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Australia's Banks Are Slowly Tuning In To The Risks Of Cyber Attacks

Cyber risk is a growing threat to Australian banks. Although risks at a system level remain low, a large-scale attack could significantly damage the country's banking system, and lenders with weaker cyber and nonfinancial risk governance are the most vulnerable. To date, Australian banks have not suffered a cyber incident that has led to a rating action. But given the evolving nature of cyber risk, S&P Global Ratings believes banks could face a major incident, such as a data breach.

The Rise Of The Cyber Attack

Attacks are on the increase in Australia and globally. In the year to June 30, 2021, the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) received over 67,500 reports of cybercrime, up nearly 13% from the prior year.

In late September 2022, Singtel Optus Pty Ltd. (Optus), an Australia-based telecommunications operator fell victim to a large-scale data breach attack. The company estimates the breach affected up to 9.8 million of its current and former accounts. The cause and scale of the breach are under investigation. The attack raises governance concerns regarding Optus' ability to manage its risks, particularly the control of its IT systems and robustness of its cybersecurity defenses (see "Optus Data Breach Could Squeeze Market Share And Margins," Sept. 29, 2022).

Banks are attractive targets. A successful attack can yield access to payment infrastructure as well as a wide range of personal information and data on companies and individuals, which may lead to substantial losses.

Financial institutions were the most frequently attacked organizations cumulatively over a five-year period to 2020 (according to cyber security specialist Guidewire Software Inc.; see also "Cyber Risk In A New Era: The Effect On Bank Ratings," May 25, 2021), making up around 26% of attacks.

Cyber Attacks Could Rattle Australia's Financial System

Cyber risks pose a threat to the stability of the Australian financial system, which is heavily interconnected. The four major banks-- Commonwealth Bank of Australia, National Australia Bank Ltd., Westpac Banking Corp., and Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.--dominate with about 76% of banking system assets.

Many banks participate in direct payments and a successful attack on even one lender could affect the national system. The potential risks will rise as smaller banks gain access.

An attack on a third-party service provider could also cripple banking operations. Many smaller banks use the same content delivery networks (e.g., Akamai, which saw a major outage in 2021), cloud-based service providers (such as AWS), or providers of software as a service for core banking systems (e.g., Temenos or Data Action, which is especially relevant for smaller and regional banks).

Authorities Are Taking Action

Regulators and other authorities have supported the resilience of individual banks and the overall system. In July 2019, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) issued an Information Security Prudential Standard to help the industry prepare and build out cyber risk management frameworks.

APRA has also strengthened its scrutiny of cyber risks. The regulator issued notices in 2021 advising all banks to start preparing for Information Security tripartite reviews. The review required the board of a bank to engage third-party independent auditors to undertake a compliance review with the results reported to the bank's board and APRA.

APRA has flagged that banks must strengthen their ability to oversee cyber resilience. This is according to an independent assessment contained in APRA's November 2021 publication of the outcome of two pilot initiatives covering its technology resilience data collection and compliance with its Information Security Prudential Standard. APRA encouraged boards to have the same level of confidence in reviewing and challenging information security issues as they do when governing other business issues. APRA also suggested that in many cases there was little evidence of boards actively reviewing and challenging the information that senior management has provided on cyber topics. It also states that some boards are not receiving information about the effectiveness of testing of information security controls.

All businesses in Australia, including banks, are required to notify the government-run ACSC of any cyber incident that has a critical or relevant impact. ACSC, which is charged with developing solutions to cyber security threats, monitors cyber threats globally and alerts Australian businesses on emerging risks.

Nonbank financial institutions are not as closely regulated and may be lagging their regulated bank peers in developing cyber defenses. However, we have observed many banks and nonbanks reference cyber risk against the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology at the U.S. Department of Commerce) framework, which we view as a sound approach to cyber risk management.

Industry Collaboration Is A Boon

The ongoing gradual increase in formal collaboration within the Australian banking industry should help ease systemwide cyber risks, in our view.

In March 2019, the Australian Council of Financial Regulators (APRA, the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission, and the Federal Treasury) established a cyber security working group with the aim of establishing a framework to improve cyber resilience in the Australian financial services industry.

As part of its prudential standards, APRA requested banks to share information on cyber events. This helps the regulator surveil the threat landscape and provides a feedback loop to banks and industry.

The Australian Department of Home Affairs also encourages all critical infrastructure asset owners (of which banks are one) to voluntarily report cyber security incidents to ACSC, even if the threshold for mandatory reporting is not met, again for the benefit of the whole.

We have also observed that where industry participation in the past occurred on an ad hoc basis it has been formalized in recent years. For example, the chief information security officers of banks and industry bodies now regularly meet to discuss cyber risk issues.

Overall Cyber Risk Is Low

In our view, the overall level of cyber risk for the Australian banking system is low. This is because of early steps taken to strengthen cyber risk management, strong industry collaboration, and the strong capitalization of the banking system.

Using a tail-value-at-risk calculation Guidewire measures the average loss for the 40 most severe simulations (or 0.4% of the most severe loss scenarios) and assesses that the 20 Australian banks we rate would suffer a weighted average tail loss of 0.69% of their equity following a cyber attack. In comparison, the average regulatory operational risk capital charge for the banking system was 7% of total equity and should therefore be more than sufficient to cover losses from a cyber event. However, this assessment does not incorporate possible business position effects, associated revenue loss potential due to reputational damage, or cyber ransom.

The chart below shows losses for Australian banks in the Guidewire analysis for different scenarios and confidence levels. We averaged the losses for the 20 Australian banks for different confidence levels and plotted the loss levels against these tail quantiles. For example, in less than 0.1% of the scenarios was the average loss less than 1% of common equity.

Chart 1

image

Cyber-Skill Shortages Heighten Risks Locally And Globally

Globally, the cyber-skill workforce gap is about 2.7 million people, driven by a rise in cyber incidents and new cyber security and data privacy laws that are forcing organizations to protect their data more closely (according to (ISC)2 cybersecurity workforce study). In addition, banks are competing with an information technology sector that is also experiencing an increasing demand for these skills.

In Australia the pandemic has exacerbated the problem as skilled immigration from overseas came to a standstill. In our discussions with banks, we noted that banks that are willing to pay can attract resources--this is particularly the case for larger banks with deeper pockets. However smaller banks find it difficult to retain and attract suitable staff.

Immigration flows returning in 2023 should address this risk in part, in our view. Furthermore, moves by tertiary institutions to provide more relevant training may also lead to improvements, given the demand for cyber related skills.

Data Breaches Are A Key Risk

The growth of ransomware linked to data theft, coupled with the significant amount of sensitive information that banks handle, suggests that data breaches are a significant risk for Australian banks, particularly compared to other dangers such as business interruptions. Worldwide, ransomware-related attacks leading to data leaks increased by 82% year on year in 2021, to 2,686 attacks (source: "2022 Global Threat Report" from Crowdstrike, a cybersecurity technology company.).

The chart below shows a percentage breakdown of the components of the tail value at risk loss (which is the average of the worst 40 simulations).

Chart 2

image

The size of banks in terms of customer base and revenue seems key to gauging susceptibility to a data breach event. For banks with significant customer sets and relative lower revenue numbers the risk of a data breach is much higher. Other factors that may also play a role include the number of unique IP addresses a company has, its volume of network traffic, and the general popularity of its website.

Guidewire also lists these banks (please see chart below, mainly Australian regional banks with relative larger customer sets) as outliers in terms of total losses--mainly from a data breach event.

Chart 3

image

Cyber risk is an evolving risk. The frequency and sophistication of attacks are on the increase and the banking industry as a collective faces the challenge of combining efforts to manage the risk. Failing to do so could have systemic implications.

Related Research

This report does not constitute a rating action.

S&P Global Ratings Australia Pty Ltd holds Australian financial services license number 337565 under the Corporations Act 2001. S&P Global Ratings' credit ratings and related research are not intended for and must not be distributed to any person in Australia other than a wholesale client (as defined in Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act).

Primary Credit Analyst:Nico N DeLange, Sydney + 61 2 9255 9887;
nico.delange@spglobal.com
Secondary Contacts:Sharad Jain, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2077;
sharad.jain@spglobal.com
Lisa Barrett, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2081;
lisa.barrett@spglobal.com

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