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Cyber Risk Insights: Sovereigns And Their Critical Infrastructure Are Prime Targets

This report does not constitute a rating action.

Sovereigns, local governments, and state-owned organizations (including critical infrastructure such as electricity and transportation providers) globally accounted for a majority, about 54%, of cyber breaches reported by entities rated by S&P Global Ratings, according to our analysis of almost 25 years of data provided by RiskRecon, a cyber information service (see chart 1).

The figure is notable, yet not surprising. Government entities are a favored target for politically motivated cyber attacks, which, alongside human errors (often from within organizations), are a principal cause of cyber breaches. According to data from the European Repository of Cyber Incidents (EuRepoC), sovereigns (including institutions such as the military and legislative services) were the target of 47% of politically motivated incidents since 2000. That placed them ahead of critical infrastructure, at 41% of such incidents, which likely attract unwanted attention from hackers as a proxy target for sovereigns, which often own the infrastructure.

Chart 1

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The frequency of attacks has risen dramatically since 2019. EuRepoC recorded 314 politicized cyber attacks involving sovereigns and 424 attacks on critical infrastructure in 2024, an increase of 3.5x and 13.7x, respectively, compared to 2018. That trend is likely to continue and could intensify. We expect cyber attacks to be driven by geopolitical instability, while wider cyber breaches will also increase amid the ongoing digitalization of government operations and services across the globe.

Sovereigns that fail to take preventive cyber security measures could face the increased likelihood of a disruptive cyber attack that interrupts revenue collection, damages economic activity, and/or heightens internal and external political tensions.

A Pervasive And Growing Threat

Cyber breaches at sovereigns have increased since the start of 2019 resulting in a compound annual growth rate of about 3%, according to RiskRecon data analyzed by S&P Global Ratings (see chart 2). Incidents of breaches spiked notably in 2020, likely due to COVID-19 prompting rapid digitalization by individuals and organizations, and again in 2023, when we believe that cyber attacks related to geopolitical conflicts contributed to a greater number of breaches. The volatility in cyber incidents is also the result of non-political factors, including the availability of new ransomware or a desire to simply cause disruption. Moreover, the data we cite includes only successful cyber breaches that were confirmed by entities rated by S&P Global Ratings.

Chart 2

image

Attacks aimed at gaining access to a system (or systems) accounted for about 30% of breaches over the 25 years of data we reviewed. That made hacking the most common cause of a cyber breach, according to RiskRecon, ahead of human error, ransomware demands, and malware attacks.

It is not only sovereigns (central government entities and their services) that are at risk. State-owned organizations and infrastructure can be valuable, critical in nature, and politically symbolic. That makes them a potentially attractive target for cyber attacks, including by criminals, but also by hacktivists (who claim political or moral motivation for their actions), and foreign adversaries (either directly or via proxies).

There is evidence of a recent uptick in the number of attacks on critical infrastructure. That appears to be linked to an increase in the conduct of so-called hybrid warfare, which combines traditional kinetic force with unconventional attacks, including cyber attacks. Hybrid warfare has been a feature of recent conflicts, including the Russia-Ukraine war (since 2022) and the latest Israel-Hamas war (since 2023).

Sovereigns' Key Cyber Risks

We consider that sovereigns currently face three key risks from malicious cyber activity:

Political disruption due to interference or misinformation that disrupts voting, influences opinion, or erodes trust in political processes. About 49 countries are likely to hold parliamentary or presidential elections over the remainder of 2025, according to IHS Markit Data. All will face the prospect of a cyber attack that could disrupt or influence the process. Precedents include the misinformation campaign that reported a coup against Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2022 and attacks on Ecuador's overseas voting systems and domestic institutions during its 2023 presidential election.

Disruption that affects trade and economic growth. Cyber attacks that hobble key public infrastructure could directly damage economies and affect businesses and consumer confidence. For example, a 2022 attack on 30 Costa Rican ministries led to short-term disruptions in trade and the declaration of a state of emergency, though it ultimately didn't affect debt service payments and seemed to have no long-term impact on growth.

Disruption to international relations. Cyber attacks deployed as a tool of espionage can have significant effects on international relations, both between perpetrator and target states and between target states and third-party nations (if damage affects trade or payments). Cyber attacks are also an increasingly important part of conflict (and a threat to fragile treaties), as demonstrated by the hybrid wars between Russia and Ukraine, and Israel and Hamas. Both conflicts have provided prominent examples of state-sponsored cyberattacks, notably targeting communications, utilities infrastructure, and transportation systems.

We have previously written about the potential for cyber incidents to affect a sovereign (see "Cyber Risk In A New Era: How Cyber Risk Affects Sovereigns," Oct. 31, 2022) and provide a summary of the potential impacts below (see table 1).

Unlikely But Consequential Credit Risk

We consider it unlikely that a cyber incident could significantly and directly affect the creditworthiness of a sovereign, though the possibility remains if, for example, a catastrophic cyber event delayed a country’s debt service payments. And we note that a severe attack against a sovereign could trigger knock-on effects for corporations, other organizations, and the population (for example, due to regional outages of key services or an interruption to government transfer payments).

We will continue to monitor cyber attacks on the public sector and monitor sovereigns' preparation for, response to, and recovery from cyber incidents, which we consider within our assessment of an entity's governance and could ultimately weigh on our credit analysis (see "Your Three Minutes In Cyber Security: Cyber Hygiene Can Affect Creditworthiness," Sept. 24, 2024).

Robust and adaptable cyber preparedness is likely to incorporate regular monitoring of global cyber threats; a program of investment in cyber security technology and talent; a national cyber security strategy that is applied across all layers of national and local government; testing that drives improvement, response, and recovery; and timely adaptation to emerging threats. Cyber security systems also increasingly deploy AI in areas such as attack detection, response, and Security Operations Center (SOC) analytics.

Sovereign Cyber Attacks' Potential Impact
Institutional
Cyber attacks with a political agenda could weaken confidence in a country’s institutions and, in a more extreme scenario, contribute to domestic instability or regime change. Low sovereign institutional assessments often signal relatively weak governance, which could correlate with lower cyber preparedness and defenses, and thus higher impact from cyber attacks, in our view.
Economic
A systemwide attack across several sectors over a prolonged period that affects trade, the banking system, or other critical infrastructure and services could have repercussions for businesses and households. An attack in one country could also have broader effects across geographies and sectors. For instance, the NotPetya attack in 2017 resulted in global losses exceeding $10 billion (see “Cyber Threat Brief: How Worried Should We Be About Cyber Attacks On Ukraine?,” Feb. 22, 2022). Sovereign perpetrators of cyber attacks may face international sanctions that could affect broader economic activity and their access to international trade and financial markets.
External
Incidents that affect the trade of goods and services could weaken current account positions and weigh on international liquidity. A potential attack linked to a central bank could also affect a country’s external liquidity position.
Fiscal
Cyber disruptions could directly affect a sovereign’s revenue collection capacity by targeting government tax systems. Spending pressure could result from increased spending on cyber security and from costs related to cyber attacks. Our sovereign criteria focuses on the fiscal position of the general government (including national, regional and local governments, and social security and pension funds). However, cyber attacks on government-related enterprises or key public service entities such as utilities, hospitals, or airports could materialize as contingent liabilities for the government.
Monetary
A targeted attack on the country’s central bank or wider banking system could affect monetary policy credibility and reflect weak regulatory supervision and coordination.
Note: This table first appeared in "Cyber Risk In A New Era: How Cyber Risk Affects Sovereigns," Oct. 31, 2022. Source: S&P Global Ratings.

Writer: Paul Whitfield

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