This report does not constitute a rating action.
Key Takeaways
- We expect global public investments by local and regional governments (LRGs) will broadly stagnate in real terms over 2024-2025 because of weaker global economic growth, higher interest rates, and many LRGs' tighter fiscal policies.
- European LRGs will increase their investments by 2% over 2024-2025, mainly supported by EU funds, rising infrastructure needs, and migration. Latin American LRGs will continue to delay investments, mainly due to limited access to external funding and declining central government transfers.
- Chinese LRGs will reduce capital expenditure (capex) due to a stronger focus on fiscal discipline and weaker economic growth prospects. Australian and Canadian LRGs, on the other hand, will increase capex because of large transportation and health care projects.
- Unlike European and Latin American LRGs, which will continue to finance most of their investments through budgetary resources, Australian and Indian LRGs will rely on borrowing.
We estimate global LRGs' investment growth will be limited over 2024-2025, with capex remaining at about 2% of GDP (see chart 1). Balanced budgetary requirements in Europe, lower central government transfers in emerging economies, weaker global economic growth, and high interest rates will weigh on investments globally.
Chart 1
We continue to expect capex of LRGs in emerging economies will lag the global average, increase infrastructure gaps, and postpone pressure on budgets beyond 2025. At the same time, capex of LRGs in developed economies will stagnate in most cases but remain above pandemic levels in most countries. In our view, this stabilization of investments stems from high inflation since LRGs prioritize operating expenditure, which limits their budget flexibility (see chart 2). Exceptions include Canada, Australia, southern Europe, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, where we expect capex will remain high or even increase. This is because of infrastructure needs in transportation and health care, high migration flows, and the availability of EU funds.
Chart 2
Europe Benefits From EU Funds And Infrastructure Needs
We estimate European LRGs' capex will grow by 2% in real terms by 2025 (see charts 3 and 4). In our view, the limited increase results from muted economic growth, the return of EU fiscal rules, and high interest rates. A rise in interest payments or structural operating expenditures, particularly for wages and subsidies, could put pressure on LRGs' operating budgets, which could translate into LRGs prioritizing operating expenditure over capex in the medium term. Additionally, higher interest rates could prevent LRGs from increasing borrowing to finance infrastructure projects.
Chart 3
Chart 4
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
CEE LRGs' infrastructure gaps exceeded those of other European countries over 2022-2023 and will continue to do so over 2024-2025. The differential stems from generally weaker institutional frameworks and less efficient management as CEE LRGs rely heavily on grants and often struggle to execute their investment plans. For example, we recently revised downward our institutional framework assessment on Polish LRGs as the central government loosened regulations on balanced budgets. In our view, this could reduce fiscal and investment predictability.
We expect CEE LRGs' investments will decline by an average of 10% in 2024, before slightly increasing by 3% in 2025. This is because the EU multiannual financial framework (MFF) cycle heavily affects CEE LRGs' investment activity. The 2014-2020 MFF cycle ended in 2023 and led to a rise in investments by an average of about 10% last year. Although the 2021-2027 MFF cycle has already started, we expect investment activity will only pick up from 2025-2026 onward as LRGs need to pre-fund investments and therefore require some time to execute these programs. This explains the drop in investments we expect for Polish and Czech LRGs in 2024. LRGs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, notably in the Republic of Srpska, might have to prioritize operating expenditure over capex because their access to external funding sources is limited.
Southern Europe
Southern European LRG currently benefit from large inflows from the Next Generation EU program, which runs from 2021 to 2026. Yet, execution rates and fund distributions vary across the region. For example, Spanish LRGs' investments will peak in 2024 and decline thereafter--even though they will remain high, at least until 2026--while Italian LRGs' investments will only peak over 2025-2026, after increasing in 2024. Both countries benefited significantly from the Recovery and Resilience Facility that needs to be executed by 2026. If spent effectively, EU funds will enable Italian LRGs, which focused less on capex as a proportion of GDP than other EU countries, to increase their investments to a level that is in line with the European average.
The Nordics
Given the demographic challenges, particularly related to high migration flows, and upcoming investment needs in water infrastructure, we expect Nordic LRGs' capex will increase over 2024-2025, particularly in Finland and Sweden. Norwegian LRGs have the highest capex levels as percentage of GDP in the Nordics due to their enlarged service mandate and high investments that resulted from demographic challenges in recent years. Danish LRGs operate under a strict central government regulation for eligible loan financing of investments. Consequently, their debt ratio and capex as a percentage of GDP are the lowest in the Nordics (see chart 3).
France and Germany
We expect French and German LRGs will increase investments only moderately. French LRGs, in particular departments, face budgetary constraints because inflation costs and lower property tax receipts reduced their operating surpluses and limited their ability to carry out investments without further deteriorating their budgetary performance. Due to the return of EU fiscal rules, some LRGs will likely have to cut down capex to meet fiscal requirements. Similarly, we expect the re-application of domestic fiscal rules will play a role in the anticipated decline in German LRGs' investments to 2.5% of GDP in 2025, from 2.7% of GDP in 2023.
European LRGs' Funding Mix
European LRGs finance their investment needs through operating surpluses and capital revenues (see chart 5). They benefit from their healthy budgetary performance and, in some instances, EU or state transfers to finance investments. In addition, binding fiscal rules, including limits on debt intakes, cap some LRGs' ability to finance investments through borrowing.
Chart 5
Latin America Still Suffers From Infrastructure Gaps
Latin American LRGs have large infrastructure gaps, mainly because of limited access to external funding, weaker budgetary performance, and their high dependency on central government transfers, which reduce their investment capabilities. We estimate capex will decline by an average of 8% in real terms by 2025, compared with 2023 (see chart 6). Capex as a proportion of GDP will decline to 1.3% of GDP in 2025, from 1.5% in 2023.
Chart 6
Argentina
The new government in Argentina plans to significantly cut expenditures, which will further limit LRGs' flexibility to undertake investments in the medium term. Additionally, LRGs' limited access to external funding prevents them from commercial borrowing to finance their investments.
Brazil
Brazilian LRGs' investments have increased, albeit from very low levels, since 2017. Then, operation car wash, one of the biggest anti-corruption investigations globally, paralyzed investments in the country. When the government changed a few years later, capex rebounded, supported by the post-pandemic economic recovery over 2021-2023. Nevertheless, capex could start to decline again in 2025 as lower federal grants and rising inflation put pressure on LRGs' cash position and operating performance.
Mexico
Mexican LRGs' investments remain similar to pre-pandemic levels, with capex representing only about 0.8% of GDP. We believe the balanced budget requirement, limits to contracting long-term funding, and declining state transfers constrain most Mexican states' fiscal flexibility and reduce infrastructure budgets.
Latin American LRGs' Funding Mix
Latin American LRGs have limited access to external funding. This is because of the lack of deep and liquid local capital markets, as well as currency and interest rate risks associated with borrowing in foreign currency, specifically in Argentina. Due to these constraints, LRGs rely on their operating surpluses and capital revenues to finance investments (see chart 7). This prevents them from investing counter-cyclically and supports growth during economic downturns.
Chart 7
Asia-Pacific (APAC) Faces A Mixed Picture
Chart 8
China
Following a record-high investment growth over 2020-2022, Chinese LRGs reduced their capex to offset revenue declines that resulted from the property market downturn and the pandemic. Additionally, Chinese LRGs accumulated large debt amounts and are now more focused on fiscal discipline, which limits capex. We estimate LRGs' capex will drop to about 10.6% of GDP in 2025, from 13.0% in 2022.
Chinese LRGs' Funding Mix
Chinese LRGs historically rely on capital revenues, mostly from land sales, to finance their land development costs (see chart 9). As the pandemic cooled the economy and the real estate market went through a correction, capital revenues and land development costs declined markedly. Accordingly, LRGs increased borrowing to fund infrastructure projects in the hope of supporting the economy. We expect this trend will moderate over 2024-2025 as LRGs will be more focused on fiscal sustainability and pacing their exit strategies, without taking too much heat out of the economy.
Chart 9
Japan
Japanese LRGs' developed infrastructure and sustained spending increases on infrastructure in recent years should allow for contained capex growth in the medium term. For example, LRGs in Osaka Prefecture are involved in large infrastructure projects, not least due to Expo 2025. The cost of these infrastructure projects will be shared with the central government and the private sector.
Australia
To stimulate regional economic growth, Australian states raised their capex substantially since the outbreak of the pandemic, with capex of 3.1% of GDP in 2023, from 2.6% in 2019. Australian LRGs have an ambitious capital investment plan for the next few years, particularly when it comes to infrastructure. This means investments will remain high over 2024-2025. For example, Victoria will carry out several transportation infrastructure projects--including the North East Link road project, which is worth Australian dollar (AUD) 26 billion--that will delay fiscal consolidation in the state.
Australian LRGs' Funding Mix
Australian LRGs rely heavily on debt funding to finance investments (see chart 10). This has been the case particularly since 2020 when they started to ramp up spending on large infrastructure projects. Australian states will continue to raise debt over the next few years because of their ambitious investment plans. We expect Australian LRGs' debt will increase to 139% of operating revenues in 2025, from 118% in 2022.
Chart 10
New Zealand
New Zealand LRGs' capex increased over 2023 as councils funded water infrastructure projects to address a backlog of renewals and comply with new environmental standards. Councils originally had a strong incentive to bring forward these projects as responsibility for water infrastructure was to be taken away from them under the former government's Three Waters Review, which is also known as the Affordable Water Reform. However, the new government has recently repealed the reform. Inflationary pressures also led to an increase in LRGs' capex as New Zealand needed access to labor and capital for infrastructure projects. We expect capex will stabilize over the next two years due to increasing fiscal constraints. Councils' long-term plans, which they will announce this year, will provide more clarity.
India
Indian LRGs are clearly an outlier in the Asia-Pacific region as they continue to raise public investments. The country's large infrastructure gaps weigh heavily on LRGs' weak budgetary metrics and high debt accumulation. A part of the country's infrastructure plan is related to the National Infrastructure Pipeline, a program that was launched by the central government and that will cost $1.5 trillion over 2020-2025.
Indian LRGs' Funding Mix
Indian LRGs' capex, which represented about 2.7% of GDP in 2023, is mostly financed through borrowing (see chart 11). This is because of LRGs' weak budgetary performance, which limits their ability to generate surpluses.
Chart 11
Canada Benefits From Large Infrastructure Projects
Canadian LRGs' increase in capex was significant, particularly since the pandemic, with capex increasing to 2.9% in 2023, from 2.5% of GDP in 2019 (see chart 12). We expect capex will continue to increase in 2024, before stabilizing at a high level in 2025. This is because Canadian LRGs, in particular provinces, have large infrastructure projects in their pipeline that are mainly related to health care and transportation projects.
Chart 12
Canadian LRGs' Funding Mix
Canadian LRGs will finance their investments mostly through borrowing in 2024, which partly reflects the fiscal framework's lack of binding budgetary performance targets and debt limits (see chart 13). LRGs benefit from unfettered access to market funding, which gives them ample flexibility to choose the timing and amount of their investments, even with relatively high levels of outstanding debt.
Chart 13
Appendix
To assess LRGs' capex trends, we focused on a sample of rated LRGs across 37 countries (see table 1). We acknowledge that LRGs' capex depends on a number of variables, which reduce direct comparability of LRGs across countries and even within in the same country. These variables include a country's degree of government centralization, LRGs' ability to generate budgetary surpluses, access to external funding to finance investments, investment needs, and the initial capital stock.
Table 1
| Local and regional governments' capital expenditure as a percentage of GDP | ||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| (%) | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | |||||||||||
| Emerging economies | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Argentina | 3.0 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.3 | |||||||||||
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 4.7 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 2.7 | |||||||||||
| Brazil | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.9 | |||||||||||
| Bulgaria | 1.0 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.1 | |||||||||||
| China | 13.4 | 14.6 | 15.0 | 16.9 | 14.1 | 13.0 | 11.6 | 11.0 | 10.6 | |||||||||||
| Czech Republic | 1.6 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.8 | 1.6 | 1.8 | |||||||||||
| India | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.8 | |||||||||||
| Jordan | 0.9 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.6 | |||||||||||
| Kazakhstan | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.1 | |||||||||||
| Latvia | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.1 | |||||||||||
| Mexico | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 | |||||||||||
| North Macedonia | N.A. | 1.2 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.7 | |||||||||||
| Poland | 1.4 | 1.8 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 1.5 | |||||||||||
| Romania | 2.3 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.2 | |||||||||||
| Serbia | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 0.9 | |||||||||||
| South Africa | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.8 | |||||||||||
| Thailand | 1.6 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | |||||||||||
| Turkiye | N.A. | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.1 | |||||||||||
| Ukraine | N.A. | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.9 | |||||||||||
| Developed economies | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Australia | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 2.9 | |||||||||||
| Austria | 3.4 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.6 | |||||||||||
| Belgium | 2.6 | 3.3 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 2.9 | |||||||||||
| Canada | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.0 | |||||||||||
| Denmark | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | |||||||||||
| Finland | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | |||||||||||
| France | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.3 | |||||||||||
| Germany | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.5 | |||||||||||
| Israel | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | |||||||||||
| Italy | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.1 | |||||||||||
| Japan | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 4.2 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 3.5 | |||||||||||
| Netherlands | N.A. | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | |||||||||||
| New Zealand | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.1 | |||||||||||
| Norway | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.7 | |||||||||||
| Spain | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 1.9 | |||||||||||
| Sweden | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | |||||||||||
| Switzerland | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.1 | |||||||||||
| U.K. | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | |||||||||||
| N.A.--Not available. Source: S&P Global Ratings. | ||||||||||||||||||||
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