Against the backdrop of a soft landing, EMEA's banks remain buoyant. Supported by solid capital and liquidity buffers, good profitability, and still-sound asset quality, most banks across Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) are showing sturdy performance and creditworthiness. At the same time, S&P Global Ratings expects asset quality indicators to weaken a little, reflecting increasing pressure on small and midsize entities (SMEs), companies operating in the commercial real estate (CRE) segment, and unsecured consumer credit. We think this should be manageable for most banks, though. And while we don't expect further growth, we expect banks to report solid profits in 2024. Earnings upside likely peaked last year, and lending growth remains muted in Europe. The focus on managing costs is becoming even more important as business growth volumes remain muted.
While we expect EMEA banks to maintain their strong performance, we see three main risks to our baseline assumptions:
- A protracted, painful recession could undermine the financial health of corporates and households, leading to material asset quality deterioration in the most vulnerable segments.
- Tighter liquidity, higher funding costs, and market turbulence could unsettle some EMEA banks. For lower-rated banks, higher funding costs might become an issue. In addition, heightened geopolitical risks could increase market turbulence. This could destabilize financial institutions (FIs) with weaker funding profiles, especially nonbank FIs with high refinancing needs, and expose banks to higher counterparty risks.
- Banks with weak business models might find it difficult to tackle inefficiencies, digitalize their businesses, and sustain cyber resilience.
Positive Rating Actions And Stable Outlooks Persist
Our rating actions on EMEA banks maintained a pronounced positive net bias in 2023 and the first five months of 2024, and 80.4% of ratings have a stable outlook. This supports our view of FIs' likely resilient performance in 2024.
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Solid Capital Positions Despite Growing Shareholder Distributions
Capital and earnings will remain a credit strength for many rated banks in the region. Higher profits, comfortable capital headroom, modest expected balance sheet growth, and the manageable effect of Basel III amendments on banks' capital supported increased distributions to shareholders. Major listed European banks announced over €100 billion in dividends and share repurchases in 2024, a material increase from 2022. Nevertheless, we do not expect these distributions to change our view of banks' capital positions or ratings.
The capital buffers of banks operating in some of the region's emerging markets are, on average, more modest than those of European banks. This doesn't include banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region or Israel, where banks traditionally maintain stronger capital buffers compared to other emerging market institutions. While higher economic risk and stronger growth in lending will continue to limit banks' capital assessments, we expect that solid revenue growth will somewhat offset these issues and enable stable capital positions over the next 12-18 months.
Financing Conditions Remain Supportive For EMEA Banks
Favorable financing conditions reflect positive credit sentiment and investors' search for returns. Banks have been issuing senior debt and successfully replacing their additional Tier 1 (AT1) instruments with upcoming call dates. By the end of 2025, European banks might have to replace up to 30% of outstanding AT1 instruments. A decision to call a hybrid capital instrument at the next call date and refinance it could result in incremental costs. We therefore continue to expect that banks will be weighing this potentially higher cost against the need to maintain good access to their investor base when making a call/noncall decision.
European banks' stable and diversified funding base, with a solid deposit base and good access to domestic and international capital markets, helps them to manage funding costs and maintain satisfactory liquidity. The European Central Bank's (ECB's) new operational framework, announced in March, won't tighten conditions for banks to access central bank liquidity and, in our view, should prove supportive to banks' funding and profitability. The framework does not imply any acceleration in the reduction of the ECB's balance sheet, although it doesn't rule it out either. Importantly, the ECB will supply liquidity to banks on a full allotment basis and against a broad set of collateral at a reduced spread of 15 basis points (bps) above its deposit facility rate, versus 50 bps currently. This will likely limit the volatility on money market rates and leave little room for a strong resurgence in money market transactions, especially unsecured interbank lending.
Monoline CRE Lenders Are More Vulnerable
At about 11% of European banks' total customer lending, and less for most emerging market banks, CRE exposures will likely be manageable overall. We believe that monoline CRE lenders are more vulnerable, though, especially those with substantial exposure to the U.S. CRE market, which faces material pressure. In Europe, we view German and Swedish banking sectors as having the highest CRE exposures, which, for some banks are more than double the banks' common equity Tier 1 capital.
Strategic M&A Deals Appear To Be Gaining Momentum
We see an increased appetite from European banks for strategic acquisitions, provided they are economically attractive, add value in terms of size or capability, and are in the acquiring bank's core markets. This fits in with banks' increased focus on areas where they have competitive advantage or scale, and their withdrawal from businesses or markets that are not considered core.
Several recently announced acquisitions fit this trend: Deutsche Bank (U.K. corporate broker Numis), Barclays (Tesco Bank), HSBC (SVB UK and Citi's Chinese wealth business), Nationwide (Virgin Money), ABN AMRO (Hauck Aufhauser Lampe), and BBVA's tender offer to buy Sabadell. We note also the following exits from certain markets: OTP (from Romania), Svenska Handelsbanken (from Finland), Danske Bank (from Norwegian retail operations), and BNPP (from Czechia). We consider that the modest uplift in banks' valuations last year, large capital buffers, and the incentives to improve efficiency could prompt European banks to persist in their search for strategic acquisitions and divestments in 2024.
Gradually Improving Environment For Emerging Market Banks
The expected soft landing in advanced economies will continue to support credit conditions in emerging markets. For the majority of EMEA emerging markets, we expect continued solid economic growth and disinflation will improve financing conditions for borrowers and support banks' creditworthiness. Financing conditions have been gradually improving for emerging market issuers overall. However, strong activity and inflation data have pushed market expectations for the Fed's first rate cut toward the end of the year instead of the previously expected middle of the year. This, and the upward trend in commodity prices--particularly oil--could disrupt a disinflation trend in emerging markets and slow or delay central banks' interest rate reductions.
The risk of increasing geopolitical tensions and sharper than currently expected downturn in developed economies continue to weigh on growth prospects for emerging markets. This could lead to further disruption in supply chains and the production of key commodities, depress export flows and revenues, and stymie foreign direct investments to emerging markets.
Climate Change Disclosures Are Set To Improve For EU Banks
From 2024, EU banks must disclose their Green Asset Ratio (GAR) in their Pillar 3 reports, showing the share of EU Taxonomy-aligned assets in selected financial assets. Despite certain methodological challenges and complexity related to the GAR calculation, we consider this as a step toward greater transparency. We expect further legislative and regulatory initiatives will follow. These include banks' enhanced disclosure requirements regarding climate risk that will complement information on exposure to sectors vulnerable to transition and physical risks, and greenhouse gas emissions (GHG)-financed emissions. The average GAR of European global systemically important banks (GSIBs) was a low 2.8% as of Dec. 31, 2023, and we think this will gradually increase.
Geopolitical Risks Are Rising
We continue to see heightened geopolitical risks, although these remain indirect and so far limited for the majority of EMEA countries (apart from Israel). As a result, we could see risks relating to the disruption of supply chains and increased energy prices, triggering flight to quality, risk aversion, high volatility, and a temporary financial markets freeze.
The recent attack on Israel by Iran represents a dangerous expansion of the Israel–Hamas war and raises the risk of a sharp escalation of the conflict. The signaling and coordination that minimized harm prevented an immediate full-scale regional conflict. While the recent events signal a significant increase in geopolitical risk, the central narrative of our base-case scenario remains broadly unchanged, including our baseline macroeconomic assumptions for major economies. Nevertheless, our expectations will be contingent on any potential further regional escalation.
Increased Geopolitical Tensions Are Disrupting Israeli Banks' Performance
Israeli banks face weaker economic prospects given the heightened geopolitical tensions in the country. On the back of continued disruption and uncertainty, we expect real GDP growth of around 0.5% in 2024 and quarterly output to remain below pre-war levels throughout 2024. While we expect growth will rebound by 5% in 2025, the Israeli economy could face longer-term damage. An escalation of the conflict could present additional security and social risks for Israel, which could have a deeper impact on the domestic economy.
While we have seen a limited increase in nonperforming loans since the outbreak of the conflict, we consider that the pressure on asset quality has intensified. The increase in recourse to payment deferrals that affected about 3.7% of systemwide loans as of end-March 2024 is an example of this. We consider that tourism-related businesses, SMEs, unsecured lending, and real estate and construction are the most vulnerable sectors. We therefore forecast credit losses will remain elevated, having reached about 50 bps in 2023. We anticipate that banks' resilient profitability will help them cushion the overall negative impact from the weaker economic environment and will continue to support their overall solvency and capital positions. That said, we think that the sector's buffers could be eroded if war escalates as it will lead to a more meaningful asset quality deterioration or materially higher exposure to financial and nonfinancial risks.
Key Banking Sector Risks In EMEA
The table below presents S&P Global Ratings' views about the key risks and risk trends affecting the banking sectors in EMEA where we rate banks. For more information, see the latest Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) on a given country. According to our methodology, BICRAs fall into groups from '1' to '10', ranging from what we view as the lowest-risk banking systems (group '1') to the highest-risk (group '10').
Selected Research
We recently published several articles highlighting our views on EMEA banking sectors:
- Top Nordic Banks Continued Strong Performance In Q1, May 28, 2024
- Czech Banking Sector Will Benefit From Receding Economic Risks; Ceska Sporitelna Outlook To Stable From Negative, May 16, 2024
- Your Three Minutes In Banking: When Rates Drop, GCC Banks' Profitability Will Follow, May 14, 2024
- Bulletin: Turkish Banks' Economic Imbalances Expected To Unwind As Economy Gradually Rebalances, May 10, 2024
- Various Rating Actions On Israeli Banks On Increased Geopolitical Risks; All Outlooks Negative, May 02, 2024
- Your Three Minutes In Saudi Vision 2030: Credit Implications For Banks And Corporates, May 02, 2024
- U.K. Building Societies Go On The Front Foot With Bank Acquisitions, May 2, 2024
- Your Three Minutes In Banking: Saudi Banks May Turn To Alternative Funding Options, Apr. 30, 2024
- U.K. Banks Squeeze Another Quarter Of Solid Earnings From Higher Rates, Apr. 30, 2024
- Outlooks On Six Spanish Banks Revised To Positive On Stronger Profitability, Apr. 29, 2024
- Islamic Finance 2024-2025: Resilient Growth Anticipated Despite Missed Opportunities, Apr. 29, 2024
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment Update: April 2024, Apr. 26, 2024
- Your Three Minutes In Banking: Higher Minimum Reserve Requirements Will Dent Swiss Banks’ Profits, Apr. 26, 2024
- Unsecured Consumer Lending Will Drive U.K. Banks' Credit Losses To £4.4 Billion, Apr. 18, 2024
- Your Three Minutes In Climate Disclosure: Benefits And Limitations Of The Green Asset Ratio For EU Banks, Apr. 11, 2024
- Two Tunisian Banks Upgraded To 'CCC+' On Receding Macroeconomic Instability Risk; Outlooks Stable, Apr. 08, 2024
- Three Icelandic Banks Upgraded On Receding Economic Imbalances; Outlooks Stable, Apr. 04, 2024
- Bulletin: Nigerian Banks Are Confronted With The Lingering Naira Depreciation, Apr. 02, 2024
- Credit FAQ: GCC Banks' Climate Transition Journey Has Only Just Begun, Mar. 21, 2024
- Prolonged External Financing Constraints Could Lead To Greater Economic Imbalances For Kenya's Banking Industry, Mar. 21, 2024
- French Banks' Results Should Generally Strengthen In 2024 After A Mixed 2023, Mar. 21, 2024
- Outlooks On Three Egyptian Banks Revised To Positive Following Same Action On Sovereign; Ratings Affirmed, Mar. 21, 2024
- Global Shadow Banks Face Scrutiny As Risks Rise, Mar. 20, 2024
- Outlooks On Five Kazakhstani Banks Revised To Positive On Better Asset Quality, Regulatory Oversight; Ratings Affirmed, Mar. 19, 2024
- Your Three Minutes In Banking: European Banks' Earnings Top Equity Costs, For Now, Mar. 19, 2024
- CreditWeek: What Have We Learned In The Year Since SVB Triggered Turmoil In The Banking Sector? Mar. 14, 2024
- Ten Takeaways From The Big European Bank Giveaway, Mar. 14, 2024
- Credit FAQ: How Our Bank Ratings Consider Interest Rate Risk In The Banking Book, Mar. 14, 2024
- Eurozone Banks: ECB's Operational Framework Review Backs The Status Quo, Mar. 14, 2024
- Your Three Minutes In Banking: BCBS Calls Time On G-SIB Window Dressing, Mar. 13, 2024
- Various Rating Actions Taken On Portuguese Banks Amid Easing Economic Risks, Mar. 12, 2024
- Six Takeaways From U.K. Banks' Full-Year 2023 Results, Mar. 06, 2024
- Supervising Cyber: How The ECB Stress Test Will Shape The Agenda, Mar. 06, 2024
- U.K. Proposal Would Unlock Resolution Funding For Small Banks, Mar. 05, 2024
- Tech Disruption In Retail Banking: Heavy Digital Investment Helps U.K. Banks Fend Off Competition, Mar. 04, 2024
Economic, Sovereign, And Other Research
- Global Economic Update: Policy And Exchange Rate Forecasts Revised On New Fed Funds Rate Expectations, May 02, 2024
- Private Markets Monthly, April 2024: Private Credit Is A Growing Segment Of Nonbank Finance, April 26, 2024
- Global Credit Conditions Update April 2024: Geopolitical Risks Rise On Iran-Israel Conflict Expansion Despite Immediate Reprieve, April 15, 2024
- Real Estate Digest, April 8, 2024
- Credit Conditions Europe Q2 2024: Credit Heals, Defense Shields, March 27, 2024
- Sovereign Debt 2024: Developed European Governments To Borrow About $1.84 Trillion in 2024, Feb. 27, 2024
- Sovereign Debt 2024: EMEA Emerging Market Borrowing To Slow To $492 Billion As The Cycle Turns, Feb. 27, 2024
- Sector And Industry Variables | Criteria | Financial Institutions | Banks: Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment Update: March 2024, March 26, 2024
- Credit Conditions Emerging Markets Q2 2024: Unmet Expectations Could Heighten Risks, March 27, 2024
- An Update On Securities Firm Anchors By Country (February 2024), Feb. 20, 2024
- Downside Risks Abound For Financing Companies In 2024, Feb. 19, 2024
- Credit FAQ: How We Assess Stablecoins And Why It Matters, Feb. 15, 2024
Updated Rating Methodology
- Criteria | Financial Institutions | General: Risk-Adjusted Capital Framework Methodology, April 30, 2024
- Updated Financial Institutions Risk-Adjusted Capital Framework Methodology Published, April 30, 2024
- RFC Process Summary: RFC Process Summary: Risk-Adjusted Capital Framework Methodology, April 30, 2024
BICRA Changes
Over the past two quarters, we made the following changes to our BICRAs.
Armenia
We have revised our economic risk score for Armenia to '7' from '8'. We consider credit risk in the Armenian economy has improved, largely because the share of foreign currency loans in total lending has declined and we expect it to stay subdued. We expect the proportion of foreign currency loans in the Armenian banking system will reduce further over the next few years despite a likely weaker exchange rate. With this change to the economic risk score, we have also revised our economic risk trend for Armenia to stable from positive.
Czech Republic
We have revised our economic risk trend for Czech Republic to stable from negative. Economic activity in the Czech Republic will improve thanks to a recovery of private consumption and business investments. We expect the Czech economy will return to growth in 2024. The disinflation process in the country and ongoing monetary easing will likely contribute to higher household consumption and corporate investments. This improving economic environment will be beneficial to banks. We believe risks to the Czech banking sector are receding. Their high earnings generation capacity and resilient portfolio quality, despite challenging operating conditions over the last 18 months, are proof of structural strengths, in our view.
Iceland
We have revised our BICRA for Iceland to Group '4' from Group '5' and our economic risk score to '4' from '5'. We consider that economic risks facing Icelandic banks have faded with the stabilizing housing market. Residential house price growth has slowed since the mid-2022 peak. The 12-month price inflation fell steeply over 2023 and real prices corrected by 3.5%. Still, underlying demand appears robust and transaction activity has rebounded over recent months, albeit below the pre-pandemic average, resulting in some upward pressure on housing prices. This is partly explained by government measures to support households affected by the volcanic activity on the Reykjanes peninsula and the town of Grindavik, including the government's purchase of 89 new properties for residents in the area. With these changes, we have also revised our economic risk trend for Iceland to stable from positive.
Israel
We have revised our BICRA for Israel to Group '4' from Group '3' and our economic risk score to '4' from '3'. We consider that economic risks for Israeli banks have increased due to the higher geopolitical risk that Israel faces. An escalation of the conflict presents additional security and social risks for Israel, lowering the resiliency of the domestic economy. We think economic prospects remain weak for 2024 and while we expect growth will rebound in 2025 it remains uncertain whether there could be longer-term scarring for the Israeli economy. We expect asset quality to deteriorate, particularly in sectors more affected by the direct and indirect consequences of the war. We forecast credit losses will remain elevated after having reached about 50 bps in 2023. The economic risk trend remains negative. Although we expect strong profitability and good capitalization will help banks to cushion the impact of the more negative environment, we think the sector's buffer could be eroded if the geopolitical scenario further deteriorates if war escalates as it could lead to meaningful asset quality deterioration, particularly in the real estate sector, considerable decline in profitability, or materially higher exposure to financial and nonfinancial risks.
Kazakhstan
We have revised our economic risk score for Kazakhstan to '7' from '8'. We believe the Kazakhstani banking sector has shown better resilience to macroeconomic challenges in recent years, amid exacerbated geopolitical risks in the region. The system's asset quality metrics and financial performance have been significantly better than our expectations. Kazakhstan's banking industry has recovered from a protracted correction and credit risks are now under control. We estimate that systemwide nonperforming loans (NPLs; defined as Stage 3 under International Financial Reporting Standards) are likely to remain broadly stable at about 8% in 2024 versus about 18% in 2020. We expect the recovery will continue and support banking sector operating performance at least through 2024. We forecast retail lending will expand up to 20% in nominal terms in 2024 compared with an average of 25%-30% in 2022-2023. The regulator has signaled that it will keep the fast-growing retail segment under control, and we therefore anticipate a tighter regulatory environment and a gradual cooling of the housing market. We think that retail lending is likely to peak, given base effects and limits on the ability of the household sector to absorb substantially more debt.
We have also revised our industry risk trend for Kazakhstan to positive from stable. We acknowledge that the banking regulator has taken several steps to strengthen banking supervision. These include conducting a systemwide asset quality review in 2019, transition to supervisory review and evaluation process practices, and introducing a number of measures (including variable risk weights for capital adequacy ratios) to limit banks' risk appetites. However, the regulator tends to address problems on a case-by-case basis. Although we observe enhancements in financial oversight, we still consider that Kazakhstan's banking regulator lacks independence and can be subject to political interference. The Kazakhstani banking system has largely resolved the interruption of Russian banking activities in 2022 in an orderly manner through market-based solutions with regulatory support, which helped to avoid a banking crisis and operational disruption. The Kazakhstani regulator supported the banking sector by absorbing the short-term effect of the shock amid a rapid realignment of market structure.
Portugal
We have revised our economic risk score for Portugal to '5' from '6'. We have observed continuous improvement in Portugal's external financial position and public sector indebtedness. For more than a decade, Portugal's private sector has also deleveraged, and its indebtedness is now better aligned with its debt capacity, which reduces credit risk for banks.
We have also revised our industry risk trend for Portugal to positive from stable. This is because deleveraging has also strengthened Portuguese banks' funding profiles, with domestic retail deposits emerging as banks' primary source of funding and reliance on external sources kept at lower levels. Portuguese banks currently hold deposits in excess of loans and thus have minimal reliance on external funding. Indeed, the banking system's net external position turned negative (i.e., banks became external lenders) in 2021 and has remained negative since then. In 2023, Portuguese banks repaid about €7 billion of targeted longer-term refinancing operations to the European Central Bank, of which the remaining balance amounts to about €4.7 billion, and managed to maintain sound liquidity thereafter. Banks have tapped the foreign capital markets only occasionally and primarily to build up their minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities, rather than to fulfill pure funding needs. But we think they could access them if needed. The ongoing improvement of Portugal's sovereign creditworthiness should further support investors' appetite for Portuguese risk, including for Portuguese banks.
Moreover, a favorable interest rate environment and solid efficiency have boosted banks' profitability in Portugal. Portuguese banks' profitability improved notably in 2023, outperforming our expectations. The rapid increase of interest rates pushed up banks' net interest income significantly (banks' net interest margin reached 2.6% in the first nine months of 2023 compared with 1.5% in the first nine months of 2022), given that most lending is at floating rates. Deposits migrated from demand to time deposits to a larger extent than in other countries, but still banks were able to contain the increase in funding costs. In addition, previous years' efforts on the cost side paid off and the efficiency ratio further improved, to an estimated 45% at Sept. 30, 2023, comparing well with that of peers. The containment of the cost of risk at 47 bps also supported banks' bottom lines. As a result, the Portuguese banking system posted a return on average equity of 14.6% for the first nine months of 2023, which compares well with the average 4.5% reported in the past five years, and we think the improvement is sustainable. Indeed, we expect banks' 2024 profitability will remain solid. Finally, previously wide differences in performance among peers have reduced.
Spain
We have revised our industry risk trend for Spain to positive from stable. The return of positive interest rates significantly strengthened Spanish banks' profitability after years in which they could not meet their cost of capital. The rapid increase in interest rates significantly boosted earnings, given Spanish banks' focus on traditional commercial banking, largely floating asset bases, and funding profiles that are weighted toward cheap retail deposits. Banks' profitability also benefited from their strong focus on efficiency in recent years. Spanish banks meaningfully downsized their operating structures organically and through consolidation. Moreover, problem loans and the cost of risk remained contained, despite the rising cost of living and increased financing costs for borrowers. Although the extraordinary tax on revenue imposed by the government has reduced banks' bottom-line profits, it proved to be affordable, given their strong earnings.
Profitability prospects remain solid, in our view. We forecast that interest rates will start to fall from mid-2024, which will put some pressure on earnings. However, we feel confident that Spanish banks will maintain sound returns going forward. Growth prospects for the Spanish economy are sound, and growth will outpace that of European peers. In addition, the private sector has meaningfully reduced leverage over more than a decade, placing households and corporates in a good position, and the country has made progress in correcting external imbalances.
Türkiye
We have revised our economic risk trend for Türkiye to positive from stable. In our base case, we expect economic imbalances to unwind, curbing demand for credit, moderating real estate prices, and slowing the economy, amid rising portfolio inflows and narrowing current account deficits. As a result, we anticipate Turkish banks will face elevated, but manageable credit losses.
We forecast that nominal loan growth will decelerate to about 40% in 2024, indicating a contraction in real terms, which should help curb domestic demand. We expect Türkiye's economic activity to slow over the next two years, so that real GDP growth decreases to 3%, from an average of 5% in 2022-2023. A prolonged period of monetary tightening, combined with better coordination between monetary, fiscal, and income policies, is expected to help gradually rebalance the economy.
Macroeconomic conditions will remain tight for some time, which is likely to erode asset quality for banks. We therefore expect credit losses to reach 190 bps by the end of 2024, up from an estimated 138 bps at end-2023. Nonperforming loans' inflows will increase, but the net effect of that on the NPL ratio will be softened given our expectation that nominal loan growth will remain elevated, banks will continue to restructure loans (while they might not recognize them as delinquent), to sell and write down NPLs.
Table 2
Ratings component scores: top 50 European banks | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Institution | Operating company long-term ICR/outlook | Anchor | Business position | Capital and earnings | Risk position | Funding and liquidity | CRA adjustment | SACP/GCP | Type of support | Number of notches support | Additional factors | |||||||||||||
Austria | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Erste Group Bank AG | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate (0) | Strong/Strong (+1) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Raiffeisen Bank International AG | A-/Negative | bbb+ | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Moderate (-1) | Strong/Strong (+1) | 0 | a- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Belgium | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Belfius Bank SA/NV | A/Stable | a- | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Moderate (-1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
KBC Bank N.V. | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Denmark | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Danske Bank A/S | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Moderate (-1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Nykredit Realkredit A/S | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Finland | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Nordea Bank Abp | AA-/Stable | a- | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a+ | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
France | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
BNP Paribas S.A. | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Very Strong (+2) | Adequate (0) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
BPCE S.A. | A/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Credit Mutuel Group | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Credit Agricole S.A. | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
La Banque Postale | A+/Negative | bbb+ | Adequate (0) | Moderate (-1) | Moderate (-1) | Strong/Strong (+1) | 0 | bbb | Group | 4 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Société Générale Société anonyme | A/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (0) | Adequate (0) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb+ | ALAC | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Germany | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Commerzbank AG | A-/Positive | bbb+ | Moderate (-1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb | ALAC | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Cooperative Banking Sector Germany | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Strong/Strong (+1) | 0 | a+ | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Deutsche Bank AG | A/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (0) | Adequate (0) | Moderate (-1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 1 | bbb+ | ALAC | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Volkswagen Bank GmbH | BBB+/Stable | bbb+ | Constrained (-2) | Very Strong (+2) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb+ | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Greece | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Alpha Bank S.A. | BB-/Positive | bb | Adequate (0) | Constrained (-1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bb- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Eurobank S.A. | BB/Positive | bb | Adequate (0) | Constrained (-1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 1 | bb | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Piraeus Bank S.A. | BB-/Positive | bb | Adequate (0) | Constrained (-1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bb- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Ireland | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
AIB Group PLC§ | A/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Moderate (-1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb+ | ALAC | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Bank of Ireland Group PLC§ | A/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Moderate (-1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb+ | ALAC | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Israel | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Bank Hapoalim B.M. | A-/Negative | bbb | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Moderate (-1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb+ | Sov | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M. | A-/Negative | bbb | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Moderate (-1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 1 | bbb+ | Sov | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Italy | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA | BBB/Stable | bbb- | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb+ | None | 0 | -1 | |||||||||||||
Mediobanca SpA | BBB/Stable | bbb- | Adequate (0) | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Iccrea Banca SpA | BBB-/Stable | bbb- | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Constrained (-2) | Strong/Strong (+1) | 0 | bbb- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
UniCredit SpA | BBB/Stable | bbb | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb+ | None | 0 | -1 | |||||||||||||
Netherlands | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
ABN AMRO Bank N.V. | A/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | -1 | bbb+ | ALAC | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Cooperatieve Rabobank U.A. | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
ING Bank N.V. | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Norway | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
DNB Bank ASA | AA-/Stable | a- | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a+ | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Spain | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. | A/Stable | bbb | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Banco de Sabadell S.A. | BBB+/Positive | bbb | Adequate (0) | Adequate (0) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Banco Santander S.A. | A+/Stable | bbb | Very Strong (+2) | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
CaixaBank S.A. | A-/Positive | bbb | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb+ | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Sweden | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB | A+/Stable | a- | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Svenska Handelsbanken AB | AA-/Stable | a- | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a+ | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Swedbank AB | A+/Stable | a- | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Moderate (-1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Switzerland | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
UBS Group AG§ | A+/Stable | a- | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Moderate (-1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Raiffeisen Schweiz Genossenschaft | AA-/Stable | a- | Adequate (0) | Very Strong (+2) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a+ | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Zuercher Kantonalbank | AAA/Stable | a- | Strong (+1) | Very Strong (+2) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Strong (0) | 0 | aa- | GRE | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
U.K. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Barclays PLC§ | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Moderate (-1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
HSBC Holdings PLC§ | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Strong/Adequate (0) | 0 | a | ALAC | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Lloyds Banking Group PLC§ | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Nationwide Building Society | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
The Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC (NatWest Group PLC)§ | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Standard Chartered PLC§ | A+/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate (0) | Adequate (0) | Adequate (0) | Strong/Strong (+1) | 0 | a- | ALAC | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Source: S&P Global Ratings; data as of May 30, 2024. In the "Type of Support" column, "None" includes some banks where ratings uplift because of support factors may be possible but none is currently included. For example, this column includes some systemically important banks where systemic importance results in no rating uplift. §Holding company; the rating reflects that on the main operating company. ICR--Issuer credit rating. GRE--Government-related entity. SACP--Stand-alone credit profile. Sys. Imp.--Systemically important. ALAC--Additional loss-absorbing capacity. GCP--Group credit profile. CRA--Comparative Ratings Adjustment. N/A--Not applicable. Sov—government support. |
Table 3
Ratings component scores: top 20 CEEMEA banks | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Institution | Operating company long-term ICR/outlook | Anchor | Business position | Capital and earnings | Risk position | Funding and liquidity | CRA adjustment | SACP/GCP | Type of support | Number of notches support | Additional factors | |||||||||||||
Bahrain | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Ahli United Bank B.S.C. | BBB+/Stable | bb+ | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb | Group | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Arab Banking Corp. B.S.C. | BBB-/Stable | bb+ | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Jordan | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Arab Bank PLC | B+/Stable | bb | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Moderate (-1) | Strong/Strong (+1) | 0 | bb+ | None | 0 | -3 | |||||||||||||
Kuwait | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
National Bank of Kuwait S.A.K. | A/Stable | bbb | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a- | Sov | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Qatar | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Qatar National Bank (Q.P.S.C.) | A+/Stable | bbb- | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb | GRE | 4 | 0 | |||||||||||||
The Commercial Bank (P.S.Q.C.) | A-/Stable | bbb- | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Moderate (-1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb- | Sov | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Oman | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
BankMuscat S.A.O.G. | BB+/Positive | bb | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Moderate (-1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bb+ | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Saudi Arabia | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
The Saudi National Bank | A-/Stable | bbb | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Al Rajhi Bank | A-/Stable | bbb | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | a- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Riyad Bank | A-/Stable | bbb | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb+ | Sov | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Banque Saudi Fransi | A-/Stable | bbb | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Moderate (-1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb | Sov | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Arab National Bank | A-/Stable | bbb | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Moderate (-1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb | Sov | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
The Saudi Investment Bank | BBB/Positive | bbb | Moderate (-1) | Strong (+1) | Moderate (-1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb- | Sov | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
United Arab Emirates | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Mashreqbank | A/Stable | bbb- | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb | Sov | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
First Abu Dhabi Bank P.J.S.C. | AA-/Stable | bbb- | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Adequate/Strong (0) | 0 | a- | GRE | 2 | 1 | |||||||||||||
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank PJSC | A/Positive | bbb- | Strong (+1) | Strong (+1) | Moderate (-1) | Adequate/Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb | GRE | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
Source: S&P Global Ratings; data as of May 30, 2024. In the "Type of Support" column, "None" includes some banks where ratings uplift because of support factors may be possible but none is currently included. For example, this column includes some systemically important banks where systemic importance results in no rating uplift. §Holding company; the rating reflects that on the main operating company. ICR--Issuer credit rating. GRE--Government-related entity. SACP--Stand-alone credit profile. Sys. Imp.--Systemically important. ALAC--Additional loss-absorbing capacity. GCP--Group credit profile. CRA--Comparative Ratings Adjustment. N/A--Not applicable. Sov—government support. |
Table 4
Ratings component scores: nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Institution | Industry | Operating company long-term ICR/outlook | Anchor | Business position | Capital and earnings | Risk position | Funding and liquidity | CRA adjustment | SACP/GCP | Type of support | Number of notches support | Additional factors | ||||||||||||||
Azerbaijan | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Entrepreneurship Development Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan | NBFI -- Finco | BB-/Positive | b | Adequate (0) | Very strong (+2) | Moderate (-1) | Adequate/ Adequate (0) | +1 | bb- | None | 0 | 0 | ||||||||||||||
Cyprus | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Ronin Europe Ltd. | NBFI -- Securities Firm | B+/Stable | bb- | Constrained (-2) | Very strong (+2) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/ Adequate (0) | -1 | b+ | None | 0 | 0 | ||||||||||||||
Denmark | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Saxo Bank A/S | NBFI -- Securities Firm | A-/Negative | bbb- | Moderate (-1) | Very strong (+2) | Adequate (0) | Strong / Strong (+1) | -1 | bbb | ALAC | 2 | 0 | ||||||||||||||
Finland | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
LocalTapiola Finance Ltd | NBFI -- Finco | BBB/Stable | bbb- | Moderate (-1) | Adequate (0) | Moderate (-1) | Adequate/ Adequate (0) | 0 | bb | Group | 3 | 0 | ||||||||||||||
Kazakhstan | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
OnlineKazFinance Microfinance Organization JSC | NBFI -- Finco | B-/Stable | b | Moderate (-1) | Moderate (0) | Moderate (-1) | Adequate/ Adequate (0) | 0 | b- | None | 0 | 0 | ||||||||||||||
Saudi Arabia | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Saudi Real Estate Refinance Company | NBFI -- Finco | A-/Stable | bbb- | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Moderate (-1) | Moderate/ Adequate (-1) | 0 | bb+ | GRE | 4 | 0 | ||||||||||||||
United Kingdom | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Marex Group PLC | NBFI -- Securities Firm | BBB-/Stable | bbb- | Adequate (0) | Strong (+1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/ Adequate (0) | 0 | bbb | None | 0 | -1 | ||||||||||||||
NewDay Group (Jersey) Ltd. | NBFI -- Finco | B+/Stable | bb+ | Moderate (-1) | Constrained (-3) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/ Adequate (0) | +1 | b+ | None | 0 | 0 | ||||||||||||||
Together Financial Services Ltd. | NBFI -- Finco | BB/Stable | bb+ | Moderate (-1) | Adequate (0) | Adequate (0) | Adequate/ Adequate (0) | 0 | bb | None | 0 | 0 | ||||||||||||||
Source: S&P Global Ratings; data as of May 30, 2024. ICR--Issuer credit rating. GRE--Government-related entity. SACP--Stand-alone credit profile. Sys. Imp.--Systemically important. ALAC--Additional loss-absorbing capacity. GCP--Group credit profile. CRA--Comparative Ratings Adjustment. N/A--Not applicable. Sov—government support. |
Table 5
Recent rating actions: EMEA banks | ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Date of action | Bank | Country | To | From | ||||||
May 23, 2024 | BFA Tenedora de Acciones, S.A.U. | Spain | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | BB+/Stable/B | ||||||
May 22, 2024 | Carrefour Banque S.A. | France | BBB/Negative/A-2 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
May 21, 2024 | Jordan Islamic Bank | Jordan | NR | B+/Stable/B | ||||||
May 17, 2024 | Alior Bank S.A | Poland | BB+/Positive/B | BB+/Stable/B | ||||||
May 17, 2024 | mBank S.A | Poland | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
May 17, 2024 | VP Bank AG | Liechtenstein | A-/Negative/A-2 | A-/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
May 16, 2024 | Ceska Sporitelna, a.s. | Czech Republic | A/Stable/A-1 | A/Negative/A-1 | ||||||
May 10, 2024 | Banco BPI S.A. | Portugal | BBB+/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
May 7, 2024 | Permanent TSB Group Holdings PLC | Ireland | BB+/Positive/B | BB+/Stable/B | ||||||
May 7, 2024 | Permanent TSB PLC | Ireland | BBB+/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
May 2, 2024 | Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M. | Israel | A-/Negative/A-2 | A/Negative/A-1 | ||||||
May 2, 2024 | Bank Hapoalim B.M. (New York branch) | Israel | A-/Negative/A-2 | A/Negative/A-1 | ||||||
Apr 30, 2024 | Bank of Aland PLC | Finland | NR | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
Apr 30, 2024 | Ibercaja Banco S.A. | Spain | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | BBB-/Stable/A-3 | ||||||
Apr 30, 2024 | CaixaBank, S.A. | Spain | A-/Positive/A-2 | A-/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
Apr 30, 2024 | Banco de Sabadell S.A. | Spain | BBB+/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
Apr 30, 2024 | Cajamar Caja Rural S.C.C. | Spain | BB+/Positive/B | BB+/Stable/B | ||||||
Apr 30, 2024 | Banco de Credito Social Cooperativo S.A. | Spain | BB+/Positive/B | BB+/Stable/B | ||||||
Apr 30, 2024 | Abanca Corporacion Bancaria S.A. | Spain | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | BBB-/Stable/A-3 | ||||||
Apr 26, 2024 | Arion Bank | Iceland | NR | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
Apr 8, 2024 | Banque de Tunisie et des Emirats | Tunisia | CCC+/Stable/C | CCC/Negative/C | ||||||
Apr 8, 2024 | Arab Tunisian Bank | Tunisia | CCC+/Stable/C | CCC/Negative/C | ||||||
Apr 4, 2024 | Landsbankinn hf | Iceland | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | BBB/Positive/A-2 | ||||||
Apr 4, 2024 | Islandsbanki hf | Iceland | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | BBB/Positive/A-2 | ||||||
Apr 4, 2024 | Arion Bank | Iceland | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
Apr 1, 2024 | BankMuscat | Oman | BB+/Positive/B | BB+/Stable/B | ||||||
Apr 1, 2024 | ForteBank JSC | Kazakhstan | NR | BB-/Positive/B | ||||||
Mar 22, 2024 | First City Monument Bank | Nigeria | B-/Negative/B | B-/Stable/B | ||||||
Mar 22, 2024 | Clydesdale Bank PLC | United Kingdom | A-/Watch Pos/A-2 | A-/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
Mar 22, 2024 | Virgin Money UK PLC | United Kingdom | BBB-/Watch Pos/A-3 | BBB-/Stable/A-3 | ||||||
Mar 21, 2024 | Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. | Egypt | B-/Positive/B | B-/Stable/B | ||||||
Mar 21, 2024 | Banque Misr S.A.E. | Egypt | B-/Positive/B | B-/Stable/B | ||||||
Mar 21, 2024 | National Bank of Egypt S.A.E | Egypt | B-/Positive/B | B-/Stable/B | ||||||
Mar 19, 2024 | Nurbank JSC | Kazakhstan | B-/Positive/B | B-/Stable/B | ||||||
Mar 19, 2024 | Kaspi Bank JSC | Kazakhstan | BB/Positive/B | BB/Stable/B | ||||||
Mar 19, 2024 | Halyk Bank JSC | Kazakhstan | BB+/Positive/B | BB+/Stable/B | ||||||
Mar 19, 2024 | ForteBank JSC | Kazakhstan | BB-/Positive/B | BB-/Stable/B | ||||||
Mar 19, 2024 | Bank CenterCredit JSC | Kazakhstan | BB-/Positive/B | BB-/Stable/B | ||||||
Mar 18, 2024 | BPER Banca SpA | Italy | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | |||||||
Mar 15, 2024 | Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank | United Arab Emirates | A/Positive/A-1 | A/Stable/A-1 | ||||||
Mar 13, 2024 | Kommunalkredit Austria AG | Austria | BBB/Stable/A-2 | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | ||||||
Mar 12, 2024 | Banco Comercial Portugues S.A | Portugal | BBB-/Positive/A-3 | BBB-/Stable/A-3 | ||||||
Mar 5, 2024 | KA Finanz AG | Austria | NR | AA+/Stable/A-1+ | ||||||
Mar 5, 2024 | Banco Santander Totta | Portugal | A-/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Positive/A-2 | ||||||
Feb 26, 2024 | Banca Popolare di Sondrio S.p.A | Italy | BBB-/Stable/A-3 | |||||||
Feb 22, 2024 | Iccrea Banca S.p.A. | Italy | BBB-/Stable/A-3 | BB+/Positive/B | ||||||
Feb 14, 2024 | Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG | Germany | BBB-/Negative/A-3 | BBB/Negative/A-2 | ||||||
Feb 6, 2024 | Aegon Bank N.V | Netherlands | BBB+/Negative/A-2 | A-/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
Feb 9, 2024 | Banco de Sabadell | Spain | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | BBB/Positive/A-2 | ||||||
Feb 9, 2024 | Ardshinbank CJSC | Armenia | BB-/Stable/B | B+/Positive/B | ||||||
Jan 16, 2024 | Xalq Bank | Uzbekistan | B/Negative/B | B/Watch Neg/B | ||||||
Dec 20, 2023 | PASHA Bank | Azerbaijan | BB-/Stable/B | B+/Stable/B | ||||||
Dec 20, 2023 | Entrepreneurship Development Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan | Azerbaijan | BB-/Positive/B | BB-/Stable/B | ||||||
Dec 14, 2023 | Piraeus Financial Holdings S.A. | Greece | B/Positive/B | B-/Positive/B | ||||||
Dec 14, 2023 | Piraeus Bank S.A. | Greece | BB-/Positive/B | B+/Positive/B | ||||||
Dec 14, 2023 | National Bank of Greece S.A. | Greece | BB/Positive/B | BB-/Positive/B | ||||||
Dec 14, 2023 | Eurobank Holdings | Greece | B+/Positive/B | B/Positive/B | ||||||
Dec 14, 2023 | Eurobank S.A | Greece | BB/Positive/B | BB-/Positive/B | ||||||
Dec 14, 2023 | Alpha Services and Holdings Societe Anonyme | Greece | B/Positive/B | B/Stable/B | ||||||
Dec 14, 2023 | Alpha Bank SA | Greece | BB-/Positive/B | BB-/Stable/B | ||||||
Dec 14, 2023 | Aegean Baltic Bank S.A | Greece | B+/Positive/B | B+/Stable/B | ||||||
Dec 14, 2023 | Bank of Cyprus | Cyprus | BB/Positive/B | BB-/Positive/B | ||||||
Dec 12, 2023 | Hypo Vorarlberg Bank | Austria | A+/Negative/A-1 | A+/Stable/A-1 | ||||||
Dec 11, 2023 | Ecobank Nigeria Ltd. | Nigeria | B-/Negative/B | B-/Stable/B | ||||||
Dec 8, 2023 | Deutsche Bank | Germany | A/Stable/A-1 | A-/Positive/A-2 | ||||||
Nov 27, 2023 | Lansforsakringar Bank | Sweden | A/Positive/A-1 | A/Stable/A-1 | ||||||
Nov 27, 2023 | Lansforsakringar AB | Sweden | A/Positive/A-1 | A/Stable/A-1 | ||||||
Nov 23, 2023 | Credit Municipal de Paris | France | AA-/Negative/A-1+ | NA | ||||||
Nov 23, 2023 | Ahli United Bank | Bahrain | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | BBB/Positive/A-2 | ||||||
Nov 17, 2023 | Deutsche Pfandbriefbank | Germany | BBB/Negative/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
Nov 17, 2023 | Landsbankinn hf. | Iceland | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
Nov 17, 2023 | Islandsbanki hf | Iceland | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
Nov 17, 2023 | Arion Bank | Iceland | BBB/Stable/A-2 | BBB/Negative/A-2 | ||||||
Nov 14, 2023 | Bank Polska Kasa Opieki | Poland | BBB+/Positive/A-2 | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
Nov 10, 2023 | Commerzbank AG | Germany | A-/Positive/A-2 | A-/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
Oct 31, 2023 | Freedom Finance Global PLC | Kazakhstan | B/Negative/B | B/Watch Neg/B | ||||||
Oct 31, 2023 | Freedom Holding Corp. | Kazakhstan | B-/Negative/-- | B-/Watch Neg/-- | ||||||
Oct 31, 2023 | Freedom Finance JSC | Kazakhstan | B/Negative/B | B/Watch Neg/B | ||||||
Oct 31, 2023 | Israel Discount Bank Ltd. | Israel | BBB+/Negative/A-2 | BBB+/Positive/A-2 | ||||||
Oct 31, 2023 | Mizrahi Tefahot Bank Ltd. | Israel | A-/Negative/A-2 | A-/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
Oct 31, 2023 | Bank Hapoalim B.M. | Israel | A/Negative/A-1 | A/Stable/A-1 | ||||||
Oct 31, 2023 | Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M. | Israel | A/Negative/A-1 | A/Stable/A-1 | ||||||
Oct 25, 2023 | Iccrea Banca SpA | Italy | BB+/Positive/B | BB+/Stable/B | ||||||
Oct 25, 2023 | Muganbank OJSC | Azerbaijan | NR | B-/Stable/B | ||||||
Oct 24, 2023 | Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. | Egypt | B-/Stable/B | B/Stable/B | ||||||
Oct 24, 2023 | Banque Misr (S.A.E.) | Egypt | B-/Stable/B | B/Stable/B | ||||||
Oct 24, 2023 | National Bank of Egypt (S.A.E) | Egypt | B-/Stable/B | B/Stable/B | ||||||
Oct 23, 2023 | Bank Alliance JSC | Ukraine | CCC+/Stable/C | CCC/Developing/C | ||||||
Oct 20, 2023 | Central Bank of Savings Banks Finland | Finland | A-/Stable/A-2 | A-/Negative/A-2 | ||||||
Oct 6, 2023 | L-Bank | Germany | AA+/Positive/A-1+ | AA+/Stable/A-1 | ||||||
Oct 5, 2023 | BankMuscat | Oman | BB+/Stable/B | BB/Positive/B | ||||||
Oct 5, 2023 | Bonum Bank | Finland | BBB/Positive/A-2 | BBB/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
Oct 3, 2023 | Dexia Crediop SpA | Italy | NR | BBB/Stable/A-2 | ||||||
Source: S&P Global Ratings. |
This report does not constitute a rating action.
Primary Credit Analyst: | Natalia Yalovskaya, London + 44 20 7176 3407; natalia.yalovskaya@spglobal.com |
Secondary Contacts: | Elena Iparraguirre, Madrid + 34 91 389 6963; elena.iparraguirre@spglobal.com |
Mohamed Damak, Dubai + 97143727153; mohamed.damak@spglobal.com | |
Nicolas Charnay, Frankfurt +49 69 3399 9218; nicolas.charnay@spglobal.com | |
Additional Contact: | Financial Institutions EMEA; Financial_Institutions_EMEA_Mailbox@spglobal.com |
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