the development of local and cross-border capital markets. In addition, while there may be room for LRGs to increase their debt burden as a share of their own budgets, their fiscal space and liquidity may not be strong enough to support repayment.
In our view, sovereign macroeconomic context also matters not only for creditworthiness, but also for access to external credit markets and the development of domestic ones. Argentine provinces have been effectively shut out of international capital markets since they restructured their external debt in 2020-2021, and a return to global capital markets is unlikely until the country advances in solving its macroeconomic imbalances. The majority of external debt is commercial, but a lack of market access has led to an increase in multilateral lending institution (MLI) financing and declining borrowing.
EM Subnational Debt Could Outstrip Domestic Market Debt, Even If Borrowing Capacity Likely Remains Underutilized
Driven by Chinese LRGs, we expect EM will represent half of total outstanding stock of LRG debt--US$7.8 trillion in 2024 (about 8% of today's global nominal GDP)--and could even outstrip domestic market debt in 2025. At a projected US$6.5 trillion in 2024, China alone will account for 38% of global subnational debt. By comparison, U.S. cities and states represent about 20% (US$3.3 trillion).
We project that the pace of new borrowing for other EM LRGs will continue to reflect persistent barriers to financing growth-related investment for EM local governments. Ongoing development of domestic capital markets, funding from multilaterals, and institutional development will be key to ensuring that local governments have access to financing for future growth.
Chart 9
Related Research
- Subnational Debt 2024: Fiscal Policy Differences Influence Borrowing In Developed Markets, March 4, 2024
- Subnational Debt 2024: France, Adaptability Will Remain Key Amid Sluggish Growth, March 4, 2024
- Subnational Debt 2024: Spain (Debt Absorption Scenarios): All could benefit, with some more than others, March 4, 2024
- Subnational Debt 2024: Australian States' Debt Rift Deepens, Feb. 29, 2024
- Subnational Debt 2024: Canadian Local And Regional Governments Are Running Fast To Stay In Place, Feb. 29, 2024
- Subnational Debt 2024: Global LRGs Can Handle Rising Interest Expenses, Feb. 29, 2024
- Subnational Debt 2024: Focus on debt sustainability, Feb. 29, 2024
- Subnational Debt 2024: Germany, Subdued Fiscal Performance Suggests Borrowing Will Rebound, Feb. 29, 2024
- Subnational Debt 2024: Infrastructure Spending Succumbs To Economic Slowdown, Feb. 29, 2024
- Subnational Debt 2024: Spain: Lower borrowings, but bond issuances recover, Feb. 29, 2024
- Subnational Debt 2024: Switzerland, Resilient Budget Surpluses Should Enable Further Deleveraging, Feb. 29, 2024
- China City Governments Risk Falling Into A Debt Trap, Feb. 20, 2024.
- Argentine Provinces Update: Navigating The Shock Therapy, Jan. 23, 2024
- Institutional Framework Assessment: China's Push To Delink LRGs From SOEs Relieves Some Pressure On Tier-Two Governments' Elevated Debt, Aug. 10, 2023
- Stimulus Is A Highwire Act For China's City Governments Facing Property Go-Slow, June 20, 2023
- Argentine Provinces Try To Avoid Default After Latest Capital Controls, June 14, 2023
- China Local Governments: Balancing Growth And Risk, June 5, 2023
Appendix
Table 1
| Gross borrowing and debt stock of EM LRGs | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross borrowings as of year end (bil. $) | Debt stock (bil. $) | ||||||||||
| 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2025 | |
|
Argentina |
11.8 | 13.3 | 5.7 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 24.7 |
|
Bosnia and Herzegovina |
0.6 | 1.3 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 8.8 |
|
Brazil |
6.7 | 6.7 | 4.9 | 5.1 | 4.2 | 3.6 | 5.4 | 7.0 | 7.1 | 7.2 | 245.7 |
|
Bulgaria |
0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 1.1 |
|
China |
912.2 | 644.8 | 635.4 | 631.5 | 933.8 | 1,161.4 | 1,093.6 | 1,311.4 | 1,163.6 | 1,009.0 | 7,191.6 |
|
Colombia |
- | 0.4 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 6.2 |
|
Croatia |
0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 1.3 |
|
Czech Republic |
0.0 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 3.4 |
|
India |
76.1 | 74.9 | 82.8 | 104.4 | 142.5 | 134.4 | 140.7 | 151.2 | 178.2 | 191.3 | 1,055.9 |
|
Indonesia |
0.2 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 3.8 |
|
Jordan |
- | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 2.2 |
|
Kazakhstan |
- | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 2.7 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 3.3 |
|
Latvia |
0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 1.9 |
|
Mexico |
3.7 | 6.9 | 7.9 | 5.3 | 7.1 | 2.0 | 5.0 | 9.1 | 6.2 | 6.3 | 40.6 |
|
Morocco |
0.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 2.9 |
|
Nigeria |
5.6 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 6.7 |
|
North Macedonia |
0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
|
Pakistan |
- | 0.8 | 0.1 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 11.4 |
|
Peru |
0.3 | - | 0.5 | 0.3 | - | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.8 |
|
Philippines |
0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 4.4 |
|
Poland |
1.5 | 2.2 | 4.5 | 4.2 | 4.8 | 3.1 | 2.4 | 5.6 | 3.0 | 2.7 | 24.2 |
|
Romania |
0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 5.4 |
|
Serbia |
0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 |
|
South Africa |
0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 4.0 |
|
Thailand |
- | - | - | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 1.8 |
|
Turkiye |
- | 4.7 | 4.3 | 2.0 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 4.5 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 6.7 |
|
Ukraine |
- | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 1.6 |
|
Vietnam |
- | - | - | - | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 2.5 |
Table 2
| Restrictions on LRG Borrowing | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Country | Foreign currency borrowings | Bonds | Restrictions on debt burden | Central government approval on borrowings | Restrictions on deficit | |||||||
| Argentina | Y | Y | Annual debt service payments < 15% of operating revenues net of transfers to municipalities | Y, for all borrowings | Operating expenditure growth is limited to revenue growth/inflation | |||||||
| Bosnia & Herzegovina | Y | Y | N | Y, all MLI funding is done via the CG | N | |||||||
| Brazil | Y | N | Net consolidated debt < 200% of net revenues (for states); 120% (for munis) | Y, for all external borrowings and guaranteed debt | N | |||||||
| Bulgaria | Y | Y, minor use | Annual DS < 18% of own revenues and general subsidy | N | N | |||||||
| China | N | Y, only for Tier 1 | CG defines annual net borrowing quota and debt stock ceiling for Tier 1 LRGs | N | Indirectly, via borrowing quota | |||||||
| Colombia | Y | Allowed, but nonexistent | Debt stock < 80% of operating revenue; interest < 40% of operating revenues | Y, for external borrowings | Balanced budget | |||||||
| Croatia | Y | Allowed, but nonexistent | Annual DS < 20% of revenues; annual consolidated borrowings < 2% of consolidated revenues | Y, for all borrowings | Balanced budget | |||||||
| Czech Republic | Y | Y | Debt stock < 60% of total revenues (guideline) | Y, for bonds | N | |||||||
| India | N | Y | N | Y, via RBI for bonds | LRG deficit < 3% of GDP (indicational, not enforced recently) | |||||||
| Indonesia | N | Allowed, but nonexistent | Debt to GDP < 60% | Y, for bonds | LRG deficit < 3% of GDP | |||||||
| Kazakhstan | N | Y | CG annually defines debt stock quota for LRGs | Y, for all borrowings | N | |||||||
| Latvia | Y, but de facto nonexistent since 2008 | Allowed, but nonexistent | CG defines annual gross borrowing quota for LRGs | Y | Indirectly, via borrowing quota | |||||||
| Mexico | N | Y | Individual net borrowing ceiling < 15% of discretionary revenues | N | Balanced budget | |||||||
| Morocco | Y | Allowed, but nonexistent | N | N | Balanced budget | |||||||
| Nigeria | Y | Y | Bonds are allowed when debt stock < 50% of revenues and any monthly debt service < 40% of monthly revenues | Y, for external borrowings | N | |||||||
| North Macedonia | Y | Allowed, but nonexistent | DS < 30% of revenues; debt stock < 100% of revenues | Y, for all borrowings | N | |||||||
| Pakistan | N | N | Bonds are allowed when debt stock < 50% of revenues | Y, only budget loans are allowed | N | |||||||
| Philippines | N | Allowed, but nonexistent | Debt service < 20% of revenues | Y, for external borrowings | N | |||||||
| Peru | Y, only CG guaranteed MLI loans | Y | Debt stock < 100% of revenues | Y, for all borrowings | Balanced budget | |||||||
| Poland | Y | Y | Annual debt service to the average of the past three or seven years' balance of operating revenues (LRGs have to select either one), privatization proceeds, and operating expenditures. | N | N | |||||||
| Romania | Y | Y | Annual DS < 30% own revenues | N | Balanced budget | |||||||
| Russia | De facto N | Y | Debt stock < 100% of own revenues; annual DS < 20% of own revenues plus non-earmarked grants; interest < 10% of expenditures | Y, for bonds | Deficit < 15% of own revenues | |||||||
| Serbia | Y | Y | Debt stock < 50% of revenues; Annual DS < 15% of revenues | N | N | |||||||
| South Africa | Y, for special projects | Y | N | Y, for external borrowings | Balanced budget | |||||||
| Thailand | De facto N | Allowed, but nonexistent | GG borrowing < 20% of annual budget and 80% of principal payment | Y | N | |||||||
| Turkiye | Y | Y | Debt stock < 150% of revenues | Y, for borrowings > 10% of revenues | N | |||||||
| Ukraine | Y | Y | Debt stock plus guarantees < 200% (400% for Kyiv) of development budget revenue | Y, for all borrowings | N | |||||||
| Vietnam | N | Y | Debt stock < 90% of own revenues | Y, for all borrowings | Balanced budget | |||||||
| Y--Yes. N--No. FX--Foreign exchange. DS--Debt stock. CG--Central government. Source: S&P Global Ratings. | ||||||||||||
| Primary Credit Analysts: | Constanza M Perez Aquino, Buenos Aires + 54 11 4891 2167; constanza.perez.aquino@spglobal.com |
| Sarah Sullivant, Austin + 1 (415) 371 5051; sarah.sullivant@spglobal.com | |
| Secondary Contacts: | Wenyin Huang, Singapore +65 6216 1052; Wenyin.Huang@spglobal.com |
| YeeFarn Phua, Singapore + 65 6239 6341; yeefarn.phua@spglobal.com | |
| Michelle Keferstein, Frankfurt (49) 69-33-999-104; michelle.keferstein@spglobal.com | |
| Hugo Soubrier, Paris +33 1 40 75 25 79; hugo.soubrier@spglobal.com | |
| Alina Czerniawski, Buenos Aires +54 1148912194; alina.czerniawski@spglobal.com | |
| Omar A De la Torre Ponce De Leon, Mexico City + 52 55 5081 2870; omar.delatorre@spglobal.com |
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