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Asia-Pacific Financial Institutions 1Q 2025 Monitor: Most Banks Will Absorb U.S. Policy Volatility

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2025 will be a bumpy ride for the Asia-Pacific financial institutions sector.  Foremost, we anticipate markets will experience significant added volatility. This will hit bank borrowers and in turn banks.

Asia-Pacific remains inextricably linked to the U.S.   S&P Global Ratings expects highly uncertain and volatile trade policy during the Trump administration. The exact transmission effects on Asia-Pacific banks during 2025 are uncertain. The U.S. will steadily add clarity on its trade and other policies, and this will give us more visibility on the implications for Asia-Pacific.

Financial institutions will most likely incur secondary effects from the added uncertainty and volatility that we anticipate.   The direct ratings effects could still be profound. Interlinkages among Asia-Pacific financial institutions and other sectors (cross-sector and cross-region) are complex, and the knock-on effects are difficult to predict. For example, potentially higher tariffs on the Mexican auto sector will affect the auto sector globally, including in the big carmaking hubs in Asia-Pacific (Japan, Korea, China). This could in turn affect Asia-Pacific banks that lend to the auto sector, along with related corporate borrower-clientele that are reliant on bank funding.

While it is early days for the new U.S. administration,  our base case is that relative rating stability across Asia-Pacific financial institutions will persist through 2025. The interplay of several key factors, however, could contribute to a change in our ratings view for banks:

A Change In Complexion Affecting Asia-Pacific Sovereigns

We believe that governments in 16 of the 19 banking systems that we cover in Asia-Pacific are supportive toward systemically important private-sector commercial banks (see chart 1).   That is, we believe that in the unlikely event of a banking crisis extraordinary government support would be available to these banks. Our credit view for the Asia-Pacific banking sector is somewhat of a contrast to other regions, notably Western Europe and the U.S. In these banking jurisdictions we believe that no banks would likely be a recipient of extraordinary government support, at least as a first port of call. In these jurisdictions we believe that additional loss absorbing capacity (ALAC) would be the most likely go-to if extraordinary support were needed.

Chart 1

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As many Asia-Pacific banks benefit from rating uplifts due to their systemic importance they likewise are vulnerable to a change in sentiment affecting sovereign creditworthiness.  A sovereign ratings or outlook change in Asia-Pacific will result in an immediate and concomitant ratings change for some banks. However, of the 21 sovereigns that we rate in Asia-Pacific, 18 are on stable outlook (the other three are on positive outlook). Our base case for most sovereigns is for continuing ratings stability. A less-likely downside scenario is that certain sovereign ratings or outlooks will turn negative, hitting some banks.

Survival Of The Fittest

The flipside of the systemically important rated bank cohort across Asia-Pacific  is the (much larger) rated and unrated universe of non-systemically important--and financially weaker--banks and other financial institutions. That said, based on our outlook for credit fundamentals, and even considering a likely healthy dose of added market volatility in 2025, most rated, non-systemically important financial institutions are on stable outlook and our base case is that ratings stability is likely to endure during 2025 for most.

We fully anticipate that some further credit differentiation could occur, however, in 2025.

The credit-standing of many nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) are already more vulnerable than banks. This principally reflects the more discrete and nuanced segments in which they operate, and their much more concentrated business, asset, and funding profiles. Added volatility in 2025 may simply accelerate credit vulnerabilities that are already apparent.

Furthermore, across the unrated space in some Asia-Pacific jurisdictions, we anticipate continuing rationalization and consolidation.  Inevitably, these will include failures--whether or not market volatility ramps up. These include small banks in the rural-bank sector in China. Some strains may play out against a backdrop of regulators and public authorities in this and some other jurisdictions pushing for a smaller number of more-robust and economically viable institutions. This is with the objective of moving toward a healthier banking industry.

Market Expectations Shimmy Materially Outside Our Current Forecasts

Our current ratings and outlooks on financial institutions consider our economic forecasts and credit conditions views.  (see "Economic Outlook Asia-Pacific Q1 2025: U.S. Trade Shift Blurs The Horizon," Nov. 24, 2024; and "Macro Effects of Proposed U.S. Tariffs Are Negative All-Around," Feb. 6, 2025). The evolution of a more extreme alternative scenario outside our forecasts will clearly have the potential to hit financial institutions.

Table 1

Real GDP forecast
Change from prior forecast
(% year over year) 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2024 2025 2026
Australia 2.0 1.1 2.1 2.2 2.4 0.0 (0.1) (0.2)
China 5.2 4.8 4.1 3.8 4.3 0.2 (0.2) (0.7)
Hong Kong 3.3 2.7 2.3 2.3 2.3 (0.6) (0.4) (0.2)
India 8.2 6.8 6.7 6.8 7.0 0.0 (0.2) (0.2)
Indonesia 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 0.0 (0.1) 0.0
Japan 1.7 (0.3) 1.3 1.0 1.0 (0.3) 0.0 0.1
Malaysia 3.5 5.5 4.9 4.5 4.5 0.4 0.1 0.0
New Zealand 0.9 0.8 2.2 2.4 2.4 (0.2) (0.1) 0.0
Philippines 5.5 5.5 6.0 6.2 6.5 (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Singapore 1.1 3.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 1.0 0.0 (0.2)
South Korea 1.4 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.0 (0.1) 0.0 0.0
Taiwan 1.3 4.4 2.4 2.1 2.4 0.2 0.3 (0.3)
Thailand 1.9 2.8 3.1 3.0 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Vietnam 5.0 6.7 6.6 6.7 6.7 0.5 (0.2) 0.0
Asia-Pacific 4.9 4.5 4.2 4.1 4.4 0.1 (0.2) (0.3)
Note: For India, 2023 = FY 2023 / 24, 2024 = FY 2024 / 25, 2025 = FY 2025 / 26, 2026 = FY 2026 / 27, 2027 = FY 2027 / 28. Source: S&P Global Ratings Economics.

More certainty concerning the potential additional tariffs on Asia-Pacific countries with a large trade deficit with the U.S. could change the equation for our view of economic risk as it affects banks.  China has the largest trade surplus with the U.S. globally, and Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam have significant trade surplus. The announcement of additional tariffs may ultimately result in dollar strength, causing currency depreciation in emerging markets and some developed markets. These dynamics may contribute to increasing interest rates in these jurisdictions, which may hurt borrowers and banks' asset quality.(Equally, higher interest rates--or lower than forecast rate cuts--may contribute to less pressure on banks' interest margins).

Furthermore, pain may be acute for some domestic corporations that borrow in U.S. dollars. That will happen if the borrowers haven't hedged--or have only partially unhedged--their U.S.-dollar cash outflows and they have no offsetting U.S.-dollar cash inflows. In turn, banks' asset quality will become strained.

Table 2

Effects of U.S. tariff policy and retaliations: deviations from our current baseline
Rate by which key economic data points will change from our baseline forecast in one hypothetical scenario
GDP growth (ppts) Unemployment (ppts) Inflation (ppts) Policy rate (bps) Exchange rate versus U.S. dollar (%)
2025f 2026f 2025f 2026f 2025f 2026f 2025f 2026f Rate of change over 2025f Rate of change over 2026f
U.S. -0.3 -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.2 75 50 - -
Canada -1.3 -1.1 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.3 (50) 0 (9) (3)
Mexico -1.7 -1.3 1 0.8 0.8 0.3 150 50 (10) (4)
China 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 20 (1) (1)
Memo: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eurozone* -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 (25) (25) (10) (9)
*Hypothetical. See "Commentar Economic Research Macro Effects Of Proposed U.S. Tariffs Are Negative All-Around," published Feb. 6, 2025 for details about our hypothetical tariff scenario. f--Forecast. ppts--Percentage points. bps--Basis poiints. Source: S&P Global Ratings.

For banks, greater clarity is the name of the game for 2025.  As the trade policies and other of the U.S. become clearer as well as the retaliatory efforts of other countries this ultimately give us a clearer line of sight of the impact on banks.

Buffers Will Absorb Some Of The Strain

The Asia-Pacific banking sector is heading into an environment of escalating trade tensions and market uncertainty in overall good shape.  The sector is incredibly diverse across the 19 jurisdictions where we rate banks and it is far from a level playing field as to how and where problems could manifest. Heading into a more uncertain environment, however, we assess economic risks trends as they impact banks as stable (see table 3) in all 19 jurisdictions. This gives us confidence that all countries--within the context of their respective highly differential risk profiles--have a degree of financial strength and flexibility to contend with a worsening of the economic outlook driven by trade and currency wars.

Further reinforcing our view is that we assess industry risk trends as stable in 17 of 19 jurisdictions.

The table below presents S&P Global Ratings' views about key risks and risk trends for banking sectors in Asia-Pacific countries where we rate banks. According to our methodology, BICRAs fall into groups from'1' to '10', ranging from what we view as the lowest-risk banking systems (group '1') to the highest-risk (group '10').

Table 3

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Banks' credit and financial metrics are also broadly supportive of ongoing credit stability.  Even a worsening of some metrics will not cause an immediate diminution in rating quality. While we expect credit losses across Asia-Pacific will increase over the next two years (see chart 2), we currently believe they will remain within tolerances for many banks at current rating levels. Furthermore, we anticipate capital levels will remain sound, noting idiosyncratic factors at play in certain jurisdictions associated with regulatory changes or industry developments that could drive a change in our view of capital.

Chart 2

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Large Chinese Banks Can Withstand Tariff Increases

We believe that the stand-alone credit profiles (SACPs) of the largest rated Chinese banks can absorb the knock-on effects of trade and policy wars and market volatility.  Furthermore, issuer credit ratings on these banks are also likely to remain intact--assuming the China sovereign rating outlook remains stable. China is at the epicenter of the U.S.-China trade conflict and the four largest Chinese banks are also the four largest banks globally, by asset size.

Our view on economic risk as it affects our banking industry country risk assessment (BICRA) for China is stable. This indicates our view that the Chinese banking system can largely withstand trade tensions.  We see less than a one-in-three chance that we will revise down the stand-alone credit profiles of the four Chinese mega banks and the ratings on their Tier-1 capital instruments.

We already assess China as a relatively high-risk banking system by global standards (see table 3).  It is characterized by already-high economic imbalances, and very high credit risks in the economy as the Chinese property developer sector continues to unwind. Our current view is that there scope for diminution in the Chinese economy--driven by trade or other factors--with no immediate effect on our BICRA or anchor assessment as it affects bank ratings.

What-If Scenario--China Is Downgraded

All other factors remaining equal and unchanged, a downgrade or outlook revision for the Chinese sovereign rating will have a differential effect across the Chinese banking sector.  We reiterate that a Chinese sovereign downgrade is not our base case as the Chinese sovereign ratings are on stable outlook. It is an alternate, lower-probability 'what if' downside scenario outside our base case.

A hypothetical one-notch sovereign rating downgrade would likely cause us to downgrade three of the four Chinese mega banks by one notch.   That is, we would likely lower by one notch the issuer credit ratings on Agricultural Bank of China Ltd. (A/Stable/A-1), China Construction Bank Corp. (A/Stable/A-1) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd. (A/Stable/A-1).

Meanwhile, we would likely affirm the issuer credit rating on Bank of China Ltd. (A/Stable/A-1) would likely be affirmed. This reflects Bank of China Ltd.'s higher stand-alone credit profile (SACP) compared with its three major domestic peers (see table 4). The higher SACP indicates that Bank of China Ltd. has greater flexibility to contend with a downgrade of China, all other factors equal and unchanged.

Table 4

Issuer credit ratings and component scores for the top 60 Asia-Pacific banks
Institution Opco L-T ICR/outlook Anchor Business position Capital and earnings Risk position Funding and liquidity Comparable rating analysis SACP or group SACP Type of support No. of notches of support Additional factor adjustment
Australia

Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.

AA-/Stable a- Strong Strong Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 a+ Sys. Imp. 1 0

Commonwealth Bank of Australia

AA-/Stable a- Strong Strong Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 a+ Sys. Imp. 1 0

Macquarie Bank Ltd.

A+/Stable a- Adequate Strong Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 a Sys. Imp. 1 0

National Australia Bank Ltd.

AA-/Stable a- Strong Strong Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 a+ Sys. Imp. 1 0

Westpac Banking Corp.

AA-/Stable a- Strong Strong Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 a+ Sys. Imp. 1 0
China

Agricultural Bank of China Ltd.

A/Stable bb+ Very Strong Adequate Adequate Strong/Strong 0 bbb+ GRE 2 0

Bank of China Ltd.

A/Stable bbb- Very Strong Adequate Adequate Strong/Strong 0 a- GRE 1 0

Bank of Communications Co. Ltd.

A-/Stable bb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Strong/Adequate 0 bbb- GRE 3 0

China CITIC Bank Corp. Ltd.

A-/Stable bb+ Adequate Moderate Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 bb+ Group 4 0

China Construction Bank Corp.

A/Stable bb+ Very Strong Adequate Adequate Strong/Strong 0 bbb+ GRE 2 0

China Merchants Bank Co. Ltd.

A-/Stable bb+ Strong Adequate Strong Strong/Strong 0 bbb+ Sys. Imp. 1 0

China Minsheng Banking Corp. Ltd.

BBB-/Stable bb+ Adequate Constrained Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 bb Sys. Imp. 2 0

Hua Xia Bank Co. Ltd.

BBB-/Stable bb+ Adequate Moderate Moderate Adequate/Adequate 0 bb GRE 2 0

Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd.

A/Stable bb+ Very Strong Adequate Adequate Strong/Strong 0 bbb+ GRE 2 0

Postal Savings Bank Of China Co. Ltd.

A/Stable bb+ Strong Moderate Adequate Strong/Strong 0 bbb GRE 3 0

Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co. Ltd.

BBB/Stable bb+ Adequate Constrained Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 bb GRE 3 0
Hong Kong

Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd.

A+/Stable bbb+ Strong Strong Adequate Strong/Strong 0 a+ Sys. Imp. 1 -1

Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd.

A+/Stable bbb+ Adequate Strong Adequate Strong/Strong 0 a Sys. Imp. 1 0

Bank of East Asia Ltd. (The)

A-/Stable bbb+ Adequate Adequate Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 bbb+ Sys. Imp. 1 0

Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd. (The)

AA-/Stable bbb+ Strong Strong Adequate Strong/Strong 0 a+ Sys. Imp. 1 0
India

Axis Bank Ltd.

BBB-/Positive bbb- Strong Adequate Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 bbb None 0 -1

Kotak Mahindra Bank

BBB-/Positive bbb- Adequate Strong Adequate Adequate/Adequate -1 bbb- None 0 0

HDFC Bank Ltd.

BBB-/Positive bbb- Strong Strong Strong Adequate/ Strong 0 a- None 0 -3

ICICI Bank Ltd. §

BBB-/Positive bbb- Strong Strong Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 bbb+ None 0 -2

State Bank of India

BBB-/Positive bbb- Strong Moderate Adequate Strong/Strong 0 bbb None 0 -1
Indonesia

Bank Mandiri (Persero) PT

BBB/Stable bb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Adequate/Strong 0 bbb- GRE 1 0

Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. PT

BBB/Stable bb+ Strong Strong Moderate Adequate/Strong 0 bbb- GRE 1 0
Japan

Chiba Bank Ltd.

A-/Stable bbb+ Adequate Adequate Strong Adequate/Strong 0 a- None 0 0

Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc.*

A/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Strong/Strong 0 a None 0 0

Mizuho Financial Group Inc.*

A/Stable bbb+ Strong Moderate Adequate Strong/Strong 0 a- Sys. Imp. 1 0

Nomura Holdings Inc.*

A-/Stable bbb+ Moderate Strong Moderate Adequate/Adequate 0 bbb Sys. Imp. 2 0

Norinchukin Bank

A/Negative bbb+ Moderate Strong Moderate Strong/Strong 0 bbb+ Sys. Imp. 2 0

Resona Holdings Inc.

A/Stable bbb+ Adequate Adequate Adequate Strong/Strong 0 a- Sys. Imp. 1 0

Shinkin Central Bank

A/Stable bbb+ Adequate Strong Moderate Adequate/Strong 0 bbb+ Sys. Imp. 2 0

Shizuoka Bank Ltd.

A-/Stable bbb+ Adequate Strong Adequate Adequate/Strong 0 a- None 0 0

Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc.*

A/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Strong/Strong 0 a None 0 0
Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Holdings* A/Stable bbb+ Strong Moderate Strong Adequate/Strong 0 a- Sys. Imp. 1 0
Korea

Industrial Bank of Korea

AA-/Stable bbb+ Adequate Adequate Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 bbb+ GRE 4 0

KEB Hana Bank

A+/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 a- Sys. Imp. 2 0

Kookmin Bank

A+/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 a- Sys. Imp. 2 0

Nonghyup Bank

A+/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Strong/ Adequate 0 a- GRE 2 0

Shinhan Bank

A+/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 a- Sys. Imp. 2 0

Woori Bank

A+/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 a- Sys. Imp. 2 0
Malaysia

Public Bank Bhd.

A-/Stable bbb Strong Strong Strong Strong/Strong -1 a None 0 -1

Malayan Banking Bhd.

A-/Stable bbb Strong Adequate Adequate Strong/Strong 0 a- None 0 0

CIMB Bank Bhd.

A-/Stable bbb Strong Adequate Adequate Strong/Strong 0 a- None 0 0
New Zealand

ANZ Bank New Zealand Ltd.

AA-/Stable bbb Strong Strong Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 a- Group 3 0

ASB Bank Ltd.

AA-/Stable bbb Strong Strong Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 a- Group 3 0

Bank of New Zealand

AA-/Stable bbb Strong Strong Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 a- Group 3 0

Westpac New Zealand Ltd.

AA-/Stable bbb Strong Strong Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 a- Group 3 0
Philippines

Bank of the Philippine Islands

BBB+/ Stable bbb- Strong Strong Adequate Adequate/ Strong 0 bbb+ None 0 0
Singapore

DBS Bank Ltd.

AA-/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Strong/ Strong 0 a Sys. Imp. 2 0

Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. Ltd.

AA-/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Strong/ Strong 0 a Sys. Imp. 2 0

United Overseas Bank Ltd.

AA-/Stable bbb+ Strong Adequate Adequate Strong/ Strong 0 a Sys. Imp. 2 0
Taiwan

CTBC Bank Co. Ltd.

A/Stable bbb Strong Strong Adequate Adequate/Strong 0 a- Sys. Imp. 1 0

Mega International Commercial Bank Co. Ltd.

A+/Stable bbb Strong Strong Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 a- Sys. Imp. 2 0
Thailand

Bangkok Bank Public Co. Ltd.

BBB+/Stable bb Strong Adequate Adequate Strong/ Strong 0 bbb- Sys. Imp. 2 0

KASIKORNBANK PCL

BBB/Stable bb Strong Adequate Adequate Adequate/Strong 0 bb+ Sys. Imp. 2 0

Krung Thai Bank Public Co. Ltd.

BBB-/Positive bb Adequate Adequate Adequate Adequate/Adequate 0 bb Sys. Imp. 2 0

Siam Commercial Bank Public Co. Ltd.

BBB/Stable bb Strong Adequate Adequate Adequate/Strong 0 bb+ Sys. Imp. 2 0
Data as of Jan. 16, 2025. In "Type of support" column, "None" includes some banks where ratings uplift because of support factors may be possible but none is currently included. (For example, this column includes some systemically important banks where systemic importance results in no rating uplift). *Holding company; the rating reflects that on the main operating company. §This ICR applies to the foreigncurrency Rating only. ICR--Issuer credit rating. GRE--Government-related entity. SACP--Stand-alone credit profile. Opco--Operating company. L-T--Long term. Sys. Imp.--Systemically important. ALAC--Additional loss-absorbing capacity. N/A--Not applicable. Sov --Capped by Sovereign Rating. Source: S&P Global Ratings.

Strong Risk Management Shields Hong Kong Banks

S&P Global Ratings expects Hong Kong's residential mortgage quality to remain stable over the next two years, driven by a stable unemployment rate and household income growth.  Sharp falls in economic growth or jumps in unemployment rates have a bigger impact on credit performance than home prices. This is because a potential shrinkage in household income could strain borrowers' capacity to service debt rather than a correction in property prices.

We expect Hong Kong's GDP growth to moderate to 2.3% for 2025 and stay at that level over the next two years, after our estimate of 2.7% growth in 2024. The unemployment rate should remain stable at about 3.0% in 2025 and inch down over the next two years. Our base case does not expect significant pressure on the credit quality of residential mortgages.

Hong Kong borrowers showed a remarkable capacity prepayment in the previous economic cycle.  This also reflects positively on the Hong Kong banking sector's record of risk management. Despite a 65% drop in home prices between 1997 and 2003, Hong Kong banks maintained a low delinquency ratio (90 days past due) of 1.5% for residential mortgage loans during this period. This was due to active management by regulators and banks, full recourse terms, and disciplined household saving. (see "Banking Brief: Employment, Not Home Prices, Shape Hong Kong Mortgage Quality," Jan. 16, 2025).

Digital Renminbi Use May Erode Chinese Banks' Fee Revenues

In our view, the revenue profiles of Chinese banks will allow them to absorb a hit from the increasing use of the e-CNY.  As of 2023, gross settlement fees from various services, accounted for only about 5.0% of bank profit before tax and 2.7% of pre-provision profit. This was according to the financial disclosures of the country's top 30 banks. The impact on net fees relating to correspondent bank services is likely to be at a lower and more manageable level.

Chinese banks are likely to increase investments in fintech to advance their digital renminbi operations.  This includes investments in risk management and the development of an e-CNY digital wallet. As of 2023, Chinese megabanks and joint-stock banks have increased their fintech investments to 3%-5% of revenues from 2%-3% five years ago. They've continued to digitalize their banking operation systems and offered incremental applications in part to compete with big tech. (see "China's Digital Renminbi May Curb Banking Income," Nov. 5, 2024).

Significant Risk Transfer Activity Is Picking Up

Significant risk transfer (SRT) activity is increasing as banks try to manage risk and support their capital ratios.  Banks transfer risk to nonbanks for capital and risk management purposes. By purchasing credit protection (or selling a portion of the credit risk) on specific assets through SRTs, banks can lower the amount of capital they must hold against those assets and boost shareholder returns.

Banks also use SRTs to manage risk, regardless of the impact on capital. They may use SRTs (even on low risk assets) to effectively reduce their exposures and concentrations by asset type, borrower, or other metrics--sometimes to avoid breaching related internal limits.

For most banks, SRT issuance has not been substantial enough to date to materially affect our assessment of creditworthiness.  Disclosure in public and regulatory filings is limited. However, as usage grows, SRTs could affect our view of a bank's risk position and positively affect our calculation of the S&P Global Ratings risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio--our proprietary measure of banks' capital adequacy. While SRTs have not affected our capital analysis of banks yet, they likely will have a greater effect as issuance grows.

European banks are the most active issuers and U.S. peers have begun to follow suit.  SRTs are an established part of European banks' capital and risk management toolkits. Pillar 3 disclosures on retained SRT tranches indicate that the region's largest lenders dominate issuance volumes, led by Barclays and Santander. Usage is also increasing in other regions globally.

As more public information on SRT is disclosed by Asia-Pacific banks we will be better placed to make intra- and inter-region comparisons and assessments.

Australian Banks' Credit Losses Should Remain Low Over The Next Two Years

We expect credit losses to revert to pre-pandemic levels in 2025-2026 at about 15 basis points (bps).  Large Australian banks' reported sound earnings recently in line with our rating expectations. Profitability metrics are generally strong globally and continue to support our view of the banks' credit profiles.

  • Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) (AA-/Stable/A-1+) announced a cash net profit after tax of A$5.1 billion for the six months ended Dec. 31, 2024, up 2% over the previous corresponding period.
  • Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (ANZ) (AA-/Stable/A-1+), reported a cash profit of A$6.7 billion for the year ended Sept. 30, 2024, down 9% on the prior year. This includes a one-off A$196 million charge related to the completion of its acquisition of Suncorp Bank on July 31, 2024.
  • National Australia Bank (NAB) (AA-/Stable/A-1+) reported an 8.1% decline in cash earnings for the full year ended Sept. 30, 2024, compared with the prior year, but it was stable half on half.
  • Westpac Banking Corp. (AA-/Stable/A-1+), reported a 3% decrease in its net profit after tax for the year ended Sept. 30, 2024.
  • Macquarie Group Ltd. (BBB+/Stable/A-2) reported net profit of A$1,612 million for the six months ended Sept. 30, 2024. This was up 14% on the previous corresponding period, driven by loan growth in the bank and higher performance fees in the asset management business. This was offset by higher funding costs in the investment bank and subdued volatility in the commodities business(see "Related Research" for Australian bank bulletins for details).

The Australian regulatory proposal to phase out banks' additional tier 1 (AT1) capital should address the unique systemic risks posed by high retail investor exposure to Australian bank AT1 securities.  In December 2024, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) announced its decision to phase out the use of AT1 capital instruments to simplify and improve the effectiveness of bank capital in a crisis. We believe this would address unique systemic risks in the country. Domestic retail investors hold about half of such instruments, a concentration that may prove problematic in the event of a banking crisis. Nonetheless, we believe this phaseout has the potential to weaken stand-alone credit standings for some Australian banks (see "Phasing Out Bank AT1--An Australian Solution To An Australian Dilemma," Sept. 18, 2024)

Outlook For China's Securities Firms Hinges Upon Investor Sentiment

China's latest capital market measures could unlock earnings potential for securities firms.  But S&P Global Ratings believes much depends on whether investor sentiment will really improve. For now, some firms could see lower contributions from their consolidated mutual fund subsidiaries as fee income declines. Further, continued execution of swap facilities would increase the parents' stock market exposure--adding to volatility.

China's financial regulators have rolled out measures to push medium- and long-term funds to invest billions in the country's capital market.  As well as mutual funds, the regulator has targeted insurers, the national social security fund, the basic pension fund, enterprise annuity funds, and other long-term capital (see "China Brief: Securities Firms Await Revival In Market Sentiment," Jan. 27, 2025).

Global Banking Sector Will Stay On A Stable Rating Course In 2025

Our base case is for relative ratings stability in 2025 even as markets are likely to be volatile.  With the interest rate cycle already turning in numerous banking jurisdictions, some relief is within sight for bank borrowers. Banks' asset quality will eventually benefit although the transmission effect will take time and vary across geographies. For 2025 we anticipate about a 7% increase in global banks' credit losses compared with 2024, to about US$850 billion.

See our comprehensive reports:

BICRA Changes

Over the past quarter (through January 30, 2025), following changes have been made to our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessments (BICRAs) in the Asia-Pacific region.

Mongolia:   We revised our assessment of economic risk to '8' from '9'. Economic risks for Mongolian banks have reduced, in our view. The country has a promising economic outlook. We forecast its real GDP growth will average about 6% annually through 2027, backed by robust exports of commodities such as coal and copper. Moderating inflation and higher public sector wages have also increased household consumption.

The industry risk trend of the banking sector is also improving. This is in view of Mongolia's evolving institutional framework, although the banking regulations in the country are relaxed compared with the international standards. The Mongolian government is likely to be supportive of banks. This is in view of the government's materially improved fiscal position amid favorable economic conditions.

We have published the following comprehensive BICRA reports in the past quarter in Asia-Pacific.

Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Bangladesh, Dec. 15, 2024

Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Mongolia, Dec. 9, 2024

Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Indonesia, Dec. 3, 2024

Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Korea, Nov. 29, 2024

Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Thailand, Oct. 29, 2024

Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Cambodia, Oct. 29, 2024

Table 5

Recent rating actions: Asia-Pacific banks
Release date Legal name Country From To
December 12, 2024 Members Banking Group Ltd. Australia BBB+/Stable/A-2 BBB+/WatchNeg/A-2
November 15, 2024 J.P. Morgan Securities Australia Limited Australia A+/Positive/A-1 AA-/Stable/A-1+
November 14, 2024 Standard Chartered Bank Korea Ltd. South Korea A/Positive/A-1 A+/Stable/A-1
October 28, 2024 China Bohai Bank Co., Ltd. China BBB-/Negative/A-3 BBB-/Stable/A-3
October 15, 2024 Toronto Dominion (South East Asia) Ltd. Singapore AA-/Negative/A-1+ A+/Stable/A-1
October 9, 2024 Trade and Development Bank JSC Mongolia B/Stable/B B+/Stable/B
October 9, 2024 Golomt Bank JSC Mongolia B/Stable/B B+/Stable/B
October 4, 2024 Development Bank of Mongolia LLC Mongolia B/Stable/B B+/Positive/B
*Recent rating actions are for the period October 1, 2024 to January 16, 2025. The list refers to banks and bank holding companies (banks) where the rating has been upgraded or downgraded, or the outlook has been changed. Banks where the ratings have been affirmed or the outlooks have not been changed are not included in the list.

Editors: Lex Hall, Jasper Moiseiwitsch

Digital Designer: Halie Mustow

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Please see Instant Insights: Key Takeaways From Our Research, published Feb. 12, 2025, which is a curated compilation of the key takeaways from our most up-to-date thought leadership.

Webcasts: Asia-Pacific Banking Insights

In the last quarter, we have held the following webcasts to share our views on Asia-Pacific and other banking topics. The replays are available on

https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/events/webcast-replays/index#

Editor's note: S&P Global Ratings believes there is a high degree of unpredictability around policy implementation by the U.S. administration and possible responses--specifically with regard to tariffs--and the potential effect on economies, supply chains, and credit conditions around the world. As a result, our baseline forecasts carry a significant amount of uncertainty. As situations evolve, we will gauge the macro and credit materiality of potential and actual policy shifts and reassess our guidance accordingly (see our research here: https://www.spglobal.com/ratings \t _blank \o https://www.spglobal.com/ratings).

This report does not constitute a rating action.

S&P Global Ratings Australia Pty Ltd holds Australian financial services license number 337565 under the Corporations Act 2001. S&P Global Ratings' credit ratings and related research are not intended for and must not be distributed to any person in Australia other than a wholesale client (as defined in Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act).

Primary Credit Analyst:Gavin J Gunning, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2092;
gavin.gunning@spglobal.com
Secondary Contacts:Ryan Tsang, CFA, Hong Kong + 852 2533 3532;
ryan.tsang@spglobal.com
Geeta Chugh, Mumbai + 912233421910;
geeta.chugh@spglobal.com
Kensuke Sugihara, Tokyo + 81 3 4550 8475;
kensuke.sugihara@spglobal.com
Susan Chu, Hong Kong (852) 2912-3055;
susan.chu@spglobal.com
Peter Sikora, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2094;
peter.sikora@spglobal.com
Nico N DeLange, Sydney + 61 2 9255 9887;
nico.delange@spglobal.com
Lisa Barrett, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2081;
lisa.barrett@spglobal.com
HongTaik Chung, CFA, Hong Kong + 852 2533 3597;
hongtaik.chung@spglobal.com
Daehyun Kim, CFA, Hong Kong + 852 2533 3508;
daehyun.kim@spglobal.com
Emily Yi, Hong Kong + 852 2532 8091;
emily.yi@spglobal.com
Chizuru Tateno, Tokyo + 81 3 4550 8578;
chizuru.tateno@spglobal.com
Ming Tan, CFA, Singapore + 65 6216 1095;
ming.tan@spglobal.com
Phyllis Liu, CFA, FRM, Hong Kong +852 2532 8036;
phyllis.liu@spglobal.com
Nikita Anand, Singapore + 65 6216 1050;
nikita.anand@spglobal.com
Yiran Zhong, Hong Kong 25333582;
yiran.zhong@spglobal.com
Xi Cheng, Shanghai + 852 2533 3582;
xi.cheng@spglobal.com
Eunice Fan, Taipei +886-2-2175-6818;
eunice.fan@spglobal.com
YuHan Lan, Taipei +886-2-2175-6810;
yuhan.lan@spglobal.com
Andy Chang, CFA, FRM, Taipei +886-2-2175-6815;
andy.chang@spglobal.com
Research Assistant:Priyal Shah, CFA, Mumbai

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