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U.S. States' Fiscal 2023 Liabilities: Stable Debt, With Pension And OPEB Funding Trending Favorably

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U.S. States' Fiscal 2023 Liabilities: Stable Debt, With Pension And OPEB Funding Trending Favorably

Although State Debt Levels Were Steady In 2023, Waning Federal Stimulus And Lower Borrowing Costs Could Increase Borrowing In Coming Years

U.S. state debt levels remained relatively flat in fiscal 2023 compared with 2022, declining a modest 1.3%. S&P Global Ratings attributes this year-over-year decline to a combination of factors, including elevated borrowing costs and inflation-induced cost pressures, record-high liquidity levels due to large budget surpluses, and substantial COVID-19 relief stimulus that could be used for one-time purposes, making pay-as-you-go (paygo) funding of capital expenditures a more attractive alternative to debt financing.

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The rate-cutting cycle in the U.S. began with a 50-basis-point cut at the Sept. 18, 2024, Federal Open Market Committee meeting. S&P Global Economics believes that the Fed will continue easing monetary policy in the coming year through a regular series of interest-rate cuts. Our baseline outlook envisions a steady, spaced-out series of rate cuts that will help the Fed engineer a soft landing--where demand stays close to potential while the last bit of excess inflation evaporates. We believe the federal funds rate will fall to 3.00%-3.25% by the end of 2025 from the current 4.75%-5.00%, with another 50 basis points (bps) of cuts by the end of 2024 and 100 bps of cuts anticipated in 2025. For more information see "Economic Outlook U.S. Q4 2024: Growth And Rates Start Shifting To Neutral," published Sept. 24, 2024, on RatingsDirect.

Before the September cut, the Fed's 5.25%-5.50% target range challenged states to achieve significant savings through financings; however, lower rates in light of recent Fed actions and those anticipated continue to make the issuance environment more favorable. Given that the higher rate environment has reduced traditional refunding opportunities, some states have opted for optional extraordinary redemptions and tenders to redeploy cash and realize savings. New sale issuances have accelerated in 2024 because states have needed to balance the objective of funding critical state programs with long-term debt while striving to maintain rainy-day funds and other liquidity, thereby providing stability to state finances if an economic slowdown were to occur.

Inflation has begun to moderate in part due to the Fed's actions although it continues to adversely affect costs. Project costs have often increased well above the overall rate of inflation, with some states reporting they have revised project estimates upward by more than 30%. States have not made significant adjustments to their capital plans in general and, where possible, have leveraged American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) and Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) funds that will continue to flow into the economy over the next several years. ARPA dollars must be obligated by December 2024 and spent by the end of December 2026. The IIJA, which authorized $1.2 trillion for transportation and infrastructure spending, requires that $550 billion be spent before 2026. For example, Tennessee and Georgia have both funded their respective capital budgets with cash on hand, reducing their debt issuance expectations for fiscal years 2024 and 2025.

Since 2019, State Debt Burdens Have Generally Declined As A Share Of Real GSP And Personal Income

When evaluating a state's debt burden, S&P Global Ratings generally begins with a review of historical data. The trend of historical results and our understanding of the reasons for those trends inform our view of whether the debt burden will go up or down. We also consider a state's economic environment, our expectations for its economic growth, and that growth's likely impact on the debt burden in the future. Table 1 shows that, since 2019, the median state's debt burden has modestly decreased by most measures, including debt to personal income, debt as a percent of expenditures, and debt to real gross state product (GSP). On average, net direct debt per capita has increased modestly over the same period. This metric could increase over time if capital plans are not appropriately scaled as some states' population growth slows or declines. The five states with the most debt outstanding--are California, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Illinois--hold approximately 49% of state net direct debt outstanding (and account for about 26% of the U.S. population).

Table 1

U.S. state debt affordability over time
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Net debt service as a % of governmental expenditures 3.7 3.7 3.3 3 2.9
Net direct debt as a % of personal income 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7
Net direct debt as a % of real GSP 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4
Net direct debt per capita (mil. $) 940 932 1,000 1,006 1,067
GSP--Gross state product. Source: S&P Global Ratings.

S&P Global Economics' most recent forecast projects that U.S. GDP growth will slow to 1.8% in 2025 from 2.7% in 2024. States have a historically high level of liquidity that can be used to fund capital projects on a paygo basis, which will likely mitigate the negative impact that slowing economic growth would otherwise have on debt metrics. Therefore, we generally expect ratios will remain stable in the near-to-medium term. Many states, particularly those with larger debt burdens, employ robust debt management strategies and adhere to affordability requirements, all of which support our forward-looking view of stability when looking at median state debt burdens. We view a state's debt capacity and ability to pay debt service as correlated to its economic output, as taxes and fees generated by economic activity are the primary source to pay debt service. If generally favorable tax revenue trends reverse and the growth of state debt burdens begins to outpace growth of the revenue streams servicing them, it could suggest fiscal stress and a decreasing capacity to service debt. This is something we continually monitor throughout economic cycles.

State Current Costs For Debt, Pension, And OPEBs Tend To Correlate With The Size Of A State's Economy

States with high fixed costs, including debt, pension, and other postemployment benefit (OPEB) payments, typically have less flexibility to make necessary budget adjustments during periods of financial stress. We also expect that states with more rapid economic growth that have greater capital needs can generally support higher debt and liability levels.

Some states have increased debt burdens because they provide higher support for programs and projects that generally receive a greater proportion of funding from local governments. For example, Hawaii directly runs the public school, university, and community college systems. And Connecticut, in our view, generally provides a higher level of support to local needs resulting in a lower debt profile at the city and county level. Many states also have either constitutional or statutory requirements, or court-mandated minimums, to provide adequate educational funding, which can also lead to higher debt burdens because it can be difficult for many states to reduce funding for these programs from a legal standpoint.

Charts 1 and 2 show fiscal 2023 combined debt, pension, and OPEB current costs relative to state population and general fund revenues. On a per capita basis, South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa, Florida, and Wyoming have the lowest current costs, with all states below $120 per capita. Six states--New Mexico, Massachusetts, Illinois, New Jersey, Hawaii, and Connecticut--had carrying costs in excess of $1,000 per capita in 2023. The median carrying cost per capita among states was $365, meaning that 25 states were below this threshold, and 25 were above it (chart 1).

Chart 1

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As a percentage of general fund revenues, four states had current costs representing 2% of revenues or lower (South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa, and Wyoming), while six states had current costs that exceeded 10% of revenues (Massachusetts, Maryland, Illinois, Hawaii, New Jersey, and Connecticut) (chart 2). The median current cost as a percentage of revenues was 4.4%, meaning that 25 states were above and 25 were below this level.

Chart 2

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Combined proportionate state net pension and OPEB liabilities declined 8.8% in fiscal 2023 relative to fiscal 2022 levels. The decline in net pension liabilities and the associated improvement in pension funded ratios are largely due to positive investment returns estimated at 12% for fiscal 2023. S&P Global Ratings expects asset performance will spur notable improvement in U.S. public pension funded ratios for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2024 (July 1, 2023-June 30, 2024), with an expected 16%-17% return, adding to the positive returns for fiscal 2023. Given the typical one-year delay from pension measurement to reporting, we expect to see the positive credit impact play out over the next two years. For more information, see our report, "Pension Brief: U.S. Public Pension Funded Ratios Continue Improvement In 2024," published July 25, 2024.

Median net OPEB liabilities also declined to 0.4% of GSP in fiscal2023, from 0.5% in fiscal 2022 but increased to 0.7% as a share of personal income from 0.6% in fiscal 2022. Net OPEB liabilities per capita declined 22.7% to $248 from $321. Since most U.S. OPEB plans fund retiree medical benefits on a paygo basis, they are exposed to higher liability and cost volatility than they would be if they were prefunded. States might improve OPEB funding by adding assets, reducing liabilities, or both. Since states differ in their legal flexibility to manage liabilities, options for some to contain rising costs could be limited. Some face legal restrictions in their ability to prefund an OPEB trust, forcing claims volatility and cost escalation to directly affect these states' budgets.

Chart 3

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Many States Still Fall Short Of The Minimum Funding Progress, Though Some Show Improvement

Despite efforts to improve funding discipline, many states are falling short of making meaningful progress on their aggregate pension and OPEB liabilities. Many are funding their retirement liabilities on an actuarial basis; however, if the underlying actuarial assumptions are not consistently met or if contribution methods are weak, actuarially determined contributions (ADCs) could fail to make meaningful funding progress. Our minimum funding progress (MFP) metric is an amount that we consider meaningful progress for a given year. Actual contributions exceeded MFP for 20 states in fiscal 2023, compared with 27 states in fiscal 2022. In fiscal 2023, notable excess contributions were made in Indiana, which directed $2.5 billion of reserve balances to reduce its pre-1996 teachers plan pension liability. Tennessee has made additional proactive contributions through its budget, totaling $500 million in 2023 and $550 million in 2024, to pay its net pension liability and OPEB liabilities, in excess of the ADC level and significantly above our MFP calculation. OPEB plan funding generally stands in contrast to funding for state pension plans. Most states continue to fund OPEB liabilities on a paygo basis in which annual funding is equal to the benefits distributed; assets are not set aside to accrue returns and help offset future costs.

Chart 4

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Since mid-2021, wage growth has caught up with benefits because inflation and associated effects, as well as tight labor market conditions, have spurred state and local employers to increase wages to attract and retain workers. From 2019 to 2023, average annual wages per state government employee increased 21.5%, to $76,359 from $62,830. To offset the resulting rising pension costs due to higher wages, states and local governments have instituted less expensive pension plan tiers for new hires, with increasing employee contributions serving as one reform method that lessens the burden on employers. We believe that because of attraction and retention pressures, demand for wage growth will outpace the limited, or spent, ability of plans to add cheaper new benefit tiers, which could lead to rising budgetary stress from pension costs.

So far, the closing gap between wage and benefits growth does not appear to have affected state and local government hiring. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that state and local governments added an estimated 23,000 jobs in August 2024, marking the 31st consecutive month that state and local government employment was stable or increased. So far, reductions in future retirement benefits for new state and local government hires have not impeded employment growth in the sector, but we continue to monitor how states consider the effects of recent wage increases on the future growth of postretirement benefit costs.

Chart 5

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Robust liquidity positions, strong revenue performance, federal stimulus, and strong management controls allowed states to improve pension and OPEB funding and fund capital projects in fiscal 2023 without having to increase debt levels in aggregate. We expect economic growth to slow in 2025; however, many states citing the pursuit of growth have cut taxes and could face pressures should financial forecasts not hold, or if there is a pullback in consumer spending. Although upcoming elections could cause shifts in governmental budget and policy priorities, S&P Global Ratings believes that record-high liquidity will cushion state credit stability as current costs for debt and liabilities remain manageable. Strong asset performance in fiscal 2024 and thus far in fiscal 2025, along with an ongoing focus on funding discipline, will continue to support funding progress in the near term.

Table 2

State net direct debt statistics for fiscal 2023
State Fiscal 2023 (mil. $) Rank Per capita ($) Rank As a % of personal income Rank As a % of GSP Rank Debt service as a % of general spending Rank
Alabama 5,724 21 1,139 23 2.1 19 1.9 19 3.7 22
Alaska 892 40 1,216 22 1.7 24 1.3 27 1.6 39
Arizona* 1,593 36 214 46 0.3 46 0.3 46 0.7 45
Arkansas 829 42 270 44 0.5 41 0.5 41 3.0 25
California* 80,973 1 2,078 12 2.6 17 2.1 17 3.5 23
Colorado 4,365 25 743 31 0.9 33 0.8 33 1.9 35
Connecticut 26,568 6 7,345 1 8.4 2 7.8 2 16.4 1
Delaware 2,803 29 2,717 8 4.2 5 3.0 9 5.4 11
Florida 12,703 11 562 34 0.8 36 0.8 34 3.2 24
Georgia 10,628 14 964 28 1.6 26 1.3 28 5.1 14
Hawaii 9,293 17 6,475 2 9.9 1 8.6 1 11.4 2
Idaho 743 43 378 39 0.6 37 0.6 37 0.5 48
Illinois* 34,521 4 2,751 7 3.9 9 3.2 7 6.2 7
Indiana 1,276 39 186 47 0.3 47 0.3 47 0.7 44
Iowa 555 46 173 48 0.3 48 0.2 49 0.3 49
Kansas 3,820 26 1,299 20 2.0 21 1.7 22 2.7 28
Kentucky 4,955 24 1,095 25 2.0 22 1.8 21 2.2 32
Louisiana 7,136 20 1,560 16 2.7 15 2.3 16 5.3 12
Maine 1,450 38 1,039 26 1.6 25 1.6 23 2.7 27
Maryland 14,192 9 2,296 10 3.1 13 2.8 12 5.8 9
Massachusetts 41,103 3 5,871 3 6.7 3 5.6 3 6.4 6
Michigan 8,838 18 880 29 1.5 28 1.3 26 2.3 31
Minnesota 7,417 19 1,293 21 1.8 23 1.6 24 4.6 16
Mississippi* 5,609 22 1,908 13 4.0 8 3.8 5 6.8 5
Missouri 2,238 30 361 40 0.6 40 0.5 40 2.5 30
Montana 177 49 157 49 0.2 49 0.3 48 0.7 46
Nebraska 33 50 44 50 0.0 50 0.0 50 0.2 50
Nevada* 2,063 33 646 32 1.0 32 0.9 31 1.7 37
New Hampshire 686 44 489 37 0.6 39 0.6 38 2.6 29
New Jersey 30,925 5 3,329 4 4.1 6 3.9 4 8.5 3
New Mexico 3,286 27 1,554 17 2.9 14 2.5 15 4.7 15
New York 62,181 2 3,177 5 4.0 7 2.9 11 3.9 21
North Carolina 5,435 23 502 36 0.8 35 0.7 36 2.0 34
North Dakota 877 41 1,119 24 1.5 27 1.2 29 0.6 47
Ohio 9,474 16 804 30 1.3 30 1.1 30 4.1 19
Oklahoma 2,136 32 527 35 0.9 34 0.8 32 1.9 36
Oregon 11,717 13 2,768 6 4.2 4 3.7 6 5.3 13
Pennsylvania 18,818 8 1,587 19 2.1 18 1.9 18 4.2 18
Rhode Island 1,987 34 1,813 14 2.7 16 2.6 14 5.7 10
South Carolina 1,485 37 276 43 0.5 43 0.5 42 0.9 43
South Dakota 414 47 451 38 0.6 38 0.6 39 1.6 38
Tennessee 1,746 35 245 45 0.4 45 0.3 45 1.4 40
Texas 9,890 15 324 42 0.5 42 0.4 44 1.3 41
Utah 2,170 31 635 33 1.0 31 0.8 35 4.0 20
Vermont 634 45 980 27 1.5 29 1.5 25 2.1 33
Virginia 12,999 10 1,492 18 2.0 20 1.8 20 4.2 17
Washington 20,833 7 2,667 9 3.3 10 2.6 13 7.0 4
West Virginia 2,909 28 1,332 15 3.1 12 2.9 10 2.8 26
Wisconsin 12,559 12 2,125 11 3.3 11 3.0 8 5.8 8
Wyoming 197 48 337 41 0.4 44 0.4 43 1.0 42
Median 4,093 -- 1,067 -- 1.6 -- 1.4 -- 2.9 --
*The 2023 annual comprehensive financial reports were unavailable for Arizona, California, Illinois, Mississippi, and Nevada, so we used 2022 data. GSP--Gross state product. Source: S&P Global Ratings.

Table 3

States pension and OPEB liabilities and statistics for fiscal 2023
Pensions OPEBs
State Aggregate state share of NPL (mil. $) Aggregate pension funded ratio (%) State NPL per capita ($) Aggregate state share of NOL (mil. $) Aggregate OPEB funded ratio (%) State NOL per capita ($)
Alabama 4,792 62 938 1,518 32.8 297
Alaska 4,389 72 5,984 (1,166) 100 (1,590)
Arizona 4,381 75 590 671 59.8 90
Arkansas 2,525 79 823 1,542 0 503
California 64,063 81 1,585 97,377 4.3 2,499
Colorado 14,575 61 2,480 262 38.6 45
Connecticut 38,010 54 10,508 17,102 12.3 4,728
Delaware 1,783 86 1,728 7,421 7.7 7,192
Florida 7,596 79 336 7,843 0 347
Georgia 11,280 76 1,023 3,066 47.5 278
Hawaii 7,392 63 5,150 6,848 37.2 4,772
Idaho 706 85 360 (128) 95.4 (65)
Illinois 148,596 43 11,632 21,867 1.2 1,742
Indiana 6,509 76 948 85 76.2 12
Iowa 986 90 307 428 0 133
Kansas 7,344 71 712 0 0 0
Kentucky 28,137 49 6,217 988 67.4 218
Louisiana 6,301 73 1,378 6,768 0.0 1,480
Maine 2,315 86 1,659 1,601 25.1 1,147
Maryland 22,268 73 3,603 11,869 3.8 1,921
Massachusetts 42,771 64 6,109 14,203 13.8 2,029
Michigan 17,585 67 661 2,009 75.4 200
Minnesota 2,419 82 422 732 0 127
Mississippi 4,487 56 1,242 110 0.2 38
Missouri 8,275 56 1,336 2,637 6.8 426
Montana 2,611 74 2,305 67 0 60
Nebraska 439 92 222 27 0 13
Nevada 3,042 76 952 913 0 286
New Hampshire 1,079 67 769 1,675 0.5 1,195
New Jersey 76,660 47 8,251 74,932 0 8,065
New Mexico 6,754 66 3,194 335 40.7 159
New York 11,120 93 568 58,219 2.1 2,975
North Carolina 4,206 83 388 5,319 10.7 491
North Dakota 1,030 68 1,314 50 62.7 64
Ohio 6,808 78 578 365 94.8 31
Oklahoma 2,446 81 603 (111) 100 (27)
Oregon 4,907 82 1,159 (70) 65.6 (16)
Pennsylvania 45,692 62 3,401 9,866 5.9 1,198
Rhode Island 2,816 65 2,569 340 51.2 311
South Carolina 3,971 60 739 2,524 11.2 470
South Dakota (2) 100 (2) 0 0 0
Tennessee 830 94 117 1,357 46.1 190
Texas 58,774 73 1,927 48,613 4.5 1,594
Utah 973 95 285 (28) 99.4 (8)
Vermont 3,016 62 4,659 1,658 11.1 2,561
Virginia 6,180 81 709 1,424 16.6 163
Washington (6,192) 100 (793) 4,250 0 544
West Virginia 2,072 90 1,170 (126) 100 (71)
Wisconsin 1,520 96 257 614 59.3 104
Wyoming 589 75 999 200 0 299
Median 4,438 75 1,011 1,391 11 282
For most plans, data aligns with a state's 2023 fiscal year. For some plans, data aligns with a state's 2022 fiscal year depending on data availability. Plans with calendar year-end reporting periods are incorporated within a state's respective fiscal year (for example, reports ended Dec. 31, 2022, are counted within a state's 2023 fiscal year). Funded ratios are capped at 100%. We exclude various OPEB plans that do not offer medical benefits. The majority of these benefits resulted in relatively small liabilities but these benefits are sizable for some states. Kansas and South Dakota do not report even an implicit liability for retiree health care benefits. We are calculating Nevada’s aggregate OPEB funded ratio as negative because the state’s plan reported gross benefit payments that exceeded contributions and income in fiscal 2022. We are calculating a NOA for Utah’s OPEB plans although the state’s aggregate OPEB funded ratio is below 100% due to how we aggregate OPEB data across state plans. OPEB--Other postemployment benefits. NPL--Net pension liability NOL--Net OPEB liability. NOA--Net OPEB asset. Source: S&P Global Ratings.

Related Research

This report does not constitute a rating action.

Primary Credit Analyst:Andrew J Stafford, New York + 212-438-1937;
andrew.stafford1@spglobal.com
Secondary Contacts:Geoffrey E Buswick, Boston + 1 (617) 530 8311;
geoffrey.buswick@spglobal.com
Todd D Kanaster, ASA, FCA, MAAA, Englewood + 1 (303) 721 4490;
Todd.Kanaster@spglobal.com
Thomas J Zemetis, New York + 1 (212) 4381172;
thomas.zemetis@spglobal.com

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