This report does not constitute a rating action.

Tariffs May Come And Go But Macroeconomic Uncertainty Is Here To Stay

The Trump administration's shifting policy mix is altering the economic outlook, with a likely downshift in our global and U.S. GDP growth expectations. The April 2 tariff announcements by the U.S.--and subsequent countermeasures announced by China--went far beyond what financial markets had imagined and exceeded our previous assumptions. President Trump's recent 90-day pause of most tariffs didn't remove the uncertainty around what could ultimately occur. Unresolved trade tensions as the partial pause approaches its end could impact credit quality. As a result, if the paused U.S. tariffs are ultimately implemented in full, the economic fallout could be broad and deep. (See "Global Credit Conditions Special Update: Ongoing Reshuffling," published April 11, 2025, on RatingsDirect.)

For the U.S. technology industry, the worst-case scenario is off the table…for now. The 90-day tariff relief on certain key technology imports into the U.S.--including consumer products such as PCs, smartphones, and core IT hardware--provides short-term relief to the industry. Additionally, the U.S. tech industry has spent the better part of the past decade diversifying its manufacturing footprint away from China and into South and Southeast Asia. That said, U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick noted that the tariff pause is temporary, and that electronics and semiconductor imports will be subject to separate tariffs over the coming weeks. For now, we believe near-term, tariff-related effects, such as demand destruction and margin compression, will be mostly manageable. Additionally, we believe China’s 125% tariff on U.S. imports will not have a material impact on the U.S. tech industry as electronics, including integrated circuits, accounted for just $15 billion of the total $144 billion exported to China in 2024.

We are focused on the second order impact arising from the tariff dispute. Macroeconomic sentiment appears to be weakening rapidly. We now expect IT spending will slow, leading to gradual revenue and margin headwinds for our rated issuers in the second half of 2025 and into 2026. Reshoring manufacturing back to U.S. at a significant scale is not in our base case because it will take several quarters for lower volume products such as servers and storage, and years for mass volume products (PCs and smartphones) and even longer for leading-edge semiconductors fabs; all would presumably have a much higher operating cost base than those overseas.

Over the past decade, there has been a gradual decoupling of the tech ecosystem between the U.S. and its allies versus China. China's limited access to NVIDIA Corp.’s most advanced graphic processing units (GPUs) and ASML Holding N.V.’s extreme ultraviolet (EUV) tools speak to the growing divide. However, the unpredictability of the U.S. tariff regime could provide China with an opening to create a wedge between the U.S. and its partners. If current conditions prevail, EU consumers could turn to Chinese smartphones and its telecom providers may buy more Chinese networking gear. China could deepen its ties to the EU and the rest of Asia to the detriment of the U.S. tech sector. Foreign investments could slow if companies and investors view the U.S. as less predictable and more antagonistic. We expect China will spend aggressively in leading-edge semiconductor design and manufacturing as well as AI innovations, with the goal of becoming self-sufficient to meet its domestic consumption and beyond.

Chart 1

Global IT Spending Will Slow In 2025

Evolving tariffs and uncertainty on long-term resolution raise the downside risks to our macroeconomic baseline for the technology industry. We issued our 2025 global IT spending forecast in early January, indicating our expectations for a robust 9% growth as enterprise spending recovers, software and services remain resilient, and cloud providers continue their aggressive AI infrastructure buildout. (See "Solid IT Demand Bodes Well For Technology Credits In 2025," published Jan. 8, 2025, on RatingsDirect.) Our industry view was already leaning modestly negative through March relative to the January forecast given the slower-than-expected enterprise recovery.

Our preliminary view indicates global IT spending growth will slow to 5%-7% in 2025. This is under our base-case assumption of a global average effective tariff rate (AETR) of 10%-20% for all technology imports, with no exemptions. We expect the slowdown won’t materialize until the second half of 2025 as pull-forward orders in the first half of the year turn to inventory digestion in the second half. We believe this will have cascading effects into 2026 if macroeconomic uncertainty remains, or the business environment deteriorates further. We expect software and IT services growth will be modestly weaker while hardware, which accounts for 25%-30% of total global IT spending, will come under greater pressure.

Most hardware issuers vowed to pass on tariff-related price increases to customers. We expect there will be some demand destruction and margin compression along the way, depending on what the tariff rates are over the long term. PC and smartphone refreshes may be delayed, especially among consumers with higher demand elasticity. We believe enterprise demand for IT hardware will remain relatively stable, although we would expect greater headwinds across smaller commercial and U.S. federal customers. We also expect software and IT services vendors will remain resilient, but some vendors may find annual price increases difficult to pass along as customers reassess their IT budgets. We expect AI-related demand will remain intact because hyperscalers and internet companies’ capital spending is mostly fixed for 2025, but the pace of the buildout could slow in outer years as input costs (AI servers, for example) rise and long-term demand proves less certain.

Credit Impact Will Not Be Far Behind

We see downgrade risks growing even if tariff rates are lowered over time as macro sentiment has taken a turn for the worse. In March 2025, negative rating actions in the U.S. technology sector outnumbered positives by 5:2, reversing a positive trend seen since June 2024. We now view modest demand destruction and margin compression as a base-case scenario for most of our rated hardware and semiconductor issuers. However, we believe tariffs' financial impact is at least a quarter away because most issuers have spent the past three months stockpiling inventories; though, this respite would only be temporary.

We expect the final size and terms of the tariffs to evolve over the coming months, and therefore we have not taken tariff-specific rating actions. However, we will continue to review our ratings and could change ratings for those issuers with little to no cushion at the current level or those dependent on a positive operating environment. This is based on our assumption of weakening global demand and ongoing trade tension between the U.S. and China. We believe issuers with cushion relative to our downside ratings triggers are less at risk of a downgrade even if they are exposed to manufacturing or assembly in high-tariff countries. Inventory stockpiles, the potential for tariff-reducing trade negotiations, and the realignment of manufacturing footprints are possible mitigating factors

We have yet to take negative rating actions on U.S. tech issuers as a direct result of tariffs. However, if our view of the macro environment deteriorates further or issuers experience greater-than-expected negative effects from tariffs, we could take negative rating actions. Hardware issuers in the ‘BB’ ratings category generally have less diverse supply chains than their investment-grade peers, and to the extent that they have heavy China exposure, could see ratings pressure over time.

At lower rating levels, revenue and supply chain exposures among sponsor-owned hardware issuers are more difficult to quantify given their less demanding disclosure requirements. However, these speculative-grade issuers typically have limited room to absorb margin compressions given their generally weak liquidity profiles.

Hardware Sector Is Most At Risk

However, we believe tariffs will likely have a more modest effect on the U.S. hardware industry than initially expected. Still, there is no escaping the tariffs for a majority of the rated hardware providers. Aside from the U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement (USMCA), which exempts imports originating from Mexico, all other countries with material hardware manufacturing concentration are subject to tariffs. We note that issuers such as Dell Technologies Inc. and HP Inc. have been at the forefront of moving manufacturing out of China into nearby low-cost Asian countries, including Vietnam and Thailand, and Mexico. Apple Inc. moved about 15% of its iPhone production to India and much of its U.S.-bound MacBooks to Vietnam in recent years. Nevertheless, Apple still has a significant supply chain concentration in China.

We expect the PC and smartphone sectors to be most affected by tariffs. The PC industry is especially vulnerable given its high input cost (from which tariffs are calculated) and still high reliance on China for laptop manufacturing (versus desktops, which are assembled across Asia and Mexico). Apple would still need to import iPhones from China because India’s iPhone production, even if all were redirected to U.S., would be insufficient to meet U.S. domestic demand. We expect PC and phone makers will pass on the higher cost to customers even if it leads to some demand destruction, especially by cost-conscious consumers who make up 45% of global PC sales and most of smartphone sales. These OEMs have a track record of passing costs to consumers during periods of supply chain disruptions (COVID-19, for example) to protect their margins. Enterprise demand will be more resilient. They are likely to stay with scheduled PC refreshes, especially given the Windows 10 end-of-life in late 2025.

We expect the impact from tariffs to be limited for hardware issuers focused on server, storage, and networking equipment products. These lower volume products have less manufacturing exposure to China, with a growing final assembly presence in Mexico that is mostly subject to USMCA exemptions. We expect hardware makers to pass on the higher cost to customers with limited demand destruction. Higher-margin products such as storage and networking can absorb some margin decline if necessary to maintain demand. In all, we expect enterprise demand for IT hardware will be mostly resilient. Companies could attempt to sweat the assets longer, or sales cycle could lengthen under duress, but the demand is deferred, not gone.

Service providers are likely to maintain their upgrade schedule for networking equipment. We do not expect hyperscalers and internet companies to revise their data center buildout in 2025, but we might expect them to slow AI-related investments in 2026 if macroeconomic risks increase. Hardware original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) have been stockpiling inventory over the past few months in anticipation of tariffs; hence, price increases will not be immediate. Tariff rates could be negotiated down over time, but hardware issuers are in a vulnerable place. See Table 1 for our preliminary view on select key hardware providers.

Table 1

Hardware sector
Issuer/Ratings	Business and Credit Impact
Apple Inc. (AA+/Stable)	Business: Significant supply chain exposure to China and to a lesser extent, India and Vietnam. U.S. accounts for about 30% of total iPhone sales. Americas accounted for 43% of total sales in fiscal 2024. We estimate China produces 85% of iPhones and India the rest. iPad and Mac U.S. exposures are higher though more diversified than iPhone. Apple likely to pass on higher costs to customers, which could result in delayed replacement cycles; impact could be partially muted by telecom carrier incentives. Apple’s China sales (17% of total revenues in fiscal 2024) will be at risk over the longer term if the tariff dispute remains unresolved.
	Credit: Strong credit metrics with significant net cash position to accelerate supply chain diversification into lower tariff regions; but this will take time, and China will continue to remain the primary manufacturing hub. Apple’s hardware margins could come under pressure if it chooses to protect its market share, but its growing services segment (25% of revenues) with a high margin profile provides an offset.
Cisco Systems Inc. (AA-Stable)	Business: Low supply chain exposure to China and high exposure to Mexico. Since tariffs are assessed on the bill of materials for various products which is akin to COGS, high product gross margin means tariffs are more manageable as a percentage of the price paid by the customer. However, Cisco faces second order impacts if data center buildouts slow because other data center equipment carries a greater tariff burden or if enterprises slow investments due to IT budget curtailments. U.S. revenue represents 53% of the total, and we believe revenue exposure to China is low.
	Credit: Current leverage around 0.9x vs 1x downgrade trigger leaves little cushion to absorb an operating downturn of a little over 10% drop in EBITDA. Potential tariff burden is more manageable than other hardware providers like Dell and HP due to its high product gross margins and meaningful software revenue.
Dell Technologies Inc. (BBB/Stable)	Business: High supply chain exposure to China, Asia, and Mexico due to PC and data center infrastructure manufacturing with products shipped to the U.S. largely manufactured outside of China. Since tariffs are assessed on the bill of materials for final products which is akin to COGS, low gross margin means tariffs are high as a percentage of the price paid by the customer. There is potential for demand destruction, especially among consumer PCs if tariffs are imposed as proposed after the pause period expires and Dell passes price increase along to customers. Impact would be largely concentrated in the PC business. Impact of the originally proposed tariffs likely would have provoked significant price increases and demand destruction in the U.S. PC segment, but because that segment contributes relatively low segment profit, the rating would likely have the cushion to absorb the impact. We also believe that long-run tariff policy is likely to be less severe than the originally proposed tariffs so we expect our rating on Dell will likely be unaffected. High growth AI servers could offer an offset to PC tariff impact, but this segment is highly exposed to enterprise demand, which could suffer due to macroeconomic impact on IT spending. U.S. revenue represents 53% of the total.
	Credit: Current leverage around 1.4x vs 2.0x downgrade trigger. A 30% drop in EBITDA could push leverage near our downgrade trigger.
HP Inc. (BBB/Stable)	Business: High supply chain exposure to China and the rest of Asia due to PC and printer manufacturing. Since tariffs are assessed on the bill of materials for final products which is akin to COGS, low gross margin means tariffs are high as a percentage of the price paid by the customer. Potential for meaningful demand destruction, especially among consumer PCs, if tariffs are imposed as proposed after the pause period expires and HP passes price increase along to customers. Similar to Dell, we believe most of the tariff risk is in the PC segment. We considered the originally proposed tariffs and found that HP’s leverage could approach our downgrade threshold of 2x, but it could rebuild cushion by reducing share buybacks and either accumulating cash or repaying debt. We believe the burden of the long-term tariff policy is likely to be less than the originally proposed reciprocal tariffs. Printing offers potential offsets given stickiness and higher margin. U.S. revenue represents about one-third of the total, and HP has indicated plans for over 90% of the products it sells in North America to be manufactured outside of China by the end of fiscal year 2025, allowing it to avoid the highest tariffs.
	Credit: Current leverage near 1.6x vs 2.0x downgrade trigger. A low-20% drop in EBITDA could push leverage near our downgrade trigger. Cost reductions and reduced share buybacks could offer an additional buffer.
Hewlett Packard Enterprises Inc. (BBB/Negative)	Business: U.S. was 36% of revenues in fiscal 2024. Greater Mexico exposure for servers and storage equipment, whereas networking gears are more weighted toward Asia. Impact likely to be modest under the current tariff structure given the likely USMCA exemptions. Most, if not all, of the higher tariff costs will be passed onto customers. Large enterprise customer spending will remain resilient but smaller commercial and U.S. federal customers will likely delay some refreshes as pull-forward demand in first half of 2025 turns to a headwind in second half and into 2026. Lower unit shipments and reduced margins as a result. Revenue exposure to China estimated at less than 10%
	Credit: Negative outlook reflects the still-pending Juniper Networks Inc. acquisition, which could raise leverage to above 2x. Tariffs will pressure profitability over the next 6-12 months; although there are potential mitigants such as additional cost cuts and reduced shareholder returns if pro forma leverage exceed 2x upon close. If the Juniper transaction does not close, HPE would have significant cushion within its ratings to withstand an industry downturn.
Flex Ltd. (BBB-/Stable)	Business: Current net sales by country is Mexico at 26%, China at 17%, U.S. at 16%, Malaysia at 10%, and others at 31% as of Q3 FY 2025. Majority of U.S. revenue is manufactured in the U.S. and Mexico, which is largely protected by USMCA. A low percentage of U.S. revenue comes directly from China. China manufacturing is mostly for domestic China revenue. Less tariff impact is expected compared to other tech hardware companies exposed significantly to China manufacturing. Costs will likely be passed through to customers. A bigger risk is how a potential recessionary environment will affect demand for its fast-growing segments, such as datacom or segments tied to macroeconomic sentiment, such as consumer and auto.
	Credit: Leverage is 1.3x, below the 3.0x downgrade trigger. No ratings pressure given strong cushion to downgrade trigger. A potential 20% drop in EBITDA would keep leverage at high-1x area. Good track record of navigating through various macroeconomic cycles from tariffs, COVID-19 pandemic, and supply chain disruptions, without significant disruptions to its business operations.
Jabil Inc. (BBB-/Stable)	Business: The percentage of manufacturing space per region is Asia: 55%, Americas: 34%, and Europe: 10% as of FY 2024. Low percentage of U.S. revenue shipped from China. Most products are manufactured in the region it sells into, which will limit the tariff impact. Jabil has stated it expects to pass most of tariff costs through to customers. Apple is one of its largest customers at roughly 11% of total revenue as of year-end FY 2024 (ending August), leading to potential revenue volatility if higher iPhone prices weaken demand. A large risk is how end customers’ demand will hold up under a macroeconomic downturn. However, we also view this as a potential opportunity for large EMS providers that have a global manufacturing footprint to win new business from companies with significant exposure to manufacturing in China.
	Credit: The current leverage of 1.8x area as of Q1 FY 2025, below the 3.0x downgrade trigger. No ratings pressure on Jabil due to the good cushion to the downgrade trigger. A potential 20% drop in EBITDA would still keep leverage in the low-2x area. We also note that these larger EMS providers have shown good ability to generate FOCF even when revenue is weaker, due to its ability to better monetize working capital and lower capex spend.
Sandisk Corp. (BB/Stable)	Business: Tariff risk largely comes from second order impacts from tariffs on its customers’ products since semiconductors are currently exempt. Consumer and smartphone products manufactured in China could face meaningful demand destruction from price increases to pass through tariff costs. PC markets could face pressure if tariffs are imposed as proposed after the pause period expires because offsetting even a modest tariff could require a significant price increase (greater than 10%) given the high cost base for PCs. Given the commodity-like nature of NAND, ASPs could fall significantly given a demand shock, as with the last memory downturn in 2023. But during that downturn, the industry demonstrated good supply discipline, significantly reducing capital expenditures (capex) and idling some productive capacity, which could partially mitigate the tariff impact.
	Credit: In December, we forecast leverage of 1.2x for fiscal 2025 (ending in June) vs our 3x downgrade trigger. A 60% drop in EBITDA could push leverage near our downgrade trigger. Our free operating cash flow to debt trigger is 15%; working capital monetization and light capex will likely offset some of the EBITDA decline. Given the volatile nature of the NAND market, the company can avoid a downgrade even if metrics are beyond our downgrade threshold for a short time if we believe it has a credible path to reestablishing metrics in line with the rating.
Source: S&P Global Ratings.

Semiconductor Demand Will Correlate With Hardware Consumption

Whether semiconductor imports will be subject to tariffs is a critical issue for rated semiconductor issuers with chips that end up in hardware manufactured mostly in Asia and imported into the U.S. Though semiconductor imports are currently exempt from tariffs, that could change in coming weeks. Even U.S.-made chips are mostly sent to Asia for final packaging and testing before making their way inside hardware. Slower enterprise demand coupled with price-sensitive consumers will lead to fewer hardware purchases and lower revenues for our rated issuers. Critical semiconductor materials and wafers are mostly imported from Asia, which may also be subject to tariffs. Although unlikely in our view, chip makers could come under margin pressure from hardware makers pushing to lower their input costs. These pressures could build by the second half of 2025 as existing inventories are depleted.

Commodity products such as DRAM and NAND will face pricing headwinds given our expectations for weakening PC and smartphone demand and slowing server and storage demand in the U.S. Although unaffected for now, leading-edge GPU and custom ASIC designers could face slower growth over time if sustained macroeconomic pressure (such as a weakening advertising market) forces internet service providers to revise their data center expansion strategies. However, the positive AI spending outlook from Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp. suggests such revisions are unlikely in the near term.

Analog semiconductors are more likely to face a slower recovery given weakness in key end markets. With the increasing likelihood of lower growth or a recession, we expect tepid demand in auto, industrial, and personal electronics will likely persist. We continue to monitor for further tariff increases on U.S. semiconductor exports to China, although suppliers such as Texas Instruments Inc. and NXP Semiconductors N.V. have local manufacturing strategies that may limit this risk. However, given our belief that inventory corrections are at trough levels, outsized downside is largely contained.

The semiconductor industry may be subject to sectoral tariffs over the near term. If this is phased in over multiple years to allow for the supply chains to adjust, we would view it as a positive outcome for the industry. The recent tariff pause and exemptions (which included most of the China tariffs) demonstrates some flexibility by the U.S. administration and some acknowledgement of the critical nature of the industry. That said, we don’t discount the possibility of a more aggressive position. See Table 2 below for our preliminary view on select key semiconductor providers.

Table 2

Semiconductor Sector
Issuer/Ratings	Business and Credit Impact
NVIDIA Inc. (AA-/Stable)	Business: Direct tariff impact expected to be modest given low input cost (and hence high gross margin) for its GPUs. Overall demand expected to remain strong because we view AI-related investments to be resilient at least through 2025. Heavy GPU supply chain exposure to Taiwan but end products (like AI servers) are mostly assembled across Asia with potential for increasing Mexico assembly. AI compute demand will be less price sensitive although orders at the margin could decelerate through second half of 2025 if macro uncertainty forces customers to reassess long-term demand. New H20 export licensing requirement will endanger significant portion of its China revenues ($17 billion in fiscal 2025).
	Credit: Potential for meaningful China revenue loss and modest overall margin compression but no ratings pressure in near term given very strong cash flow metrics and significant net cash position. Expectation for revenue volatility is built into the ratings.
Texas Instruments Inc. (A+/Stable)	Business: Some secondary impacts from tariffs given China revenue exposure (19% of total revenue) and assembly and test footprint in Asia-Pacific region (20% of manufacturing in China) subject to tariffs. May manage supply chains to reduce impact to customers’ U.S. bound shipments but demand destruction across auto (35% of total revenue) and personal electronics (20%) is unavoidable.
	Credit: Tariffs increase downside demand risks, but low net leverage at 1x or below in 2025 and 2026, and significant liquidity resources allow it to absorb a slower industry recovery and maintain the current rating. Some margin pressures and lower free cash flow because of investments in growth manufacturing capex. Significant annual dividend that will exceed annual free cash flow over the next 1-2 years, but we expect reduced buybacks as an offset.
Qualcomm Inc. (A/Stable)	Business:Chip sales highly concentrated with smartphone makers such as Apple, Samsung, and Chinese smartphone OEMs. Because chips are predominantly manufactured in and sold into Asia, direct exposure to tariffs is limited. Exposed to indirect tariff impact on potentially lower chip sales and licensing revenues if smartphone OEMs are subject to tariff costs and higher costs are passed on to end consumers.
	Credit: Strong credit metrics (<0.3x leverage) and exceptional liquidity position allow the company to weather meaningful near-term business weakness.
Intel Corp. (BBB/Stable)	Business: Invested in geographically balanced manufacturing capacity: has U.S.-based wafer production fab in Oregon and Arizona, overseas fabs in Ireland and Israel, assembly and test facilities in Costa Rica, China, Malaysia, and Vietnam, and one in New Mexico. Outsources certain advanced chip designs to TSMC in Taiwan. Most products are components that are sold to PC, server, and networking equipment manufacturers that have final assembly overseas before equipment is shipped to end customers. Direct tariff exposure includes: revenue generated in the U.S. (34% of total revenues in 2024 from wafers manufactured overseas), and any U.S-manufactured wafers that are subjected to China import tariffs. China’s Semiconductor Industry Association explained that the declared country of origin for import customs semiconductors purchases is the location of the wafer fab plants. It is unclear how much of Intel’s revenue from China, which contributed 29% of total revenues, are from U.S. fabs.
	Credit: Revenue growth forecast for 2025 and 2026 could be at risk if demand is significantly reduced from higher tariff costs and weaker general business condition. Some room to absorb business underperformance from challenging macroeconomic conditions and still achieve leverage below 2.5x or DCF-to-debt above 10% over the next two years. May re-evaluate capital spending needs and control operating expenditures to further match the demand environment while continue to pursue monetization of non-core assets to maintain credit metrics.
Micron Technology Inc. (BBB-/Stable)	Business: Tariff risk largely comes from second order impacts from tariffs on its customers’ products since semiconductors are currently exempt. Consumer and smartphone products manufactured in China could face meaningful demand destruction from price increases to pass through tariff costs. PC markets could face pressure if the reciprocal tariffs are imposed as proposed after the pause period expires because offsetting even a modest tariff could require a significant price increase (greater than 10%) as the cost base for the tariff of a PC is high relative to its price. Data center markets may be more resilient, particularly for products to support the AI buildout. Given the commodity-like nature of memory, ASPs could fall significantly given a demand shock, like the last memory downturn in 2023. But during that downturn, the industry demonstrated good supply discipline, significantly reducing capital expenditures (capex) and idling some productive capacity, which hastened the recovery.
	Credit: Leverage is 0.4x compared to our downgrade threshold of mid-1x. A 75% drop in EBITDA could push leverage near our downgrade trigger. Given the volatile nature of the memory market, the company can avoid a downgrade even if metrics are beyond our downgrade threshold for a short time if we believe it has a credible path to reestablishing metrics in line with the rating.
Source: S&P Global Ratings.

Software Sector May See Residual Impact

Software is not currently subject to tariffs, though sustained macroeconomic weakness will inevitably slow revenue growth at the margin. We also note there is a risk that the EU could tax digital services such as software, which is an industry dominated by the U.S. If such tariffs are implemented, this would substantially raise the cost of U.S. software in European markets. EU exposure is significant for most large software companies. The EU accounted for 25% of Oracle Corp.’s revenues, and we estimate a similar figure for Microsoft Corp.

Tariffs may also decrease software vendors’ margins because their applications are hosted on data centers, either owned or leased through hyperscalers, whose compute costs are likely to increase. Altogether, these developments mark a significant shift toward a fragmented and uncertain global tech landscape, threatening long-term profitability and the growth trajectory of software companies.

Related Research

• Global Credit Conditions Special Update: Ongoing Reshuffling, April 11, 2025
• Solid IT Demand Bodes Well For Technology Credits In 2025, Jan. 8, 2025

Primary Contact:	Andrew Chang, San Francisco 1-415-371-5043; andrew.chang@spglobal.com
Secondary Contacts:	Jesse Juliano, CFA, Boston 1-617-530-8317; jesse.juliano@spglobal.com
	David T Tsui, CFA, CPA, San Francisco 1-415-371-5063; david.tsui@spglobal.com
	Christian Frank, San Francisco 1-415-371-5069; christian.frank@spglobal.com
	Tuan Duong, New York 1-212-438-5327; tuan.duong@spglobal.com
	Neilson H Lin, New York 212-438-1233; neilson.lin@spglobal.com
Contributor:	Shivani Vaidya, New York ; shivani.vaidya@spglobal.com