Rated oil and gas producers should be able to deliver on short-term greenhouse gas reduction targets for their own operations, but achieving net zero requires technological advancements and supportive policy. This is the main finding of this research, which explores potential risks for oil and gas companies amid evolving emissions regulations.

In this research, we focus our analysis on greenhouse gas emissions (hereafter also emissions) associated with upstream oil and gas operations (exploration, drilling, and extraction). Our references to emissions and greenhouse gases relate to scope 1 and 2 emissions and do not cover scope 3 emissions unless otherwise stated.

This research complements our reports on other sectors that use oil and gas products (see "Decarbonizing Hard-To-Abate Sectors: Credit Quality Implications And Six Key Observations," published June 25, 2024). We used data from S&P Global Commodity Insights, the International Energy Agency (IEA), U.S. Energy Information Agency, and other sources. We also analyzed emissions reduction solutions currently available.

Demand For Oil And Gas Is Rising And Emissions Remain High

The oil and gas sector is one of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases globally, and is expected to remain important for the energy system and transition for decades to come. In recent years, there has been a renewed focus on energy security, access, and affordability in many countries and regions.

As a result, global demand for crude oil and natural gas has continued to rise, and with it the volume of greenhouse gas emissions from the sector. S&P Global Commodity Insights expects demand for crude oil and liquids to peak by about 2030, and that for natural gas about 10 years later (see chart 1).

Chart 1

Decarbonizing the oil and gas sector will play a critical role for other industries and for governments to meet their emissions reduction targets. Scope 3 emissions stemming from the combustion of fossil fuels by customers (including their use in industrial processes) account for the largest share of the oil and gas sector’s emissions. However, cutting scope 1 and 2 emissions from upstream oil and gas operations would also have a significant impact on emissions reduction efforts.

Listed energy companies were responsible for the third highest amount of scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions in 2022. This is according to findings discussed in "Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trends: Most Global Industries Haven't Reduced Emissions, Only Their Intensity," published Nov. 21, 2024, where the group of energy companies in the dataset included entities in the energy equipment and services, and oil, gas, and consumable fuels industries. That year, the oil and gas sector accounted for almost 15% of global energy-related scope 1 and scope 2 greenhouse gas emissions, according to the IEA. The IEA's estimate includes the production, transport, and processing of oil and gas, which is broader than the focus of this report.

The sector's emissions reduction efforts appear to be lagging more ambitious goals. The IEA estimates that absolute scope 1 and 2 emissions from the oil and gas sector would need to reduce by 60% and 65%, respectively, by 2030, compared with the 2022 levels, to be on track for the IEA's net-zero emissions scenario. At the same time, the IEA estimates that the intensity of emissions would have to reduce by 50% and 55%, since volumes are not expected to decline materially due to continued demand.

The amount and intensity of emissions from major oil and gas producers have declined somewhat over the past five years, however. This is demonstrated by statistics from the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI), which publishes industry averages, and from S&P Global Commodity Insights, which publishes data on oil and gas majors (see chart 2). Among the companies we rate, we see quite mixed performance, from roughly no change to as much as a 20% improvement of both measures. For individual companies, both absolute emissions and their intensity are sensitive to production levels and the impact of efficiency measures already implemented. At the sector level, a 45% reduction in upstream methane emissions has translated into reductions of both total emissions and emissions intensity.

Chart 2

Chart 3

Carbon intensity can vary widely depending on the location, size, and age of oil and gas fields, as well as the technologies used. The most efficient fields can achieve carbon intensity values lower than 10 kilograms of CO2 per barrel of oil equivalent (kgCO2/boe; see chart 4). For example, certain offshore fields in Norway have already seen investment in decarbonization solutions. At the other end of the scale, assets such as the Canadian oil sands can require much more energy, for example if steam assistance is needed for extraction, meaning the carbon intensity can exceed 80kgCO2/boe.

Chart 4

Regulations To Foster Decarbonization Aren't Uniform And Are Still Evolving

Emissions regulations are a major source of potential climate transition risk for the oil and gas sector, in our view. Since the sector is one of the most significant greenhouse gas emitters, we expect pressure to decarbonize will continue to build. However, the pace will likely be uneven across regions, with factors like changing government priorities, evolving investor sentiment, and regional economic dynamics each playing a role (see “Credit FAQ: How The Global Climate Policy Pendulum Influences Our Credit Ratings,” published April 9, 2025).

Without a comprehensive policy framework that provides financial incentives, continued progress on decarbonizing the oil and gas sector could be slow. We believe uncertainty regarding the long-term stability of emissions policies and carbon credits could delay commitments to develop large-scale projects. This is particularly the case in the U.S. where it's unclear how many of the rules and incentives established will remain intact under the new administration. Longer-term decarbonization goals tend to rely on more nascent technologies--like clean energy, hydrogen, and carbon capture usage and storage--whose development and economic viability will depend on policies that support ongoing investments.

However, the scope and reach of emissions regulations differ by market (see chart 5). For example, near-term pressure for U.S.-based oil and gas producers to decarbonize has eased after the new U.S. administration’s announced review of climate policies, including its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change for a second time, reversal of the previous administration’s proposed methane fee, and ambition to expand domestic oil and gas production. In contrast, governments elsewhere, like in Europe, are tightening emissions-related regulations. In emerging markets like Brazil, decarbonization efforts will contend with priorities to ensure access and affordability of energy for the population, as well as the economic benefits of increasing oil and gas production.

Chart 5

Overall, we don’t anticipate meaningful strategic shifts from U.S.-based oil and gas producers resulting from the new administration’s policy changes. The sector's priorities will likely remain driven by returns, commodity prices, and demand. That said, we consider that changes in policies--and the uncertainty associated with such changes--could lead some companies to deprioritize investment and subsequently need to catch up if regulations tighten again. This is partly why we believe companies taking action now to reduce emissions could eventually be ahead of, or at least remain in step with, potential new and more stringent regulatory requirements. This should enable them to better manage potentially rising decarbonization costs and related credit risks.

Table 1

Summary of regulatory approach in key markets
Market	Approach
European Union	The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) requires upstream and refining companies to purchase allowances for each ton of CO2 that they emit. In some countries within the EU ETS, such as Norway, fixed tax rates can exceed the EU ETS price, requiring companies to pay further levies on top of the allowance costs. The EU Methane Regulation, which took effect in 2024, mandates strict monitoring and reporting of emissions, requires leak-detection and repair practices, and prohibits non-emergency venting and flaring.
U.S.	Under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) the Environmental Protection Agency introduced a waste emissions charge (WEC), which levies a tax on methane emissions exceeding specific performance levels. The WEC set the taxes at $900 per metric ton of methane, increasing to $1,200 in 2025 and $1,500 from 2026. However, the IRA also provides tax credit support for methane reduction, carbon capture and storage, dedicated renewables, and clean hydrogen development; for example, the 45Q tax credit provides up to $85 per ton of carbon captured and stored. The WEC took effect in 2024; however, the new U.S. administration has recently taken steps to rescind it.
Canada	Government has set a target to reduce methane emissions from the oil and gas sector by 75% by 2030 compared with the 2012 level, building on its previous target of 40%-45% by 2025. The initiative includes up to C$750 million in assistance from the Emissions Reduction Fund to support investment into reducing the amount of methane being vented. Limitations on emissions from pneumatic devices are expected to help achieve these goals. The Canadian government has also consulted on a proposed oil and gas sector greenhouse gas emissions cap, which would set annual limits and introduce mechanisms such as emissions trading. The proposal suggests the allowance price could be about C$50 per tonne of CO2e.
Norway	Government has provided direct funding to carbon capture, usage, and storage (CCUS) projects covering a significant portion of project costs, rather than tax credits. In addition, a carbon tax encourages participation in projects like CCUS that reduce companies' carbon tax liabilities.

Partnerships And Initiatives Seek To Advance Decarbonization

We observe the formation of a number of alliances between oil and gas companies and other interested stakeholders aiming to advance progress on decarbonization and technology development. We find that most rated oil and gas companies are members of one or more climate alliances, including large global producers like Saudi Aramco, ExxonMobil, and Shell.

We believe such engagement demonstrates market participants' support for sustainability, emissions reduction, and innovation, and observe that these alliances can be effective forums to exchange information and perspectives on policies that support decarbonization (see table 2).

Table 2

Key alliances focused on decarbonizing the oil and gas industry
Alliance	Targets
Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI)	The OGCI has committed to achieving net zero scope 1 and scope 2 emissions from operations by 2050. Its 12 members represent about 30% of global oil and gas production. The OCGI is on track to meet its interim target of reducing the intensity of upstream carbon emissions from about 23 kg in 2017 to 17 kg CO2e/boe by 2025; after bringing it down to 17.9 kg in 2023. The group also has a target to reduce methane emissions to almost zero by 2030, and was able to reduce its absolute methane emissions by 55% from 2017 to 2023.
Net-Zero Producers Forum (NZPF)	The NZPF's goal is to support efforts to achieve net-zero emissions by advancing technologies like CCUS, methane reduction, and hydrogen development.
Global Methane Pledge (GMP)	The GMP is a collaboration between governments and heavy emitting industries, including oil and gas, that has pledged to cut global methane emissions by 30% by 2030, compared with 2020 levels.

Most Rated Oil And Gas Companies Aim To Cut Emissions Meaningfully By 2030

These range from supermajors and national oil companies to smaller independent operators. Generally, their short-term targets are to reduce scope 1 and scope 2 emissions 20%-55% by the end of this decade. Longer-term aspirations target net zero by 2050. Some companies have more ambitious targets, such as achieving net-zero scope 1 and scope 2 emissions by 2035 or sooner (see the Appendix for more details).

The targets feature reductions of both absolute emissions and the intensity of emissions, with the latter offering more flexibility for growth of oil and gas production volumes. Some companies have also set scope 3 targets focusing on new business lines.

Strategies to achieve most near-term targets focus on cutting methane emissions, including through reduced flaring and venting. Energy efficiency improvements, such as from equipment upgrades, are also expected to contribute to near-term goals.

Longer-term targets tend to rely more heavily on offsetting emissions through nature-based solutions and technologies. These include carbon capture and storage (CCS), as well as the development of clean energy, carbon credit markets, and the advancement of new technologies such as green hydrogen production.

Existing technologies appear able to handle near-term emissions reduction goals. Among the decarbonization technologies we explored, certain key solutions are in various stages of development and application (see table 3).

Table 3

Decarbonization solutions in detail

Energy efficiency improvements will help reduce emissions across the board with low additional investment. The oil and gas sector has a history of achieving strong operational and productivity improvements. Optimizing drilling techniques using AI and real-time data will enable further efficiency gains while reducing the emissions intensity of operations, as will the replacement of equipment with newer, more efficient equipment.

Addressing methane emissions by eliminating routine gas flaring and gas leakage is relatively easy to implement. Producers can meaningfully reduce emissions immediately and, in some cases, also save costs by not burning gas that can otherwise be sold. Solutions to reduce flaring include improving connections to midstream gas capture and compression equipment, using gas onsite to power operations, and gas reinjection. Reducing leaks and venting can be achieved through methods as simple as replacing seals, valves, or pneumatic devices in the production system, or using vapor recovery and reinjection systems for methane capture. These methods are increasingly supported by new technology to detect leaks. The cost of all these solutions will vary depending on the extent of infrastructure build-out needed. However, the gas being captured can also bring in additional revenue if sold, or reduce operating costs if used on-site for power. Both benefits could offset the cost of implementation over time, depending on natural gas prices. The IEA estimates that 40% of methane reductions also decrease costs. Overall, we view eliminating routine flaring as an affordable and immediately actionable option to meaningfully reduce emissions.

Electrification using lower-carbon power has the potential to reduce emissions, but the location of operations is key. Replacing diesel-powered drilling rigs and hydraulic fracturing fleets with natural gas, electric, or alternative fuel-powered fleets, can reduce emissions by 30%-50% for drilling rigs and by 30%-70% for hydraulic fracturing fleets. The decrease can potentially be as much as 100% if the electricity comes from renewable sources. Also, the uptake of natural gas or dual-fuel-powered equipment has been strong in the unconventional onshore U.S. sector, which relies heavily on hydraulic fracturing. Operators in that sector therefore benefit from both fuel price savings for natural gas versus diesel, and lower emissions. The electrification of other aspects of production, such as switching to electric pumps and compressors, subsea systems, and company vehicles, is already prevalent. We believe the biggest challenge in adopting electricity-powered field equipment will remain access to power grid tie-ins or reliable mobile power units in remote locations. Until then, we expect that--for larger equipment such as rigs and hydraulic fracturing equipment--switching to natural gas will continue to take priority and will help lower emissions.

Carbon capture, through CCUS and CCS, is widely expected to play an important role but is currently costly and difficult to implement at scale. Many of the oil and gas producers we rate have included CCS in their decarbonization plans and several are already investing in CCUS/CCS development. ExxonMobil, for example, has invested billions into its CCUS hub along the U.S. Gulf Coast, where it plans to increase capacity to more than 100 million tons per year, supporting its decarbonization efforts and that of third parties. We believe oil and gas producers are well positioned to leverage their expertise in drilling, carbon transport, and managing large projects to develop CCUS or CCS facilities. We are nevertheless mindful of several impediments to widespread CCUS adoption, including its high cost, technological barriers, and lack of a cohesive policy framework. We therefore don’t foresee deployment at scale before the end of this decade (see "Sustainability Insights: Research: Carbon Capture, Removal, And Credits Pose Challenges For Companies," published June 8, 2023).

Other clean energies

The broader adoption of clean energy technologies--such as blue and green hydrogen, renewables, and biofuels--is also likely to become part of the oil and gas sector's value chain. Yet, as is the case for CCS, such technologies would require supportive policies and further innovation to push down costs and improve project economics for widespread adoption (see "Hydrogen: New Ambitions and Challenges," Feb. 15, 2024).

The Potential Impact Of Decarbonization Is Part Of Our Rating Analysis

We believe the energy transition, alongside pressure to decarbonize, will be an increasing risk factor and cost burden for the oil and gas sector, affecting various credit transmission channels.

We capture much of this risk in our assessment of industry risk. In January 2021, we revised our assessment of industry risk to moderately high from intermediate (see "The Change To The Industry Risk Assessment For Exploration & Production Companies And What It Means For Issuer Ratings," Jan. 25, 2021). Our view of increased risk stemmed from significant hurdles and uncertainties posed by the energy transition. These include the potential long-term decline in demand for fossil fuels due to growth in renewables and pressures on profitability in the sector stemming from additional spending for decarbonization.

Our assessment of a company’s competitive position also considers exposure to risks associated with decarbonization by evaluating certain credit attributes. For example, we consider the share of an issuer’s production mix--weighted by more-emissions-intensive operations (such as oil sands) versus natural gas--and its exposure to more stringent regulations in certain jurisdictions. For example, in the U.S., we consider California to be a more challenging operating environment than states such as Texas. Similarly, we could consider a company operating in industry friendly countries in the Middle East to have relatively lower exposure to decarbonization risks than those operating only in Europe.

Another key aspect is the extent of a company's diversification into low-carbon, non-fossil-fuel businesses. Although this may help the company become more resilient in the longer term, it can have a negative impact on profitability in the near term. This is because of the need for often large, upfront capital expenditure with no prospects for near-term material cash inflows, particularly when it involves establishing a clean energy business rather than upgrades to infrastructure or carbon capture facilities. Furthermore, even though the financial impacts of evolving carbon regulation remain uncertain, we incorporate known costs that can influence liquidity and profitability into our projections. These include potential decarbonization-related capital expenditure, carbon taxes, and the costs of asset-retirement obligations.

Several evolving risks and opportunities could have an impact on the credit materiality of decarbonization in the oil and gas sector. We believe there are plausible scenarios in which these factors could evolve and materialize through credit transmission channels over the next several years. Although the long-term financial impacts are uncertain, rated oil and gas producers have, in general, strengthened their balance sheets over the past several years. Consequently, many have financial headroom within our ratings, with credit metrics comfortably above our downgrade triggers. These entities have benefited from a combination of improved financial discipline, cost reduction, and generally supportive commodity prices in most regions. In view of these factors, we believe the credit profiles of oil and gas companies we rate could likely absorb unexpected decarbonization costs, thereby mitigating some of the related credit risks.

Decarbonization credit risks and opportunities

Climate-related litigation cases against companies in the oil and gas sector have increased significantly, with the potential for significant costs from settlements and legal fees. This is according to Sustainability Insights Research "Climate Litigation: Assessing Potential Impacts Remains Complex," published May 7, 2024. Shareholder activism pushing for greater energy-transition preparedness has achieved mixed success in the sector, and many companies have dialed back earlier shareholder-driven commitments, which in some instances included a pivot from core oil and gas operations to building clean energy businesses. For now, though, targets for reducing companies’ own scope 1 and 2 emissions remain intact.

In markets with carbon pricing mechanisms and regulatory measures in place, customers could be encouraged to buy low-carbon fuels to reduce their emissions and carbon tax liabilities, which could support premium pricing. The EU’s methane rules, for example, will require importers to report methane-related data on fossil fuel imports and comply with methane-intensity thresholds to avoid paying additional fees, which could provide an incentive for liquefied natural gas (LNG) producers to source low-carbon-certified natural gas as a feedstock. Many gas-focused producers in the U.S. have pursued third-party verifications as providers of responsibly sourced gas, which could position them well as LNG feedstock suppliers.

Carbon pricing poses several risks, depending on the extent of carbon taxes levied. For companies with high-carbon-intensity assets, such as producers of heavy crude oil, high carbon prices could make production uneconomical, and assets could become uncompetitive or--in extreme cases--devalued or even liabilities. In contrast, companies with low-carbon-intensity production could face a moderate increase in operating costs. That said, as we note above, the viability of assets is more likely to be linked to commodity prices than carbon pricing.

Some lenders have adopted policies that aim to prioritize cleaner technologies or restrict lending to high-emission sectors such as oil and gas. This could limit the availability of finance or raise costs in certain markets. We have not seen a material impact on the funding environment for the oil and gas sector in terms of access to and cost of capital. However, we believe oil and gas producers that don't take steps to reduce their own emissions could eventually find it more difficult to obtain funding than lower-emission peers in certain regions. On a regional basis, certain European banks and asset managers are setting stricter sector-exclusion policies than their North American counterparts.

Inconsistency in regulations could place differing regulatory burdens on operators, potentially affecting competitiveness. This could provide cost advantages to companies with production in regions with low regulatory intensity. Those in stricter environments could find it harder to pass on additional costs while remaining competitive in the global commodities market, ultimately affecting the economic viability of assets.

Looking Ahead

Oil and gas producers have made some progress toward achieving their short-term targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions from their upstream operations. In particular, reductions have been achieved through the use of already available technologies that target methane emissions and through upgrades to equipment.

But long-term decarbonization prospects for the sector appear uncertain. Although the intensity of emissions may decrease further, the reduction of absolute emissions could be more difficult, since demand for oil and gas is expected to remain robust in the coming decade. In addition, longer-term net zero goals will require substantial investment in technologies that are not yet fully scalable.

The uneven regulatory landscape could help or hurt certain producers in the short term. In recent years, regulation has been changing across Europe and North America, with more requirements, taxes, and incentives to address high emissions. That said, recent rollbacks of policies create uncertainty, and it is unclear how regulations might develop over the next five years amid changing geopolitical factors.

For now, we expect rated oil and gas producers can deliver on their near-term voluntary emissions-reduction goals, thanks to the relatively low cost of implementing certain solutions, such as eliminating flaring. We expect most would have sufficient capacity to absorb an increase in regulation-related costs or pass them on if they were to occur. Nevertheless, the risks of climate-related litigation, pricing premiums, and funding are areas to watch if other sectors and stakeholders prioritize their own decarbonization strategies.

Editor

Bernadette Stroeder

Digital Design

Tim Hellyer

Appendix

Table 4

Selected carbon targets of rated oil and gas producers
Company	Targets
Abu Dhabi National Oil Co. (ADNOC)	--Reduce operational scope 1 and 2 emissions intensity by 25% by 2030--Achieve net-zero scope 1 and scope 2 emissions by 2045
BP	--Reduce operational absolute scope 1 and 2 emissions by 45%-50% by 2030 (2019 baseline)--Achieve net-zero scope 1 and scope 2 emissions by 2050 or sooner
Chevron	--Reduce equity upstream (operated and nonoperated) scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions intensity by about 35% for oil, and for gas by 31%, by 2028 (2018 baseline) to 24 kgCO2e/boe for both oil and gas--Aspiration for net-zero upstream scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions by 2050
ConocoPhillips	--Reduce gross operated and net equity scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions intensity by 50%-60% by 2030 (baseline 2016)--Achieve net-zero operated and net equity scope 1 and 2 gross greenhouse gas emissions by 2050
Devon Energy	--Reduce scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions intensity by 50% by 2030 (baseline 2019)--Achieve net-zero scope 1 and 2 (location-based) greenhouse gas emissions by 2050
Ecopetrol	--Reduce scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions by 25% by 2030 (baseline 2019)--Achieve net-zero scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions by 2050
Eni	--Reduce operated upstream scope 1 greenhouse gas emissions intensity by 43% by 2025 (baseline 2014)--Reduce absolute upstream equity scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions (net of offsets) by 50% by 2024, 65% by 2025 (baseline 2018), and to net zero by 2030
EOG Resources	--Reduce scope 1 greenhouse gas emissions intensity to 13.5 metric tons of CO2e/Mboe by 2025--Achieve net-zero scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions by 2040
Equinor	--Reduce scope 1 and 2 net emissions by 50% by 2030 (baseline 2015)--Achieve net-zero emissions by 2050
Expand Energy	--Reduce scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions intensity to 3 metric tons of CO2e/1,000 boe by 2025 (baseline 2020)--Achieve net-zero scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions by 2035
ExxonMobil	--Reduce upstream scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions intensity by 40%-50% by 2030, which is expected to lead to an approximate 30% reduction on an absolute basis (baseline 2016)--Ambition to achieve net-zero scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions by 2050
Petróleo Brasileiro, S.A. (Petrobras)	--Reduce scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions intensity in the upstream segment by 32% by 2025 (baseline 2015); equates to absolute intensity of 15 kg of CO2e/boe by 2025 and maintaining through 2030)--Net zero scope 1 and 2 emissions in operated activities by 2050
Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS)	--Achieve 25% reduction in scope 1 and scope 2 emissions by 2030 from global portfolio under equity sharing approach--Aspiration to achieve net-zero scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions by 2050
Repsol	--Reduce absolute operated scope 1 and 2 net greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030 (baseline 2016)--Zero net emissions, scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions from operated assets, by 2050
Saudi Arabian Oil Co. (Saudi Aramco)	--Reduce upstream scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions intensity by at least 15% by 2035 (baseline 2018)--Ambition to achieve net-zero scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, across wholly owned operated assets
Shell	--Reduce scope 1 and 2 absolute net emissions by 50% by 2030 (baseline 2016)--Achieve net-zero emissions by 2050
TotalEnergies	--Reduce scope 1 and 2 absolute net emissions by 40% by 2030 (baseline 2015) --Achieve net-zero emissions by 2050
kgCO2e/boe--Kilograms of CO2 equivalent per barrel of oil equivalent. Mboe--Million barrels of oil equivalent. Sources: Based on publicly available company disclosures, S&P Global Commodity Insights.

Related Research

• Credit FAQ: How The Global Climate Policy Pendulum Influences Our Credit Ratings, April 9, 2025
• Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trends: Most Global Industries Haven't Reduced Emissions, Only Their Intensity, Nov. 21, 2024
• White Paper: Scenarios Show Potential Ways Climate Change Affects Creditworthiness, July 25, 2024
• Decarbonizing Hard-To-Abate Sectors: Credit Quality Implications And Six Key Observations, June 25, 2024
• Climate Litigation: Assessing Potential Impacts Remains Complex, May 7, 2024
• White Paper: Assessing How Megatrends May Influence Credit Ratings, April 18, 2024
• Sustainability Insights: Why Climate Risks Are Changing So Few Corporate Ratings, April 12, 2023
• ESG Materiality Map: Oil And Gas, May 18, 2022
• S&P Global Ratings Takes Multiple Rating Actions On Major Oil And Gas Companies To Factor In Greater Industry Risks, Jan. 26, 2021

Authors:	Paul J O'Donnell, CFA, CORPORATE RATINGS, New York 1-212-438-1068; paul.odonnell@spglobal.com
	Terry Ellis, SUSTAINABILITY RESEARCH, London 44-20-7176-0597; terry.ellis@spglobal.com
Contributor:	Pierre Georges, SUSTAINABILITY RESEARCH, Paris 33-14-420-6735; pierre.georges@spglobal.com