(Editor's Note: S&P Global Ratings believes there is a high degree of unpredictability around policy implementation by the U.S. administration and possible responses--specifically with regard to tariffs--and the potential effect on economies, supply chains, and credit conditions around the world. As a result, our baseline forecasts carry a significant amount of uncertainty, magnified by ongoing regional geopolitical conflicts. As situations evolve, we will gauge the macro and credit materiality of potential and actual policy shifts and reassess our guidance accordingly [see our research here: spglobal.com/ratings].)
This report does not constitute a rating action.
Key Takeaways
- Our stress test revealed that European banks are well placed to absorb potentially higher credit losses due to rising trade tensions, with only a handful of banks potentially seeing a material effect.
- European banks' asset quality has remained resilient so far, with several macro-financial shocks only causing sporadic deterioration in asset quality.
- In our base case, we expect asset quality metrics will remain broadly stable over 2025-2026 due to a combination of cyclical and structural factors.
The European macroeconomic outlook is subject to elevated uncertainty. An increase in U.S. trade tariffs poses the most prominent source of downside risk.
Our stress test revealed that additional credit losses from corporate sectors that are most at risk due to their reliance on U.S. trade could reduce median pretax profits by 17%-29%, with significant variations around this median. Importantly, we found that only a handful of rated banks would be exposed to more material effects.
We believe our stress test findings support our assessment that European banks have improved their resilience to credit risks substantially. They also underpin our expectation that upcoming regulatory stress tests conducted by authorities will likely reach similar conclusions.
Despite several macro-financial shocks, European banks' asset quality has not deteriorated meaningfully in recent years. In line with our expectations, credit risks have so far only materialized in a meaningful way in Austria, Germany, and Luxembourg, and were concentrated on commercial real estate (CRE) and small and midsize enterprise (SME) portfolios.
Continuing positive developments in several countries more than offset these sporadic negative trends. Nonperforming loan (NPL) stocks continued to decline, with large EU banks' NPL ratios reaching a cyclical low of about 2% at year-end 2024.
In their base case, S&P Global Ratings' economists forecast sluggish European economic growth in 2025 and a more significant rebound in 2026. Even though banks might struggle to achieve their lending growth ambitions this year due to low credit demand, asset quality is unlikely to deteriorate materially.
This is because of still low real interest rates and accommodative fiscal policies that support borrowers' repayment capacity. What's more, we expect European consumer spending and employment rates will remain resilient. Additionally, we consider it unlikely that banks will loosen their underwriting standards.
How We Use Sensitivity Analysis And Stress Tests
Sensitivity analysis--which tends to be narrow in nature and focused on a few variables--and broader stress tests offer insights into potential outcomes beyond the base case that we embed in our issuer credit ratings. We may undertake this analysis ourselves or observe the outcomes of work by external parties, for example bank supervisors.
The results of any analysis need to be viewed in the context of its objectives, methodological choices, assumptions, and the data it incorporates. For example, sensitivity analysis is not a holistic assessment of alternative scenarios. The scenarios may be plausible but unlikely, and stress tests inevitably employ simplifying assumptions (such as static balance sheets, and no allowance for management actions) to enhance consistency or reflect limitations in input data.
Nevertheless, this analysis can provide new insights about a bank's relative vulnerability or resilience under alternative scenarios--for example in terms of profitability, capitalization, or liquidity. While there is no direct link between the results of this analysis and bank ratings, they can, on occasion, lead to rating actions where the alternative scenario has a meaningful likelihood of occurring and the rating does not already capture the revealed resilience or vulnerability. The stress tests we have performed (as described in this report) have not resulted in any rating actions.
Rising Trade Tensions Could Moderately Reduce Profits
The three scenarios in our stress test outline potential credit losses and the resulting reduction in pretax profits for a sample of 90 rated European banks (see table 4). Our analysis only covers the direct effects of trade tensions on selected corporate loan exposures and assumes no offsetting factors--meaning no change in loan exposures and no specific fiscal support programs for at-risk corporate sectors. It also does not include existing government guarantees that could cover parts of the stressed corporate portfolios.
We modelled loss rates based on EU banks' submissions in the 2023 European Banking Authority (EBA) stress test, which required banks to estimate loss rates under an adverse macro-financial scenario at a sectoral level (see appendix). We have applied lower/higher stressed loss rates to banks that are active in lower-/higher-risk countries, according to our banking industry country risk assessment (BICRA).
Based on our stress test, the median reduction in annual pretax profits is 17%-29% (see chart 1). The most pronounced reduction corresponds to scenario 3, where we envisage countertariffs and the escalation of trade tensions to key services sectors. Importantly, no bank would record annual losses in any of our three scenarios. The effect on profits would be material only for a handful of rated banks, whose pretax profits would reduce by around 60% or more (see table 2 and appendix).
Overall, the most pronounced effects on these banks result from a combination of:
- Relatively higher exposure to corporate sectors to which we applied higher loss rates;
- Relatively large size of the loan book compared with total assets;
- Relatively lower expected profitability in 2025; and
- Relatively higher economic risk (from our BICRA) in the countries where the banks operate.
Table 1
Potential loss rates in the case of rising trade tensions | ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Scenario | Description | Stressed sectors | Median increase in cost of risk (%) | Median reduction in 2025f pretax profit (%) | ||||||
Scenario 1 | U.S. tariffs on goods affect the credit quality in economic sectors most reliant on exports to the U.S. market. | A Agriculture, forestry, and fishing; B mining and quarrying; C manufacturing; G wholesale and retail trade; H transport and storage | 0.32 | 17 | ||||||
Scenario 2 | The EU's retaliatory tariffs on goods increase asset quality pressures for economic sectors most reliant on imports from the U.S. | Scenario 1 + D electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply; E water supply; F construction | 0.46 | 24 | ||||||
Scenario 3 | Trade tensions escalate further and embroil key services sectors that are most reliant on U.S. trade. | Scenario 2 + J information and communication; K financial and insurance activities; M professional, scientific, and technical activities; R arts, entertainment, and recreation | 0.56 | 29 | ||||||
Sectoral classification as per the EU NACE categories. Source: S&P Global Ratings. |
Chart 1
Table 2
Only a handful of banks face more material effects from rising corporate loan losses due to trade tensions | ||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025f | Scenario analysis--reduction in 2025f pretax profits (%) | |||||||||||||||||
Bank | Currency | Pretax profit (mil.) | Credit loss provisions (mil.) | Preprovision operating income (mil.) | PPI / credit loss provisions (x) | Scenario 1 | Scenario 2 | Scenario 3 | ||||||||||
DLR Kredit A/S | DKK | 1,387 | 20 | 1,407 | 70.4 | 73 | 80 | 83 | ||||||||||
Cooperatieve Rabobank U.A. | EUR | 6,445 | 650 | 7,095 | 10.9 | 62 | 67 | 70 | ||||||||||
Commerzbank AG | EUR | 3,100 | 850 | 4,650 | 5.5 | 50 | 61 | 69 | ||||||||||
BPCE | EUR | 5,630 | 2,200 | 7,830 | 3.6 | 30 | 43 | 65 | ||||||||||
Groupe Credit Agricole | EUR | 12,169 | 3,500 | 15,669 | 4.5 | 40 | 48 | 59 | ||||||||||
DKK--Danish krone. f--Forecast. PPI—Pre-Provision Income. Source: S&P Global Ratings. |
Most Banks Could Also Manage A Spillover Of Trade Tensions To Retail Portfolios
In addition to the direct effects of trade tensions on corporate portfolios, we have also assessed the potential effects of a broader spillover on the quality of banks' retail portfolios.
Under this hypothetical scenario, we applied loss rates to each bank's mortgage and consumer loan portfolios derived from EU banks' submissions to the latest EBA stress test, in addition to the loss rates on corporate sectors applied under Scenario 3. In this hypothetical scenario, the median reduction in projected 2025 pretax profits would rise to 66%, indicating a material loss for most rated European banks (see chart 2).
Chart 2
Importantly, this hypothetical scenario also shows that European banks have strengthened their financial resilience to credit risk over time. After applying the same additional credit losses to rated banks' pretax profits from 2021--the year before interest rates and most banks' profits rose--we found the median reduction in 2021 pretax profits would have been 105%. Additionally, the already low number of banks facing significant effects has reduced meaningfully since 2021.
Asset Quality Resisted The Macro Slowdown
The inflation shock, the subsequent rise in nominal interest rates induced by central banks, and the slowdown in economic growth did not affect European banks' asset quality metrics in the past three years. At the system level, stage 2 and stage 3 ratios have been remarkably resilient in the past three years (see chart 3). This is due to a combination of cyclical and structural factors.
Chart 3
Cyclical factors
Negative real interest rates: Despite higher nominal interest rates, real interest rates have remained negative or low in key jurisdictions due to above-average inflation (see chart 4). Bank financing conditions therefore remained broadly favorable for most borrowers, particularly for those that managed to pass through higher prices to customers. Previous periods of material asset quality deterioration were typically associated with significantly higher real interest rates.
Chart 4
Still supportive fiscal environment in many jurisdictions: Several government initiatives have mitigated the effects of higher energy prices and the ensuing increase in inflation. We believe this direct support also benefited borrower repayment capacity and, with that, bank asset quality.
That said, the ensuing rise in public debt in some countries and fiscal consolidation challenges are now weighing on the outlook for some sovereign ratings, such as France and Belgium.
Structural factors
Resilient consumer spending and labor markets: European labor markets continue to experience a soft landing, with a gradual slowdown in job openings but no meaningful rise in unemployment yet. At the same time, consumer spending picked up in 2024 and rising real incomes point to a continuation of this trend.
Lower appetite for credit risk and better credit risk management practices: In several European countries, loan growth has been flat or negative in recent years. For the riskiest sectors, such as CRE, loan growth was also very limited and focused on senior secured positions with known customers. Overall, we believe European banks have strengthened their underwriting standards. The introduction of international financial reporting standard (IFRS) 9 and stricter guidance from supervisors has also helped raise the quality of credit risk management.
Asset Quality Deterioration Is Focused On Specific Portfolios
At a more granular level, the only negative outliers are some banks in Germany, Austria, and Luxembourg, as well as CRE and SME portfolios. That said, asset quality deterioration was limited in recent years (see charts 5 and 6).
Germany, Austria, and Luxembourg were most affected by the economic slowdown from the war in Ukraine, energy price shocks, and the price correction in the real estate market. As for CRE and SME portfolios, these are typically very vulnerable during economic slowdowns. As such, the current trends are in line with our expectations at the beginning of the economic slowdown and reflect mainly cyclical factors. In our portfolio of rated European banks, we currently assign negative outlooks directly related to asset quality deterioration to the ratings on Banque Internationale à Luxembourg and Hypo Vorarlberg Bank AG.
Chart 5
Chart 6
Overall asset quality metrics in Germany, Austria, and Luxembourg remain close to EU averages, indicating a normalization rather than a deviation from regional trends. We note a higher degree of divergence in the distribution of stage 2 ratios. That said, we believe the ratios are not fully comparable across banks, despite supervisory efforts to align practices.
The Role Of IFRS 9 In Asset Quality Assessments Of European Banks
IFRS 9 requires banks to provision for loan losses, based on a forward-looking expected credit loss (ECL) impairment model. We see IFRS 9 as a positive development, as it requires banks to provision for credit losses on a more timely, forward-looking basis. That said, the application of the standard also puts more emphasis on management judgement in the measurement of loan losses.
Disparities among these estimates can cause loan loss estimates to vary significantly across banks (see chart 7). Not all disparities result from differences in the underlying asset quality or loan composition.
Three key factors are at play for European banks
Migration from stage 1 to stage 2: The migration of loans from stage 1 (performing loans, requiring a 12-month ECL provision) to stage 2 (underperforming and watchlist loans, requiring a lifetime ECL provision) can affect loan loss provisions significantly. The migration reflects a significant increase in credit risk (SICR), which is based on an assessment that depends on bank management teams' judgment.
We believe the lack of clarity about what constitutes an SICR leads to inconsistencies across banks and, consequently, to differences in loan loss provisions that do not exclusively result from differences in asset quality.
Extensive use of management overlays: ECL models incorporate historical experience and data to estimate parameters, but sudden changes in economic conditions can lead to the application of management overlays. This has increased recently to encompass risks from exceptional events, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and tariff-related uncertainties.
Different approaches to macroeconomic scenarios and their weighting: The application of multiple economic scenarios and their weightings can significantly influence the final ECL estimate.
European regulators continue to monitor the resulting variability in the application of provisioning requirements under IFRS 9. While some divergence is likely to persist due to the principles-based nature of IFRS 9, European regulators aim to create stronger incentives for convergence.
Chart 7
Our Base Case Foresees A Stabilization Of Asset Quality
Our economists revised down their macro forecasts following the rise in global trade tensions in early April 2025. For the eurozone, they now expect lower but still positive annual GDP growth, with steady unemployment rates that will support the resilience of the labor market. In 2026, economic growth should accelerate, primarily on the back of higher defense spending in core eurozone countries.
This means the main cyclical factors supporting asset quality will remain in play over 2025-2026. Concretely, real interest rates will remain low and fiscal policies will continue to be favorable, albeit at varying degrees: Fiscal spending will be relatively higher in Germany but lower in France and Belgium, which are undergoing excessive deficit procedures.
Against this broader macroeconomic context and provided European banks will not relax their credit underwriting standards any time soon, our base case assumes asset quality metrics will remain stable and hover around their current cyclical lows (see charts 8 and 9).
Chart 8
Chart 9
Importantly, most European banks' profitability has increased significantly in recent years, largely due to more favorable nominal interest rates. This means banks have now more capacity to absorb higher credit losses from current earnings, without having to deplete capital (see chart 10).
For the 170 European banks we rate, we expect credit costs will represent a median of only 11% of pre-provision income. Accordingly, banks could absorb a significant increase in credit costs before their earnings turn negative.
Chart 10
Appendix
Overview of our stress test exercise
Loss rates. Our stress test estimates the sensitivity of banks' profits, based on forecast 2025 pretax profits, to higher credit losses resulting from asset quality deterioration in specific corporate sectors.
These loss rates were modelled by banks for each sector under the adverse macro-financial scenario laid out by the EBA (see table 3). The lower bound corresponds to the 25th percentile and the upper bound to the 75th percentile in the distribution of annual loss rates modelled by EU banks participating in the 2023 EBA stress test.
We have annualized the loss rates because the EBA results reflected three-year cumulative loss rates. The EBA adverse scenario assumed a cumulative GDP decline in the eurozone of 5.9% over three years, with unemployment reaching 12.4% at the end of the third year.
The loss rates that we applied in our stress test for a given bank and portfolio vary, depending on the weighted average economic risk (WAER) of the bank's credit exposures. For banks with a WAER of 1, the applied loss rate was set at the lower bound, and increased linearly toward the upper bound for banks with higher WAERs.
Balance sheet assumption. We applied the loss rates to banks' portfolios as of end 2024. We did not assume any change in the composition of the loan book nor any other risk mitigating factor, for example fiscal measures to support specific sectors. We did not include the impact of government guarantees which could cover specific parts of stressed portfolios. We did not adjust loss rates for the initial level of the baseline risk cost forecast for 2025 or the existence of provision overlays for specific banks.
Table 3
Modelled additional loss rates per portfolio and sector, derived from the 2023 EBA stress test results | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Portfolio | Lower bound | Upper bound | ||||
Household | 1.00 | 2.33 | ||||
Of which mortgage loans | 0.67 | 2.00 | ||||
Of which consumer loans | 1.33 | 3.33 | ||||
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing | 2.00 | 4.00 | ||||
B Mining and quarrying | 1.00 | 3.0 | ||||
C Manufacturing | 1.67 | 3.33 | ||||
D Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply | 1.00 | 2.00 | ||||
E Water supply | 0.67 | 2.33 | ||||
F Construction | 2.00 | 4.33 | ||||
G Wholesale and retail trade | 1.33 | 3.33 | ||||
H Transport and storage | 1.33 | 3.00 | ||||
J Information and communication | 1.00 | 2.33 | ||||
K Financial and insurance activities | 0.67 | 2.00 | ||||
M Professional, scientific, and technical activities | 1.67 | 3.33 | ||||
R Arts, entertainment, and recreation | 1.33 | 3.67 | ||||
Sectoral classification as per the EU NACE categories. CRE--Commercial real estate. EBA--European Banking Authority. SME--Small and midsize enterprises. Sources: European Banking Authority, S&P Global Ratings. |
Overview of stress test results
Scenario 1
Chart 11
Chart 12
Scenario 2
Chart 13
Chart 14
Scenario 3
Chart 15
Chart 16
Detailed stress test results
Table 4
Detailed stress test results | ||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Bank | Currency | 2025f | Scenario analysis--reduction in 2025f pretax profits (%) | |||||||||||||||
Pretax profit (mil.) | Credit loss provisions (mil.) | Preprovision operating income (mil.) | PPI / credit loss provisions (x) | Scenario 1 | Scenario 2 | Scenario 3 | ||||||||||||
Abanca Corporacion Bancaria S.A | EUR | 804 | 120 | 938 | 7.8 | 31 | 42 | 52 | ||||||||||
ABN AMRO Bank N.V. | EUR | 2,800 | 300 | 3,100 | 10.3 | 2 | 24 | 38 | ||||||||||
AIB Group (U.K.) PLC | GBP | 178 | 20 | 208 | 10.4 | 9 | 14 | 17 | ||||||||||
AIB Group PLC | EUR | 1,947 | 185 | 2,232 | 12.1 | 8 | 14 | 16 | ||||||||||
Aktia Bank PLC | EUR | 108 | 8 | 116 | 14.5 | 5 | 9 | 25 | ||||||||||
Banca Mediolanum | EUR | 1,125 | 50 | 1,250 | 25 | 0 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||
Banca Popolare di Sondrio SpA | EUR | 767 | 200 | 867 | 4.3 | 34 | 44 | 52 | ||||||||||
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. | EUR | 14,672 | 6,000 | 21,197 | 3.5 | 23 | 28 | 31 | ||||||||||
Banco BPI S.A. | EUR | 691 | 60 | 766 | 12.8 | 16 | 20 | 22 | ||||||||||
Banco BPM | EUR | 2,561 | 600 | 3,161 | 5.3 | 35 | 43 | 49 | ||||||||||
Banco Comercial Portugues S.A. | EUR | 1,428 | 320 | 2,188 | 6.8 | 16 | 20 | 23 | ||||||||||
Banco de Sabadell S.A. | EUR | 2,303 | 800 | 3,253 | 4.1 | 28 | 37 | 46 | ||||||||||
Banco Santander S.A. | EUR | 18,413 | 12,500 | 34,383 | 2.8 | 23 | 28 | 32 | ||||||||||
Banco Santander Totta S.A. | EUR | 1,254 | 90 | 1,344 | 14.9 | 13 | 16 | 18 | ||||||||||
Bank of Cyprus Public Co. Ltd. | EUR | 471 | 85 | 576 | 6.8 | 12 | 16 | 19 | ||||||||||
Bank of Ireland Group PLC | EUR | 1,630 | 210 | 1,940 | 9.2 | 14 | 15 | 17 | ||||||||||
Bank of Valletta PLC | EUR | 233 | 10 | 243 | 24.3 | 10 | 15 | 20 | ||||||||||
Bank Polska Kasa Opieki S.A. | PLN | 8,228 | 900 | 9,528 | 10.6 | 14 | 17 | 19 | ||||||||||
Bankinter S.A. | EUR | 1,354 | 310 | 1,767 | 5.7 | 26 | 36 | 45 | ||||||||||
Banque Internationale a Luxembourg | EUR | 168 | 40 | 208 | 5.2 | 12 | 35 | 43 | ||||||||||
Barclays PLC | GBP | 8,817 | 2,100 | 11,387 | 5.4 | 7 | 9 | 11 | ||||||||||
Basler Kantonalbank | CHF | 191 | 8 | 265 | 33.1 | 10 | 13 | 16 | ||||||||||
Belfius Bank SA/NV | EUR | 1,401 | 70 | 1,471 | 21 | 19 | 35 | 50 | ||||||||||
BKS Bank AG | EUR | 173 | 30 | 203 | 6.8 | 19 | 33 | 41 | ||||||||||
BNP Paribas | EUR | 17,486 | 3,600 | 21,086 | 5.9 | 29 | 36 | 43 | ||||||||||
BPCE | EUR | 5,630 | 2,200 | 7,830 | 3.6 | 30 | 43 | 65 | ||||||||||
Caisse Centrale du Credit Mutuel | EUR | 6,636 | 2,200 | 8,762 | 4 | 25 | 33 | 47 | ||||||||||
Caixa Geral de Depositos S.A. | EUR | 2,047 | 150 | 2,272 | 15.1 | 9 | 13 | 14 | ||||||||||
CaixaBank, S.A. | EUR | 7,640 | 1,100 | 9,280 | 8.4 | 21 | 29 | 36 | ||||||||||
Ceska Sporitelna, a.s. | CZK | 29,959 | 700 | 30,659 | 43.8 | 8 | 10 | 10 | ||||||||||
Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka A.S. | CZK | 18,306 | 500 | 18,806 | 37.6 | 23 | 31 | 32 | ||||||||||
Commerzbank AG | EUR | 3,100 | 850 | 4,650 | 5.5 | 50 | 61 | 69 | ||||||||||
Cooperatieve Rabobank U.A. | EUR | 6,445 | 650 | 7,095 | 10.9 | 62 | 67 | 70 | ||||||||||
Crelan S.A. | EUR | 242 | 30 | 278 | 9.3 | 17 | 25 | 33 | ||||||||||
Danske Bank A/S | DKK | 28,657 | 1,000 | 29,718 | 29.7 | 16 | 20 | 25 | ||||||||||
De Volksbank N.V. | EUR | 390 | 25 | 415 | 16.6 | 0 | 3 | 6 | ||||||||||
Deutsche Bank AG | EUR | 9,436 | 1,500 | 11,236 | 7.5 | 16 | 18 | 28 | ||||||||||
Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG | EUR | 103 | 115 | 218 | 1.9 | 2 | 11 | 14 | ||||||||||
DLR Kredit A/S | DKK | 1,387 | 20 | 1,407 | 70.4 | 73 | 80 | 83 | ||||||||||
DNB Bank ASA | NOK | 55,839 | 1,800 | 57,639 | 32 | 10 | 16 | 20 | ||||||||||
DZ Bank AG Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank Frankfurt am Main | EUR | 2,578 | 525 | 3,103 | 5.9 | 18 | 26 | 29 | ||||||||||
Erste Group Bank AG | EUR | 5,391 | 550 | 6,091 | 11.1 | 23 | 33 | 36 | ||||||||||
Eurobank S.A | EUR | 1,772 | 330 | 2,152 | 6.5 | 32 | 39 | 42 | ||||||||||
FinecoBank S.p.A. | EUR | 828 | 3 | 871 | 290.5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||||||||||
Gorenjska Banka d.d. | EUR | 43 | 6 | 49 | 8.2 | 34 | 45 | 50 | ||||||||||
Graubuendner Kantonalbank | CHF | 227 | 1 | 228 | 228.3 | 12 | 18 | 29 | ||||||||||
Groupe Credit Agricole | EUR | 12,169 | 3,500 | 15,669 | 4.5 | 40 | 48 | 59 | ||||||||||
HSBC Holdings PLC | USD | 27,846 | 4,250 | 34,846 | 8.2 | 20 | 25 | 29 | ||||||||||
Ibercaja Banco S.A. | EUR | 453 | 92 | 570 | 6.2 | 25 | 34 | 39 | ||||||||||
Iccrea Banca SpA | EUR | 1,934 | 550 | 2,484 | 4.5 | 32 | 42 | 45 | ||||||||||
ING Groep N.V. | EUR | 8,254 | 1,300 | 9,780 | 7.5 | 34 | 42 | 48 | ||||||||||
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA | EUR | 13,454 | 1,600 | 15,404 | 9.6 | 19 | 24 | 30 | ||||||||||
Islandsbanki hf | ISK | 30,569 | 2,000 | 32,569 | 16.3 | 1 | 30 | 32 | ||||||||||
Jyske Bank A/S | DKK | 5,664 | 220 | 5,884 | 26.7 | 16 | 23 | 26 | ||||||||||
KBC Group N.V. | EUR | 3,973 | 270 | 4,413 | 16.3 | 23 | 30 | 37 | ||||||||||
Klarna Bank AB | SEK | 511 | 6,800 | 7,311 | 1.1 | 8 | 8 | 8 | ||||||||||
Knab N.V. | EUR | 97 | 6 | 103 | 17.2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | ||||||||||
Komercni Banka A.S. | CZK | 16,582 | 2,000 | 18,582 | 9.3 | 27 | 33 | 36 | ||||||||||
Landsbankinn hf. | ISK | 46,151 | 4,500 | 50,651 | 11.3 | 20 | 31 | 34 | ||||||||||
Lansforsakringar Bank | SEK | 2,210 | 180 | 2,780 | 15.4 | 7 | 12 | 13 | ||||||||||
LGT Bank AG | CHF | 309 | 3 | 358 | 119.3 | 0 | 2 | 4 | ||||||||||
Lloyds Banking Group PLC | GBP | 6,574 | 1,100 | 8,174 | 7.4 | 8 | 11 | 14 | ||||||||||
mBank S.A. | PLN | 3,005 | 800 | 6,805 | 8.5 | 23 | 31 | 36 | ||||||||||
Mediobanca SpA | EUR | 1,753 | 260 | 2,043 | 7.9 | 9 | 12 | 20 | ||||||||||
National Bank of Greece S.A. | EUR | 1,527 | 200 | 1,737 | 8.7 | 28 | 35 | 37 | ||||||||||
Nationwide Building Society | GBP | 1,762 | 380 | 2,642 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 1 | ||||||||||
NatWest Group PLC | GBP | 6,899 | 700 | 7,749 | 11.1 | 13 | 19 | 23 | ||||||||||
NIBC Bank N.V. | EUR | 218 | 20 | 238 | 11.9 | 10 | 16 | 24 | ||||||||||
Nordea Bank Abp | EUR | 5,984 | 200 | 6,184 | 30.9 | 13 | 17 | 23 | ||||||||||
Nova Ljubljanska Banka D.D. | EUR | 570 | 50 | 623 | 12.5 | 24 | 32 | 35 | ||||||||||
Nykredit Realkredit A/S | DKK | 15,518 | 250 | 15,768 | 63.1 | 11 | 14 | 16 | ||||||||||
Oma Savings Bank PLC | EUR | 92 | 35 | 127 | 3.6 | 8 | 12 | 16 | ||||||||||
OTP Bank PLC | HUF | 1,586,486 | 100,000 | 1,686,486 | 16.9 | 12 | 16 | 17 | ||||||||||
Piraeus Bank S.A. | EUR | 1,400 | 310 | 1,710 | 5.5 | 32 | 43 | 48 | ||||||||||
Raiffeisen Bank International AG | EUR | 2,102 | 500 | 2,902 | 5.8 | 27 | 31 | 39 | ||||||||||
RCI Banque | EUR | 1,360 | 205 | 1,565 | 7.6 | 35 | 40 | 42 | ||||||||||
Santander Consumer Bank AG | EUR | 363 | 230 | 593 | 2.6 | 29 | 31 | 34 | ||||||||||
Santander UK Group Holdings PLC | GBP | 1,609 | 250 | 2,324 | 9.3 | 2 | 3 | 12 | ||||||||||
SBAB Bank AB (publ) | SEK | 2,754 | 50 | 3,383 | 67.7 | 1 | 2 | 2 | ||||||||||
S-Bank PLC | EUR | 141 | 26 | 167 | 6.4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||||||||||
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (publ) | SEK | 43,595 | 1,400 | 44,995 | 32.1 | 14 | 18 | 26 | ||||||||||
Societe Generale | EUR | 7,307 | 1,600 | 9,207 | 5.8 | 27 | 33 | 41 | ||||||||||
Svenska Handelsbanken AB | SEK | 29,605 | 400 | 32,205 | 80.5 | 4 | 8 | 12 | ||||||||||
Swedbank AB | SEK | 36,995 | 1,250 | 40,445 | 32.4 | 6 | 8 | 10 | ||||||||||
UniCredit Bank Austria AG | EUR | 1,261 | 80 | 1,434 | 17.9 | 20 | 30 | 41 | ||||||||||
UniCredit Bank GmbH | EUR | 2,305 | 300 | 2,605 | 8.7 | 30 | 37 | 43 | ||||||||||
UniCredit SpA | EUR | 12,437 | 1,300 | 14,737 | 11.3 | 25 | 31 | 37 | ||||||||||
Van Lanschot Kempen N.V. | EUR | 206 | 10 | 216 | 21.6 | 1 | 1 | 4 | ||||||||||
Virgin Money UK PLC | GBP | 486 | 225 | 791 | 3.5 | 18 | 21 | 25 | ||||||||||
Volkswagen Bank GmbH | EUR | 807 | 130 | 937 | 7.2 | 44 | 49 | 54 | ||||||||||
CHF--Swiss franc. CZK--Czech koruna. DKK--Danish krone. f--Forecast. ISK--Icelandic króna. NOK--Norwegian krone. PLN--Polish zloty. PPI—Pre-Provision Income. SEK--Swedish krona. Source: S&P Global Ratings. |
Primary Contacts: | Nicolas Charnay, Paris 33623748591; nicolas.charnay@spglobal.com |
Giles Edwards, London 44-20-7176-7014; giles.edwards@spglobal.com | |
Osman Sattar, FCA, London 44-20-7176-7198; osman.sattar@spglobal.com | |
Karim Kroll, Frankfurt 49-69-33999-169; karim.kroll@spglobal.com | |
Secondary Contacts: | Elena Iparraguirre, Madrid 34-91-389-6963; elena.iparraguirre@spglobal.com |
Mirko Sanna, Milan 390272111275; mirko.sanna@spglobal.com | |
Benjamin Heinrich, CFA, FRM, Frankfurt 49-69-33999-167; benjamin.heinrich@spglobal.com | |
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