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Economic Outlook Emerging Markets Q3 2025: Tariffs' Direct Impact Is Modest So Far, But Indirect Effect Will Feed Through

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Economic Outlook Emerging Markets Q3 2025: Tariffs' Direct Impact Is Modest So Far, But Indirect Effect Will Feed Through

S&P Global Ratings believes there is a high degree of unpredictability around policy implementation by the U.S. administration and possible responses—specifically with regard to tariffs—and the potential effect on economies, supply chains, and credit conditions around the world. As a result, our baseline forecasts carry a significant amount of uncertainty, magnified by ongoing regional geopolitical conflicts. As situations evolve, we will gauge the macro and credit materiality of potential shifts and reassess our guidance accordingly (see our research here: spglobal.com/ratings).

This report does not constitute a rating action.

We have revised up our 2025 GDP growth projections for most EMs from our April update, in large part due to less severe U.S. tariff assumptions than what we had previously incorporated in our projections. The tariff de-escalation between the U.S. and China, consisting of a steep reduction in tariffs between both countries on May 12 and a 90-day pause on reciprocal tariffs, has improved our macroeconomic outlook for EMs. However, U.S. trade negotiations with the rest of the world remain fluid, and the uncertainty over U.S. tariff rates will, in our view, temper fixed investment in most EMs. Furthermore, despite the moderate improvement in our 2025 growth projections, risks to our outlook are significant, and mostly to the downside. These include the potential for higher oil prices amid the escalation of the conflict in Iran, a weaker-than-expected U.S. economy, more upside pressure on long-term U.S. treasury yields, and challenging fiscal dynamics across several EMs.

Chart 1

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The Direct Impact Of Tariffs On EM Trade Has Been Relatively Modest So Far

In anticipation of the announcement of an increase in U.S. tariffs on April 2, there was a clear frontrunning of EM exports to the U.S. That dynamic is evident in March trade data, with U.S. imports surging ahead of the April 2 announcement. The inverse happened in April, given U.S. imports declining precipitously (see chart 2). If we take into account the trade impact of both months (frontrunning and post-frontrunning), the net flow of goods from EMs to the U.S. was still positive (see chart below). The clear exception is China, on which U.S. tariff rates are significantly higher than on most EMs. That said, even though China's exports to the U.S. fell in March and April, the net decline was offset by its exports to other parts of the world.

Chart 2

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Chart 3

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Under our updated assumptions on U.S. trade policy, we expect U.S. tariffs will stay close to their current levels; 40% for China, 10% for most of the rest of the world, with carveouts for specific sectors (50% on steel and aluminum, and 25% on autos). Assuming that remains the case, trade frontrunning behavior, similar to what was observed in March, will become less likely. As a result, trade flows will likely be driven more by the indirect effects of tariffs, namely demand and investment confidence.

Chart 4

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The Indirect Impact Of Tariffs Will Depend On The Trajectory Of U.S. Demand And Investment

The indirect impact of shifting U.S. trade policy will likely show up in economic data over several quarters. The data so far does not yet fully reflect that dynamic, but we expect it to show up in weaker economic data as the year progresses. One key variable will be the development in U.S. demand, as it is a key driver of exports from EMs, and by consequence of manufacturing output in those countries. So far, the impact of tariffs on U.S. demand has been relatively subdued, potentially due to low levels of pass-through of prices from producers to consumers. The uncertainty over tariffs' final levels may be encouraging producers to hold off on price increases. However, we expect producers to increase prices, and employment dynamics in the U.S. to continue softening (see "Economic Outlook U.S. Q3 2025: Policy Uncertainty Limits Growth," June 24, 2025).

Chart 5

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The other indirect impact of tariffs, which we expect to become more evident in the coming quarters, will be weaker investment. Uncertainty over trade policy makes long-term investment decisions more difficult, and we anticipate some investments to be delayed until the trade uncertainty subsides. Manufacturing PMIs in several EMs remains below the benchmark level of 50, which points to expectations of weaker industrial production in the coming months.

Chart 6

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Weak U.S. Dollar Will Help EM Central Banks To Continue Lower Interest Rates

The weakening U.S. dollar will help inflation dynamics and keep the window open for more interest-rate cuts across EM central banks. The median EM currency has strengthened about 8% against the U.S. dollar this year. This has helped lower inflation expectations across most EMs, lower prices of imported goods in local currency terms will help slow inflation in the coming months. In this environment, several EM central banks have been lowering interest rates, and we expect more monetary easing in the coming quarters. In most cases, especially outside of EM Asia, the monetary policy stance of EM central banks is restrictive (interest rate levels are above neutral), which gives ample space to lower interest rates in the event economic conditions warrant monetary stimulus.

Chart 7

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Forecast Update

Our 2025 real GDP growth forecast for EM excluding China is 20 basis points (bps) higher for 2025, at 4.2%. We made the largest upward revisions to Argentina, Brazil, and Peru (40 bps each), driven by a less adverse U.S. tariff profile and stronger-than-expected growth in the first quarter. For most of the other EMs, our upward 2025 growth revisions were by about 20 bps. Conversely, we lowered our growth for South Africa by 20 bps mainly due to weaker-than-expected activity so far this year.

Table 1

S&P Global Ratings GDP growth forecasts
Real GDP %
--Change from May 1 forecasts--
EM countries 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F 2024 2025F 2026F
Argentina -2.0 -9.9 10.4 5.3 -1.6 -1.7 5.2 3.0 2.7 2.5 0.0 0.4 0.2
Brazil 1.2 -3.6 5.1 3.1 3.2 3.0 2.2 1.7 2.1 2.2 0.1 0.4 0.0
Chile 0.5 -6.4 11.5 2.2 0.6 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.3 0.0 0.2 0.0
Colombia 3.2 -7.2 10.8 7.3 0.7 1.7 2.5 2.8 2.9 2.9 0.0 0.2 0.2
Mexico -0.4 -8.6 6.3 3.7 3.4 1.2 0.0 1.4 2.1 2.3 0.0 0.2 -0.1
Peru 2.2 -10.9 13.4 2.8 -0.4 3.3 2.9 2.7 2.8 2.8 0.0 0.4 0.2
China 6.0 2.4 8.6 3.1 5.4 5.0 4.3 4.0 4.3 4.3 0.0 0.8 1.0
India 3.9 -5.8 9.7 7.6 9.2 6.5 6.5 6.7 7.0 6.8 0.0 0.2 0.2
Indonesia 5.0 -2.1 3.7 5.3 5.0 5.0 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.9 0.0 0.2 0.1
Malaysia 4.4 -5.5 3.3 8.9 3.5 5.1 4.2 4.4 4.5 4.5 0.0 0.3 0.6
Philippines 6.1 -9.5 5.7 7.6 5.5 5.7 5.9 6.0 6.6 6.5 0.0 0.2 0.1
Thailand 2.1 -6.1 1.5 2.6 1.9 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.9 2.9 0.0 0.3 -0.1
Vietnam 7.4 2.9 2.6 8.0 5.0 7.1 5.9 6.0 6.6 6.6 0.0 0.3 0.0
Egypt 5.6 3.6 3.3 6.6 3.7 2.3 3.4 3.8 4.2 4.6 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
Nigeria 2.2 -1.8 3.7 3.3 2.9 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.4 0.0 0.2 0.0
Turkiye 0.8 1.7 11.8 5.3 4.5 3.2 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0
Saudi Arabia 1.7 -3.8 6.5 12.0 0.5 1.8 3.7 3.9 3.2 3.1 0.5 0.2 -0.3
South Africa 0.3 -6.2 4.9 2.1 0.8 0.5 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.6 -0.1 -0.2 0.0
Aggregates
EM-18 4.2 -1.4 7.7 4.8 5.1 4.5 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.4 0.0 0.5 0.5
EM-17 (excluding China) 2.9 -4.3 7.1 6.0 4.9 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.6 4.5 0.0 0.2 0.1
EM LatAm 0.6 -6.6 7.4 3.9 2.1 1.8 2.0 1.9 2.3 2.4 0.0 0.3 0.0
EM Asia 4.9 -3.4 3.3 6.0 4.4 5.0 4.6 4.7 5.0 4.9 0.0 0.3 0.1
EM EMEA 2.2 -0.4 6.9 6.4 2.8 2.5 2.9 3.2 3.3 3.3 0.1 0.0 -0.1
Note: For India, 2019 = FY 2019 / 20, 2020 = FY 2020 / 21,...,2027 = FY 2027 / 28. FY year begins on April of calendar year. For Egypt: FY is July to June. Aggregates are weighted by PPP GDP (2017-2021 average) share of total. F--S&P Global Ratings forecasts. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

Regional Summaries

Latin America

We continue to expect growth in the region to average just over 2% in the coming years, which is lower than for most other EMs. We increased our 2025 GDP forecasts moderately, reflecting more benign tariff assumptions than previously incorporated, and in some cases stronger-than-expected data in the first quarter.

We now expect flat GDP growth for Mexico in 2025, a modest improvement from a 0.2% contraction in our previous forecast. The impact of tariffs that have been implemented so far has been moderate, mainly evident in volatile trade flows and lower confidence levels. We expect uncertainty over the USMCA review, which now is likely to start by the end of this year, will keep private investment subdued. Our baseline scenario assumes no material changes to the USMCA that would influence the country's strong trade relationship with the U.S. As a result, we expect the economy to start to slowly recover in 2026 with GDP growth of 1.4%.

Argentina's economic activity has been stronger than we expected, underpinning our upward revision to our 2025 GDP growth to 5.2% from 4.8% previously. After contracting for three consecutive quarters, the economy returned to sequential growth in Q3 2024 and continued that trend in Q4 2024 and Q1 2025. The Milei administration has delivered on the fiscal front, returning the budget to surplus in a very short period, and is making significant progress in lowering inflation. In April, after reaching a new US$20 billion loan agreement with the IMF, the government removed most of capital controls and liberalized its exchange rate regime. The next challenge for the government's economic adjustment program is to accumulate foreign exchange reserves, which in net terms remain negative.

Brazil's first-quarter GDP was stronger than we expected, prompting us to increase our 2025 GDP growth forecast to 2.2% from 1.8% previously. Strong agricultural production was a main driver of economic growth in Q1 2025 due to plentiful harvest. Domestic demand continues to hold up relatively well despite very high real interest rates. We expect growth to moderate in 2026 to 1.7%, as agricultural production normalizes relative to 2025, and real interest rates have a more noticeable impact on domestic demand.

We expect Colombia's GDP growth of 2.5% in 2025 and 2.8% in 2026. We expect the main driver of growth to be household consumption, supported by lower interest rates and inflation. We anticipate a continued slow recovery in fixed investment amid uncertainty over government reforms and the country's fiscal outlook. The recent temporary suspension of the fiscal rule will likely increase the risk premia on Colombian assets, making it more challenging for the central bank to normalize interest rates from their current restrictive levels.

We raised our 2025 GDP growth forecast for Peru to 2.9% thanks to strong domestic demand driven by improved purchasing power stemming from easing inflation, resilient business confidence, and export momentum. We project 2.7% growth in 2026 because of domestic demand but tempered by lower public investment and consumption amid the government transition and fiscal consolidation efforts.

We expect Chile's GDP growth of 2.2% in 2025 and 2.1% in 2026. In 2025, growth will come mostly from exports—primarily minerals and agricultural products—supported by an improvement in household consumption as purchasing power increases. We expect overall growth to remain around potential, sustained by internal demand, particularly household consumption, and a gradual recovery in investment.

EM EMEA

We made only minor revisions to our 2025 GDP growth forecasts for EM EMEA economies. Favorable developments across international food markets, as well as a weaker U.S. dollar will likely to continue improving the inflation outlook for most of the region. The ongoing conflict between Iran and Israel pushes risks to growth firmly to the downside.

We revised up our 2025 GDP growth forecast for Saudi Arabia by 20 bps to 3.7% due to an increase in oil production (to 9.5 million barrels per day starting July from around 9.0 in the first half of 2025) and significant upward revisions to historical GDP figures. However, we revised our 2026-2028 GDP growth numbers downward due to the revised GDP methodology by the General Authority of Statistics. In the new GDP series, 2024 non-oil GDP increased by around 20% in nominal terms, which in turn automatically implies a smaller effect of Vision 2030 investments in relative terms, and therefore, smaller effect on headline GDP growth.

We are still waiting for Q1 GDP data for Nigeria and Egypt. Therefore, we made only marginal forecast changes. The inflation and exchange rate outlook for Nigeria and Egypt has improved thanks to lower international food prices and a weaker dollar. The risks to our GDP growth forecast for Egypt are firmly to the downside due to the potential impact of the conflict in Iran on tourism and natural gas flows.

We also kept our growth forecast for Turkiye largely unchanged, as Q1 GDP growth was in line with expectations (1.0% in quarter-on-quarter terms). Domestic demand continues to soften, which underpins our projection for growth to slow to 2.6% this year from 3.2% in 2024.

We revised our 2025 GDP growth projection for South Africa to 1.1% from 1.3% previously due to weaker-than-expected Q1 GDP print. The initial positive impact of a recovery in agricultural output late last year is fading, as well as the boost to consumption from the introduction of a two-pot retirement system. For those reasons, we expect growth to remain relatively muted in the remainder of 2025.

EM Asia

Despite the turbulent external environment, growth in emerging Asia is set to be resilient. We forecast growth for the region for the full year to come in just below trend and to recover to trend growth by 2027. Domestic demand has held up well in most of the region, and the trade outlook is not as weak as feared amid frontloading of exports and the electronics sector's resilient performance. As a result, we made modest upward revisions to our 2025 GDP growth projections across the region.  

Inflation has been contained for several quarters amid stable food inflation and energy price disinflation. Restrained inflation and a weaker U.S. dollar have enabled EM Asian central banks to continue cutting interest rates. We expect modest further easing in monetary policy for the region, which will improve demand conditions. However, the recent volatility in global oil prices amid the Iran-Israel conflict poses a risk to inflation, capital flows, and exchange rates. Central banks may become more cautious in lowering interest rates further if volatility persists.

India's first-quarter growth was strong on the back of investment activity, even as private consumption growth has slowed. High frequency indicators point to some ongoing softness in consumer spending. The frontloading of interest-rate cuts will help improve demand. We project growth of 6.5% for the fiscal year ending March 2026.

We project Indonesia's GDP expansion of 4.8% this year, just below the trend growth of 5%. Private consumer activity is steady, but the fiscal impulse is negative as expenditure outlays have been slow. Overall investment is likely to be weak this year. We expect some recovery in fiscal expenditure in the next two years. Activity will gear toward policy priority projects including a large free school-lunch program, support for the agriculture sector, and an expansion in public housing.

In the Philippines, private consumption has been soft and public spending supported growth. Exposure to trade volatility is mitigated, as there is greater reliance on service exports, including business process outsourcing. We project 5.9% GDP growth this year, marginally better than 5.7% in 2024.

Vietnam continues to post strong growth, given the electronics sector's outperformance. There was strong frontloading of exports, especially to the U.S., in the first quarter. But we still see steady trade activity, which should support economic activity in the coming quarters. Public-sector spending will support growth. On the other hand, FDI and private investment have been somewhat soft, arguably due to global trade uncertainty. We forecast 5.9% growth in 2025, following a 7.1% expansion in 2024.

Domestic demand remains weak in Thailand. Furthermore, the manufacturing sector remains weakened, as domestic producers face fierce competition from cheaper imports from China, in addition to higher global trade uncertainty. Public-sector stimulus efforts have been underway and are now set to be redirected toward industries hit by weaker trade. Therefore, we expect soft GDP growth of 2.5% for this year and in 2026.

Investment activity in Malaysia softened in the first quarter partly due to the higher global uncertainty over trade. Weaker growth in China is also dampening the outlook. On the other hand, consumer demand is strong, and labor markets are resilient. We expect GDP growth to moderate to 4.2% this year, from 5.1% in 2024, due to weaker global trade dynamics, before gradually recovering next year.

Risks To Outlook

There are significant downside risks to our growth outlook for EMs. The potential for higher oil prices amid the recent escalation of the Iran-Israel conflict could hamper the ongoing disinflation process in EMs. This in turn could discourage EM central banks from reducing interest rates further. There is a large degree of uncertainty toward the trajectory of the U.S. economy amid current and potential future tariffs. A weaker-than-expected U.S. economy would lower growth of several EMs, a large share of whose exports going to the U.S. Furthermore, this year long-term U.S. treasury yields have headed higher, amid concerns over U.S. fiscal policy. So far, the impact on EM long-term yields has been muted. However, if long-term U.S. treasury yields increase again, they could also push up borrowing costs in EMs. Finally, fiscal dynamics have become more challenging in recent years across most EMs, amid higher budget deficits since the COVID-19 pandemic and a greater interest rate burden in most cases. This has increased the risk of fiscal slippage in several EMs, which could keep borrowing costs through higher associated risk premia.

Appendix

Table 2

Consumer price inflation (year average)
(%) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F CB inflation target
Argentina 53.5 42.0 48.4 72.4 133.5 219.9 42.0 23.0 15.0 11.0 No target
Brazil 3.7 3.2 8.3 9.3 4.6 4.4 5.1 4.5 3.5 3.0 3.0% +/- 1.5%
Chile 2.3 3.0 4.5 11.6 7.6 4.3 4.4 3.4 3.0 3.0 3.0% +/- 1.0%
Colombia 3.5 2.5 3.5 10.2 11.7 6.6 4.8 4.1 3.3 3.0 3.0% +/- 1.0%
Mexico 3.6 3.4 5.7 7.9 5.5 4.7 3.8 3.4 3.1 3.0 3.0% +/- 1.0%
Peru 2.1 1.8 4.0 7.9 6.3 2.4 1.9 2.3 2.5 2.5 1.0% - 3.0%
China 2.9 2.5 0.9 2.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.8 1.8 3.0%
India 4.8 6.2 5.5 6.7 5.4 4.6 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.0 +/- 2.0%
Indonesia 2.8 2.0 1.6 4.2 3.7 2.3 1.8 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.5% +/- 1.0%
Malaysia 0.7 -1.1 2.5 3.4 2.5 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 No target
Philippines 2.4 2.4 3.9 5.8 6.0 3.2 2.3 3.2 3.3 3.0 3.0% +/- 1.0%
Thailand 0.7 -0.8 1.2 6.1 1.2 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.0 2.0% +/- 1.5%
Vietnam 2.8 3.2 1.8 3.2 3.3 3.6 3.0 2.7 3.1 3.2 4.0%
Egypt 13.8 5.5 4.6 8.5 24.3 33.4 20.2 14.8 11.7 8.5 5.0% +/- 1.0%
Nigeria 11.4 13.3 17.0 18.9 24.7 33.2 23.2 20.3 15.8 15.4 6.0% - 9.0%
Turkiye 15.2 12.3 19.6 72.3 53.8 58.4 32.6 18.1 14.2 12.7 5.0% +/- 2.0%
Saudi Arabia -2.1 3.5 3.1 2.5 2.5 1.7 2.1 1.8 1.8 1.9 No target
South Africa 4.1 3.3 4.6 6.9 5.9 4.4 3.7 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.0% - 6.0%
Median 3.2 3.2 4.3 7.4 5.7 4.4 3.8 3.4 3.2 3.0
F--S&P Global Ratings forecasts. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

Table 3

Policy rates (end-year)
(%) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F
Argentina 55.00 38.00 38.00 75.00 100.00 32.00 25.00 20.00 15.00 10.00
Brazil 4.50 2.00 9.25 13.75 11.75 12.25 15.00 12.50 8.00 8.00
Chile 1.75 0.50 4.00 11.25 8.25 5.00 4.50 4.25 4.25 4.25
Colombia 4.25 1.75 3.00 12.00 13.00 9.50 8.25 7.00 6.50 6.50
Mexico 7.25 4.25 5.50 10.50 11.25 10.00 7.50 7.00 6.50 6.50
Peru 2.25 0.25 2.50 7.50 6.75 5.00 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
China 2.50 2.20 2.20 2.00 1.80 1.50 1.20 1.10 1.10 1.10
India 4.40 4.00 4.00 6.50 6.50 6.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25
Indonesia 5.00 3.75 3.50 5.50 6.00 6.00 5.00 4.75 4.75 4.75
Malaysia 2.96 1.75 1.75 2.75 3.00 3.00 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75
Philippines 4.00 2.00 2.00 5.50 6.50 5.75 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Thailand 1.25 0.50 0.50 1.25 2.50 2.25 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50
Egypt 15.75 9.25 8.25 11.25 18.25 27.25 24.00 16.00 12.50 10.00
Nigeria 13.50 11.50 11.50 16.50 18.75 27.50 25.00 20.00 18.00 15.00
Turkiye 12.00 17.00 14.00 9.00 45.00 47.50 38.00 17.50 12.50 12.50
Saudi Arabia 2.25 1.00 1.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 4.50 3.75 3.75 3.75
South Africa 6.50 3.50 3.75 7.00 8.25 7.80 7.00 6.50 6.50 6.50
Note: For China, the one-year medium-term lending facility (MLF) rate is shown. F--S&P Global Ratings forecasts. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

Table 4

Unemployment rate (year average)
(%) 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F
Argentina 9.8 11.6 8.8 6.8 6.1 7.1 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.3
Brazil 12.1 13.5 13.5 9.5 8.0 6.9 7.0 7.4 7.3 7.2
Chile 7.2 10.5 9.1 7.8 8.6 8.5 8.4 8.3 8.3 8.2
Colombia 10.9 16.7 13.8 11.2 10.2 10.2 10.0 9.8 9.8 9.7
Mexico 3.5 4.4 4.1 3.3 2.8 2.7 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.2
Peru 6.6 12.8 11.3 7.7 6.9 7.0 6.8 6.7 6.7 6.6
China 5.2 5.6 5.1 5.6 5.2 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.3
Indonesia 5.1 6.0 6.4 5.8 5.4 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.7
Malaysia 3.3 4.5 4.6 3.8 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
Philippines 5.1 11.3 7.8 5.4 4.4 3.8 4.1 3.9 3.6 3.4
Thailand 1.0 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0
Egypt 7.9 8.0 7.4 7.3 7.0 6.6 6.5 6.7 6.8 6.8
Nigeria 24.5 25.6 26.5 27.7 30.5 33.4 30.0 28.0 28.0 28.0
Turkiye 13.7 13.2 12.0 11.2 9.8 9.7 10.2 10.0 9.8 9.7
Saudi Arabia 5.6 7.7 6.6 5.6 4.8 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.4
South Africa 28.7 29.2 34.3 33.5 32.5 33.4 31.2 30.0 29.5 29.0
F--S&P Global Ratings forecast. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

Table 5

Exchange rates versus US$ (year average)
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F
Argentina 48 71 95 131 297 916 1,152 1,400 1,625 1,875
Brazil 3.94 5.16 5.39 5.16 5.00 5.39 5.75 5.80 5.88 5.90
Chile 703 792 759 873 840 944 959 968 973 978
Colombia 3,281 3,694 3,742 4,255 4,327 4,072 4,240 4,315 4,335 4,375
Mexico 19.26 21.49 20.28 20.12 17.74 18.33 19.75 19.75 20.25 20.6
Peru 3.34 3.49 3.88 3.84 3.74 3.75 3.70 3.77 3.78 3.80
China 6.91 6.90 6.45 6.73 7.14 7.20 7.30 7.33 7.26 7.16
India 70.9 74.2 74.5 80.0 82.8 84.6 86.6 88.2 88.8 89.6
Indonesia 14,150 14,923 14,428 15,016 15,226 15,892 16,367 16,300 16,250 16,200
Malaysia 4.14 4.20 4.14 4.40 4.59 4.51 4.27 4.21 4.19 4.18
Philippines 51.8 49.6 49.3 54.5 55.6 57.3 56.8 56.1 54.6 52.3
Thailand 31.0 31.3 32.0 35.1 35.1 34.9 33.0 32.4 32.2 32.1
Egypt 17.6 16.1 15.7 16.5 25.8 36.3 49.8 52.5 56.4 59.3
Nigeria 306.42 356.32 398.24 423.3 645.77 1,476 1,561 1,614 1,661 1,708
Turkiye 5.70 7.02 8.86 16.44 24.73 32.84 39.82 46.50 50.84 54.13
Saudi Arabia 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75
South Africa 14.50 16.50 14.79 16.38 18.45 18.34 18.18 18.35 18.75 19.15
F--S&P Global Ratings forecast. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

Table 6

Exchange rates versus US$ (end-year)
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023F 2024F 2025F 2026F 2027F 2028F
Argentina 59.9 84.15 102.75 177.13 808.5 1,033 1,300 1,500 1,750 2,000
Brazil 4.03 5.20 5.58 5.16 4.84 6.19 5.75 5.85 5.90 5.90
Chile 745 711 850 861 885 992 965 970 975 980
Colombia 3,277 3,433 3,981 4,812 3,822 4,409 4,300 4,325 4,350 4,400
Mexico 18.85 19.95 20.58 19.40 16.92 20.27 19.50 20.00 20.50 20.75
Peru 3.31 3.62 3.97 3.81 3.71 3.77 3.75 3.75 3.8 3.8
China 6.99 6.52 6.39 6.90 7.10 7.30 7.33 7.33 7.23 7.14
India 72.41 72.88 75.21 81.71 83.04 86.64 87.50 88.50 89.00 90.00
Indonesia 14,067 14,386 14,261 15,592 15,439 16,157 16,300 16,300 16,250 16,200
Malaysia 4.17 4.11 4.18 4.41 4.59 4.47 4.22 4.20 4.18 4.17
Philippines 51.0 48.3 50.5 57.4 56.1 58.1 56.7 55.7 53.8 51.5
Thailand 30.3 30.6 33.4 34.8 34.2 34.0 32.6 32.3 32.1 32.0
Egypt 16.1 15.9 15.7 18.5 30.9 47.6 50.6 54.0 57.0 60.0
Nigeria 307 380 411 441 849 1,620 1,600 1,625 1,680 1,730
Turkiye 5.79 7.86 11.14 18.61 30.00 34.53 43.00 48.00 52.00 55.00
Saudi Arabia 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75
South Africa 14.73 15.69 15.39 17.68 18.75 17.90 18.00 18.50 18.90 19.30
F--S&P Global Ratings forecast. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence.

The views expressed here are the independent opinions of S&P Global Ratings' economics group, which is separate from but provides forecasts and other input to S&P Global Ratings' analysts. S&P Global Ratings' analysts use these views in determining and assigning credit ratings in ratings committees, which exercise analytical judgment in accordance with S&P Global Ratings' publicly available methodologies.

Primary Contact:Elijah Oliveros-Rosen, Chief Economist, Emerging Markets, New York city 1-212-438-2228;
elijah.oliveros@spglobal.com
Secondary Contacts:Harumi Hasegawa, Economist, Latin America, Boston ;
harumi.hasegawa@spglobal.com
Valerijs Rezvijs, Economist, EM EMEA, London 44-79-2965-1386;
valerijs.rezvijs@spglobal.com
Vishrut Rana, Senior Economist, Asia-Pacific, Singapore 65-6216-1008;
vishrut.rana@spglobal.com

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