articles Ratings /ratings/en/research/articles/240328-creditweek-how-will-the-multidimensional-energy-transition-affect-credit-13052110.xml content esgSubNav
In This List
COMMENTS

CreditWeek: How Will The Multidimensional Energy Transition Affect Credit?

COMMENTS

Private Markets Monthly, April 2024: Private Credit Is A Growing Segment Of Nonbank Finance

COMMENTS

Hybrids Prop Up Japanese Automakers

COMMENTS

Global Auto Sales Forecasts: Slower EV Growth Offers Temporary Relief To Legacy Automakers

COMMENTS

Credit Trends: U.S. Corporate Bond Yields As Of April 24, 2024


CreditWeek: How Will The Multidimensional Energy Transition Affect Credit?

(Editor's Note: CreditWeek is a weekly research offering from S&P Global Ratings, providing actionable and forward-looking insights on emerging credit risks and exploring the questions that matter to markets today. Subscribe to receive a new edition every Thursday at: https://www.linkedin.com/newsletters/creditweek-7115686044951273472/)

The world is beginning what S&P Global defines as a multidimensional transition: "a multispeed, multifueled, and multi-technology transition with different road maps and end points for different countries." In S&P Global Ratings' view, companies' and governments' readiness to address these risks and opportunities may become even more challenging to overcome in an environment of intensifying geopolitical fragmentation, slower growth, and tighter financing conditions.

What We're Watching

As extreme weather conditions and worsening physical climate risks continue to increase and influence credit fundamentals, companies and countries alike are experiencing a confluence of challenges—culminating in tradeoffs between energy affordability; resilience and security; decarbonization efforts; and climate adaptation needs—in approaching and accelerating a multidimensional transition to a low-carbon global economy.

Decarbonization needs to take place at a global scale, but has so far failed to happen in companies across most sectors—and will require a broad range of solutions to overcome rising and ranging risks that could result in significant disruption. Our research shows that in a slow transition scenario, up to 4.4% of the world's GDP could be lost annually (absent adaptation) by 2050 if global warming does not stay well below 2 degrees Celsius, compared with preindustrial levels.

Investment in, access to, and utilization of renewable energy powered by hydrogen, wind, solar, and other sources is beneficially growing. Notably, renewable electricity generation may now be cheaper than power from fossil fuels. But while this green energy growth is expanding the global energy mix, demand is also increasing—and these green investments aren't yet demonstrably replacing fossil fuels or diminishing dependencies on them, and as such not yet altering the profitability of or access to financing for the oil and gas sector. Additionally, we see capital flows currently strongly favoring renewable power generating assets (namely wind and solar) with less focus on, for example, transmission and storage. The dislocation between policy intent and current investment is likely to result in integration bottlenecks and dysfunction in energy markets, unless market design evolves quickly.

How both public- and private-sector market participants respond to evolving regulations, adopt new technologies, and adapt to disruptive business models amid the transition will shape the breadth and depth of change required (across industries, supply chains, and customer bases, among others) to limit the potential dramatic consequences of climate change.

What We Think And Why

Climate change is a growing risk factor—and credit risk is higher in an abrupt transition. Because implementing comprehensive and coordinated climate policies and strategies remains challenging for countries and companies, divergences in actions across regions and/or industries could reshuffle sector-specific competitiveness.

The potential for negative implications across supply chains could result in weakened business positions or profitability for certain players or prompt ongoing regulatory adjustments that reduce stability, affect visibility, or jeopardize investment decisions. Borrowers managing a multidimensional transition may see credit risks become more material from the costs of decarbonizing their assets, the requirements of regulatory changes, and the uncertainty surrounding the longer time horizon discouraging some market participants from acting more imminently.

Physical climate risks may see some borrowers experience higher costs from any extreme weather events' direct damage to assets and returning their business operations to normal after disruptions from heat waves, floods, storms, wildfires, and other hazards. Corporates may also see physical risks impact their access to key inputs, costs, and availability of insurance against such events, with some markets already seeing coverage withdrawn. From an adaptation perspective, sovereigns and governments in localities with worsening physical risk exposure (along with a lack of resources, capacity, or support to adapt) that could see credit quality deteriorate may require support from developed economies and a combination of public and private funding to finance their needs and support their fiscal performance, economic strength, and growth prospects.

The hardest-to-abate sectors face particularly challenging decarbonization-related credit risks, but these higher carbon-emitting sectors have yet to feel significant credit pressure. We believe disclosure and transparency by companies about their chosen emissions-reduction solutions—and how they are planning for the associated risks—will better enable analysis of how companies might meet their decarbonization commitments and mitigate some credit risks. In the end, decarbonization could create new markets and applications for some sectors.

image

What Could Change

Balancing decarbonization with the increasing demand for key commodities may prove more difficult in the near-term amid ongoing credit headwinds and geopolitical uncertainty—especially as the costs of the energy transition continue to tighten in 2024.

Market participants are concurrently confronting still-higher-for-longer interest rates, tighter financing conditions, and heightened uncertainty about the payoff of prioritizing the transition above competing priorities (including trade frictions, spending constraints, and access to liquidity) in a more fragmented and disrupted world.

Increased geopolitical fragmentation may majorly challenge countries' willingness and abilities to address climate change if their focus shifts towards energy security. Because physical climate risks are global in nature, addressing them requires global coordination—with consideration to support adaptation in, and the multidimensional transition for, developing and lower-income countries, which are 4.4x more exposed to climate risks than their wealthier peers but lack the financial flexibility to address such challenges. Many are primarily focused on energy affordability.

But on the brighter side, we believe the climate policy paradigm has evolved to a more constructive macroeconomic transition model where green growth and a sustainable environment can coexist—under which ensuring that the benefits are shared equitably across the global landscape is critical for success. Developing technologies and the adoption of artificial intelligence at low costs and at scale will enable solutions to advance the transition under this framework.

Writer: Molly Mintz

This report does not constitute a rating action.

Primary Credit Analysts:Terry Ellis, London +44 20 7176 0597;
terry.ellis@spglobal.com
Paul Munday, London + 44 (20) 71760511;
paul.munday@spglobal.com
Pierre Georges, Paris + 33 14 420 6735;
pierre.georges@spglobal.com
Secondary Contact:Alexandra Dimitrijevic, London + 44 20 7176 3128;
alexandra.dimitrijevic@spglobal.com

No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, valuations, model, software, or other application or output therefrom) or any part thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced, or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC or its affiliates (collectively, S&P). The Content shall not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees, or agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, or availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of the Content, or for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an “as is” basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE CONTENT’S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED, OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs or losses caused by negligence) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages.

Credit-related and other analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they are expressed and not statements of fact. S&P’s opinions, analyses, and rating acknowledgment decisions (described below) are not recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions, and do not address the suitability of any security. S&P assumes no obligation to update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment, and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors, and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. S&P does not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor except where registered as such. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives. Rating-related publications may be published for a variety of reasons that are not necessarily dependent on action by rating committees, including, but not limited to, the publication of a periodic update on a credit rating and related analyses.

To the extent that regulatory authorities allow a rating agency to acknowledge in one jurisdiction a rating issued in another jurisdiction for certain regulatory purposes, S&P reserves the right to assign, withdraw, or suspend such acknowledgement at any time and in its sole discretion. S&P Parties disclaim any duty whatsoever arising out of the assignment, withdrawal, or suspension of an acknowledgment as well as any liability for any damage alleged to have been suffered on account thereof.

S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their respective activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain nonpublic information received in connection with each analytical process.

S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites, www.spglobal.com/ratings (free of charge), and www.ratingsdirect.com (subscription), and may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information about our ratings fees is available at www.spglobal.com/usratingsfees.