(Editor's Note: S&P Global Ratings believes there is a high degree of unpredictability around policy implementation by the U.S. administration and possible responses--specifically with regard to tariffs--and the potential effect on economies, supply chains, and credit conditions around the world. As a result, our baseline forecasts carry a significant amount of uncertainty. As situations evolve, we will gauge the macro and credit materiality of potential and actual policy shifts and reassess our guidance accordingly (see our research here: spglobal.com/ratings).)
Key Takeaways
- A resilient economy, sustained earnings growth, and a more manageable near-term refinancing burden lead us to forecast the U.S. speculative-grade corporate default rate will fall to 3.5% by December 2025.
- The default rate rose to 5.1% as of December 2024 mostly because of rising distressed exchanges, which we expect will remain popular as long-term interest rates remain high.
- In our optimistic scenario, we forecast the default rate could fall to 2.25% as interest rates fall faster than anticipated.
- In our pessimistic scenario, we forecast the default rate could rise to 6% as certain subsectors suffer from potential tariff increases and other political uncertainties.
S&P Global Ratings expects the U.S. trailing-12-month speculative-grade corporate default rate to fall to 3.5% by December 2025, from 5.1% in December 2024. The default rate had been falling through third-quarter 2024 but rose by year-end, almost entirely because of increased distressed exchanges, which reached roughly 65% of all defaults in the fourth quarter. Macrofinancial factors like stubbornly high interest rates have been a source of moderate stress for the weakest-rated borrowers--not enough to induce bankruptcy, but enough to force many to seek reprieve from borrowing costs.
Nonetheless, tight spreads, lower benchmark borrowing costs for loan issuers, and more manageable near-term debt are helping many issuers to better service their debt. And for now, we expect economic growth to slow but continue in 2025, while earnings have remained strong. However, downside risks are growing.
Chart 1
In our optimistic scenario, we forecast the default rate could fall to 2.25%. In this scenario, interest rates would fall faster than anticipated if inflation declines, but such a decline has proved elusive thus far amid a growing likelihood of increased tariffs and extended tax cuts in the face of rising government debt. More likely, rates could be cut out of necessity to offset the slowing growth widely expected in the coming quarters.
In our pessimistic scenario, we forecast the default rate could rise to 6%. The threat of rising U.S. tariffs, including 10% tariffs on Chinese imports and 25% tariffs on Canadian and Mexican imports, is becoming more real. But tariffs' impact on future defaults could be somewhat limited over the next 12 months, considering their ultimate timing and the relatively small number of weaker-rated issuers from subsectors most reliant on these imports.
Less clear is the potential impact on defaults in service sectors from changes in immigration policies, which could affect labor markets and economic growth. Such uncertainties may not automatically result in increased defaults, but vulnerability is higher given the weak ratings distribution since 2020 (see chart 2).
Chart 2
The Age Of Distressed Exchanges
We expect the U.S. speculative-grade corporate default rate to decline in the near term, but more slowly than its recent ascent. The 5.1% default rate as of December reflects macroeconomic fundamentals as well as situational debt restructurings and distressed exchanges initiated to avoid more traditional default events (involving otherwise lower recovery levels). Through the end of 2024, the distressed exchange default rate was 3.2%, compared with a default rate of 2% for all other types of default (see chart 3).
The distressed exchange default rate has never before surpassed the default rate for more traditional defaults except in 2021, when defaults were declining after the pandemic-induced recession. But now, distressed exchanges have led the default rate upward, in the absence of a recession. This dynamic likely results from prolonged higher interest rates, which have stressed weaker-rated issuers, but not enough to force more traditional defaults, given resilient economic growth and market expectations for rates to decline.
Chart 3
Supportive Markets Portend Fewer Defaults
Bond spreads fell through most of 2024, with some short-lived widening in early August before hitting an all-time low in early December of 214 basis points (bps). Markets remain hungry for yield even though Treasury yields have flirted with 5% recently.
The U.S. speculative-grade corporate spread indicates future defaults based on a roughly one-year lead time (see chart 4). At 227 bps in December, the average speculative-grade bond spread implies a much lower default rate by December 2025. Even loan spreads--which ended December at 424 bps--remain relatively favorable, given the large percentage of leveraged loans in the U.S. rated 'B' or 'B-'.
Chart 4
That said, the corporate distress ratio (defined as the proportion of speculative-grade bonds trading with option-adjusted spreads of 1,000 bps or more over Treasuries) is a more targeted indicator of future defaults across credit and economic cycles, especially during periods of less stress. The distress ratio indicates future defaults with a roughly nine-month lead. The 4.3% distress ratio in December would approximately correspond to a 2.4% default rate for September 2025 (see chart 5).
Chart 5
Using the CBOE Volatility Index, the ISM Purchasing Managers' Index, and components of the money supply, we estimate that in December, the average speculative-grade bond spread in the U.S. was about 220 bps below the implied level (see chart 6).
Chart 6
Tightening spreads often signal opportune times for companies to come to the market, and spreads over the last 12 months have certainly reflected that. A total $900 billion in speculative-grade bonds and leveraged loans was issued in 2024--second only to the record-setting $1.2 trillion in 2021 (see chart 7). Nonetheless, roughly three-quarters of the total went toward refinancing existing debt--a historically high percentage.
Chart 7
This large amount of issuance helped reduce the near-term refinancing obligations for speculative-grade issuers (see chart 8). Maturing debt due 2025-2027 totals roughly $803 billion, compared with $882 billion due 2024-2026. However, even if near-term maturities have shrunk, the 2028 total of $746 billion remains sizable.
Chart 8
Credit Indicators Continue Moderate Improvement
Market signals have been bullish, but many other credit and economic indicators remain more challenging (see table). Bank lending conditions continue to tighten, the yield curve remains inverted after nearly two years, and the number of weakest links (issuers rated 'B-' or lower by S&P Global Ratings with negative rating outlooks or ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications) remains elevated. Credit conditions appear to be stabilizing, but defaults remain slightly above the long-term average.
Credit indicators remain largely stable | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
U.S. unemployment rate (%) | Fed survey on lending conditions | Industrial production (Y/Y % change) | Slope of the yield curve (10 year - 3 month) (bps) | Corporate profits (nonfinancial) (Y/Y % change) | Equity market volatility (VIX) | High-yield spreads (bps) | NA CDX (bps) | Interest burden (%) | S&P Global Ratings distress ratio (%) | S&P Global Ratings U.S. SG neg. bias (%) | Ratio of downgrades to total rating actions (%)* | Proportion of SG initial issuer ratings B- or lower (%) | U.S. weakest links (no.) | |||||||||||||||||
2019Q1 | 3.8 | 2.8 | 0.6 | 1 | 5.2 | 13.7 | 385.2 | 349 | 11.3 | 7.0 | 19.8 | 73.3 | 40.8 | 150 | ||||||||||||||||
2019Q2 | 3.6 | (4.2) | (0.7) | (12) | 4.3 | 15.1 | 415.6 | 324 | 11.2 | 6.8 | 20.3 | 67.3 | 41.7 | 167 | ||||||||||||||||
2019Q3 | 3.5 | (2.8) | (1.6) | (20) | 6.4 | 16.2 | 434.1 | 350 | 10.7 | 7.6 | 21.4 | 81.5 | 37.7 | 178 | ||||||||||||||||
2019Q4 | 3.6 | 5.4 | (2.0) | 37 | 4.7 | 13.8 | 399.7 | 281 | 10.3 | 7.5 | 23.2 | 81.0 | 39.6 | 195 | ||||||||||||||||
2020Q1 | 4.4 | 0 | (5.1) | 59 | (6.5) | 53.5 | 850.2 | 658 | 10.2 | 35.2 | 37.1 | 89.9 | 54.0 | 316 | ||||||||||||||||
2020Q2 | 11.1 | 41.5 | (10.6) | 50 | (15.7) | 30.4 | 635.9 | 516 | 9.9 | 12.7 | 52.4 | 94.6 | 72.1 | 429 | ||||||||||||||||
2020Q3 | 7.8 | 71.2 | (6.4) | 59 | 9.2 | 26.4 | 576.9 | 409 | 8.2 | 9.5 | 47.5 | 63.3 | 46.2 | 390 | ||||||||||||||||
2020Q4 | 6.7 | 37.7 | (3.7) | 84 | (1.0) | 22.8 | 434.4 | 293 | 8.6 | 5.0 | 40.4 | 50.0 | 57.9 | 339 | ||||||||||||||||
2021Q1 | 6 | 5.5 | 0.6 | 171 | 24.2 | 19.4 | 390.8 | 308 | 8.0 | 3.4 | 29.9 | 30.6 | 49.5 | 265 | ||||||||||||||||
2021Q2 | 5.9 | -15.1 | 8.7 | 140 | 47.1 | 15.8 | 357.3 | 274 | 7.5 | 2.3 | 20.6 | 24.1 | 42.2 | 191 | ||||||||||||||||
2021Q3 | 4.8 | (32.4) | 3.2 | 148 | 10.5 | 23.1 | 357.1 | 302 | 7.7 | 2.6 | 16.0 | 27.3 | 36.5 | 155 | ||||||||||||||||
2021Q4 | 3.9 | (18.2) | 3.0 | 146 | 21.2 | 17.2 | 350.8 | 292 | 7.7 | 2.6 | 14.1 | 34.5 | 33.3 | 131 | ||||||||||||||||
2022Q1 | 3.6 | (14.5) | 4.6 | 180 | 3.6 | 20.6 | 346.1 | 376 | 7.7 | 2.7 | 12.5 | 36.0 | 30.4 | 121 | ||||||||||||||||
2022Q2 | 3.6 | (1.5) | 3.2 | 126 | 1.8 | 28.7 | 546.1 | 578 | 7.2 | 8.3 | 13.8 | 46.9 | 45.5 | 127 | ||||||||||||||||
2022Q3 | 3.5 | 24.2 | 4.6 | 50 | 7.0 | 31.6 | 481.4 | 609 | 6.7 | 7.9 | 16.7 | 57.8 | 50.0 | 144 | ||||||||||||||||
2022Q4 | 3.5 | 39.1 | 0.6 | (54) | 6.6 | 21.7 | 414.8 | 485 | 6.0 | 7.3 | 19.1 | 76.0 | 71.4 | 195 | ||||||||||||||||
2023Q1 | 3.5 | 44.8 | 0.1 | (137) | 9.0 | 18.7 | 414.9 | 463 | 5.1 | 9.2 | 20.2 | 61.0 | 75.0 | 299 | ||||||||||||||||
2023Q2 | 3.6 | 46 | (0.4) | (162) | 3.9 | 13.6 | 355.5 | 430 | 4.4 | 7.2 | 19.8 | 63.4 | 56.7 | 207 | ||||||||||||||||
2023Q3 | 3.8 | 50.8 | (0.2) | (96) | 3.8 | 17.5 | 344.0 | 481 | 3.9 | 6.5 | 21.7 | 60.2 | 40.0 | 229 | ||||||||||||||||
2023Q4 | 3.7 | 33.9 | 0.8 | (152) | 10.4 | 12.5 | 297.9 | 356 | 3.6 | 5.9 | 21.7 | 66.0 | 50.0 | 228 | ||||||||||||||||
2024Q1 | 3.8 | 14.5 | (0.3) | (126) | 8.6 | 13.0 | 247.1 | 329 | 3.5 | 4.9 | 20.8 | 51.9 | 35.3 | 212 | ||||||||||||||||
2024Q2 | 4 | 15.6 | 0.8 | (112) | 10.8 | 12.2 | 246.5 | 344 | 3.3 | 5.8 | 20.3 | 52.1 | 50.9 | 194 | ||||||||||||||||
2024Q3 | 4.1 | 7.9 | (0.6) | (92) | 5.9 | 16.7 | 261.4 | 330 | 3.2 | 4.8 | 19.5 | 51.5 | 43.3 | 182 | ||||||||||||||||
2024Q4 | 4.1 | 0 | 0.5 | 21 | 17.4 | 238.9 | 312 | 4.3 | 18.5 | 57.5 | 51.6 | 168 | ||||||||||||||||||
Fed survey refers to net tightening for large firms. S&P Global Ratings' negative bias is defined as the percentage of firms with negative bias out of those with either negative, positive, or stable bias. *Speculative-grade only. Bps--Basis points. SG--Speculative-grade. Y/Y--Year over year. Sources: Economics and Country Risk from IHS Markit; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.); Bureau of Labor Statistics; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; Chicago Board Options Exchange's CBOE Volatility Index; and S&P Global Ratings Credit Research & Insights. |
Upgrades Keep Momentum
Upgrades have outnumbered downgrades over the last 12 months, and net bias (the share of issuers with ratings that have positive outlooks or CreditWatch implications minus the share of ratings with negative outlooks or CreditWatch implications) has become less negative in recent quarters, suggesting a modest pace of net downgrades in the future (see chart 9). A major spike in defaults therefore appears unlikely in the near term.
Chart 9
In the fourth quarter, just two of the 13 sectors we track had positive net bias, one reached zero, and the remaining 10 had negative net bias (see chart 10).
Chart 10
Downgrades of speculative-grade issuers have increased since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the share of issuers rated 'CCC' to 'C' has grown (see chart 11). However, following the increase in defaults in 2023, the proportion of these issuers has started to decline in the past 12 months. These lowest-rated issuers have historically had much higher default rates, and we expect them to remain stressed over the next few quarters.
Consumer
Consumer-reliant sectors accounted for 43% of U.S. defaults in 2024, down from 51% the year prior, though consumer conditions largely deteriorated. The consumer products sector had the highest number of defaults, at 18. The consumer products sector also had the highest number of weakest links at the end of December, with 29, though this tally was down from the beginning of the year.
High interest rates and the cumulative effects of inflation have depleted consumer savings and discretionary income, particularly for lower-income borrowers. Larger price gaps and increased availability of products have allowed private label products to gain market share relative to branded peers as supply chains have normalized.
Health care
The health care sector had the second-highest tallies of defaults and weakest links in December, with 16 and 23, respectively. This sector is more vulnerable to cash flow disruptions amid high interest rates and inflation, given its larger share of issuers rated 'B-' or below that have floating-rate debt. These highly leveraged companies continue to struggle with inflationary and labor pressures.
Health care spending is on the rise due to increased utilization, keeping labor costs elevated. Meanwhile, inflation is also contributing to the rise in spending and may lead to tougher pricing negotiations and increased claim denials, which would pressure margins and cash flow.
Media and entertainment
The media and entertainment sector had the third-highest number of defaults last year, with 15, after leading all sectors in 2023. It also tied with health care for the second-highest number of weakest links in December, with 23.
Several legacy media companies have finally attained profitability in streaming, which could support higher cash flow in 2025. Moreover, both industry companies and investors are optimistic about potentially more supportive conditions for mergers and acquisitions, though sizable deals aren't likely in the near term. But sticky inflation and higher interest rates will likely continue to weaken consumers' discretionary spending, especially for media.
While issuers in this sector refinanced large amounts of debt through the fourth quarter, helping to curb near-term risk, companies rated in the 'B' category or lower with high leverage and weak competitive positioning continue to confront challenges in refinancing upcoming maturities.
Chart 11
How We Determine Our U.S. Default Rate Forecast
Our U.S. default rate forecast is based on current observations and on expectations of the likely path of the U.S. economy and financial markets. In addition to our baseline projection, we forecast the default rate in optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. We expect the default rate to finish at 2.25% in December 2025 (37 defaults in the trailing 12 months) in our optimistic scenario and 6% (98 defaults in the trailing 12 months) in our pessimistic scenario.
We determine our forecast based on a variety of factors, including our proprietary analytical tool for U.S. speculative-grade issuer defaults. The main components of the analytical tool are economic variables (the unemployment rate, for example), financial variables (such as corporate profits), the Federal Reserve's senior loan officer opinion survey on bank lending practices, the interest burden, the slope of the yield curve, and credit-related variables (such as negative bias).
In addition to our quantitative frameworks, we consider current market conditions and expectations. Factors we focus on can include equity and bond pricing trends and expectations, overall financing conditions, the current ratings mix, refunding needs, and negative and positive developments within industrial sectors. We update our outlook for the U.S. speculative-grade corporate default rate each quarter after analyzing the latest economic data and expectations.
Related Research
- Economic Research: Announced Steel And Aluminum Tariffs Would Mean Little Change For U.S. GDP And Prices, Bigger Risks For Downstream Users, Feb. 12, 2025
- Economic Research: How Might Trump's Tariffs--If Fully Implemented--Affect U.S. Growth, Inflation, And Rates?, Feb. 6, 2025
- Economic Research: Slowing Immigration Could Derail U.S. Economic Growth Momentum, Jan. 16, 2025
- 2023 Annual Global Corporate Default And Rating Transition Study, Dec. 28, 2024
- Credit Conditions North America Q1 2025: Policy Shifts, Rising Tensions, Dec. 3, 2024
- Economic Outlook U.S. Q1 2025: Steady Growth, Significant Policy Uncertainty, Nov. 26, 2024
This report does not constitute a rating action.
Ratings Performance Analytics: | Nick W Kraemer, FRM, New York + 1 (212) 438 1698; nick.kraemer@spglobal.com |
Brenden J Kugle, Englewood + 1 (303) 721 4619; brenden.kugle@spglobal.com | |
Research Contributor: | Vaishali Singh, CRISIL Global Analytical Center, an S&P affiliate, Mumbai |
No content (including ratings, credit-related analyses and data, valuations, model, software, or other application or output therefrom) or any part thereof (Content) may be modified, reverse engineered, reproduced, or distributed in any form by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC or its affiliates (collectively, S&P). The Content shall not be used for any unlawful or unauthorized purposes. S&P and any third-party providers, as well as their directors, officers, shareholders, employees, or agents (collectively S&P Parties) do not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, or availability of the Content. S&P Parties are not responsible for any errors or omissions (negligent or otherwise), regardless of the cause, for the results obtained from the use of the Content, or for the security or maintenance of any data input by the user. The Content is provided on an “as is” basis. S&P PARTIES DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR USE, FREEDOM FROM BUGS, SOFTWARE ERRORS OR DEFECTS, THAT THE CONTENT’S FUNCTIONING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED, OR THAT THE CONTENT WILL OPERATE WITH ANY SOFTWARE OR HARDWARE CONFIGURATION. In no event shall S&P Parties be liable to any party for any direct, indirect, incidental, exemplary, compensatory, punitive, special or consequential damages, costs, expenses, legal fees, or losses (including, without limitation, lost income or lost profits and opportunity costs or losses caused by negligence) in connection with any use of the Content even if advised of the possibility of such damages.
Credit-related and other analyses, including ratings, and statements in the Content are statements of opinion as of the date they are expressed and not statements of fact. S&P’s opinions, analyses, and rating acknowledgment decisions (described below) are not recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any securities or to make any investment decisions, and do not address the suitability of any security. S&P assumes no obligation to update the Content following publication in any form or format. The Content should not be relied on and is not a substitute for the skill, judgment, and experience of the user, its management, employees, advisors, and/or clients when making investment and other business decisions. S&P does not act as a fiduciary or an investment advisor except where registered as such. While S&P has obtained information from sources it believes to be reliable, S&P does not perform an audit and undertakes no duty of due diligence or independent verification of any information it receives. Rating-related publications may be published for a variety of reasons that are not necessarily dependent on action by rating committees, including, but not limited to, the publication of a periodic update on a credit rating and related analyses.
To the extent that regulatory authorities allow a rating agency to acknowledge in one jurisdiction a rating issued in another jurisdiction for certain regulatory purposes, S&P reserves the right to assign, withdraw, or suspend such acknowledgement at any time and in its sole discretion. S&P Parties disclaim any duty whatsoever arising out of the assignment, withdrawal, or suspension of an acknowledgment as well as any liability for any damage alleged to have been suffered on account thereof.
S&P keeps certain activities of its business units separate from each other in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of their respective activities. As a result, certain business units of S&P may have information that is not available to other S&P business units. S&P has established policies and procedures to maintain the confidentiality of certain nonpublic information received in connection with each analytical process.
S&P may receive compensation for its ratings and certain analyses, normally from issuers or underwriters of securities or from obligors. S&P reserves the right to disseminate its opinions and analyses. S&P's public ratings and analyses are made available on its Web sites, www.spglobal.com/ratings (free of charge), and www.ratingsdirect.com (subscription), and may be distributed through other means, including via S&P publications and third-party redistributors. Additional information about our ratings fees is available at www.spglobal.com/usratingsfees.