Key Takeaways
- The outlooks on most Asia-Pacific bank ratings remain stable, supported by our anticipation of strong government backing for most systemically important banks.
- In Vietnam, the impact of a recent typhoon will likely strain the profitability of domestic banks, and we believe Thai banks will weather flood-related damage.
- Hong Kong banks face high vacancy rates in office space and a spillover of weak sentiment from mainland China's property downturn.
Relative rating stability across Asia-Pacific financial institutions sector is likely to persist into 2025. That's despite heightened uncertainties affecting operating conditions.
Banks are balancing a range of risks of varying intensity, including potential spillover from tensions in the Middle East, property market woes in numerous jurisdictions, and the overarching risk of an economic hard landing. Our base case, however, is that most banks will contend with these risks into the new year. About 91% of bank ratings are on stable outlook.
Our base case assumes most Asia-Pacific governments support systemically important private sector commercial banks. We maintain that extraordinary support would be available for these banks in the unlikely event it is needed.
Our view on government support in Asia-Pacific differs from that on Western Europe and the U.S. (see chart 1). In our view, bailout, rather than bail-in, is the more likely resolution tool in the unlikely event of a banking crisis affecting Asia-Pacific. Links between ratings on sovereigns and financial institutions remain critical as does the capacity and willingness of sovereigns to support banks.
In Western Europe and the U.S., our view is that additional loss-absorbing capacity (ALAC) is the more likely resolution tool, if extraordinary support was needed. Most sovereign ratings across Asia-Pacific are on stable outlook, which, in part, underpins our view of continuing rating stability for systemically important banks. Most systemically important banks in Asia-Pacific currently benefit from modest rating uplift because of government support. Recent positive rating actions for some regional financial institutions stem from improved sovereign outlooks in select Asia-Pacific countries. Positive sovereign rating developments in India and Mongolia led to bank upgrades in 2024.
Chart 1
Our views on support also take into account that occasional government intervention may still be necessary in banking jurisdictions where we see government support as uncertain, such as in Western Europe and the U.S. Equally, we envisage that additional loss-absorbing capacity could absorb losses in certain jurisdictions where we see the government as being supportive to systemically important private sector commercial banks.
In late May, we revised the rating outlook on India to positive from stable. Sovereign and stand-alone factors led to positive outlooks on Indian banks. Underpinning this is the country's forecast strong growth of 6.5%-7% over the next three years, which favors expansion in the financial sector. Asset quality in the sector is also improving.
We raised the sovereign credit ratings on Mongolia with a positive outlook because of the outperformance of the country's economy and prospects of much stronger growth than peers. We raised the ratings on two Mongolian banks, Golomt Bank JSC and Trade and Development Bank JSC, to 'B+' from 'B' due to reduced economic risks, improving regulatory supervision, and enhanced business stability (see "Two Mongolian Banks Upgraded To 'B+' On Improved Business Stability; Outlooks Stable," published on RatingsDirect on Oct. 9, 2024).
In contrast, we lowered the rating on Bangladesh because of elevated political tension in the country. The ratings on two banks, BRAC Bank Ltd. (B+/Stable/B) and Dutch-Bangla Bank PLC (B/Stable/B), were unaffected by the sovereign downgrade. They have been largely maintaining positive net foreign exchange positions. Unlike some larger peers, they have been able to meet their foreign-exchange obligations on time; these are mostly in the form of trade-related letters of credit (see "Bangladesh's Volatile Political Situation Elevates Banking Sector Risks," Aug. 14, 2024).
India Fincos Treading Ahead Cautiously
We believe rated and unrated finance companies have strong capital levels to support high loan growth. Healthy economic growth and digitalization are underpinning robust credit growth. Technologically advanced and well-capitalized finance companies are likely to benefit more than the banks.
At the same time, we expect a host of regulatory actions by the Reserve Bank of India to enhance compliance and safeguard customers. Increased compliance costs may limit the ability of smaller companies to compete in the sector (see "Indian Fincos' Balancing Act: Will The Regulatory Burden Crimp High Credit Growth?," Sept. 24, 2024).
Climate Risks Hit Several South and Southeast Asian Economies
We expect Thai banks to weather the impact of flood damage. Flooding from heavy rainfall has hit several provinces, mostly in Thailand's north, including the tourist city of Chiang Mai. The Thai Chamber of Commerce estimated damages at Thai baht (THB) 30 billion (US$900 million; approximately 0.17% of GDP) as of Sept. 28, 2024. Commercial banks have less than 12% of their branches in northern Thailand. Of these, only a small number have so far been physically affected. Banks' digitalization efforts have gained significant traction since the pandemic struck. This has reduced reliance on physical touchpoints, mitigating disruption to financial services and transactions (see "Thai Financial Sector Will Weather Flood Damage," Oct. 08, 2024).
The effects of a recent typhoon may strain Vietnamese banks' profitability due to debt relief measures for affected borrowers. The landfall of the category-5 typhoon in Vietnam on Sept. 7, 2024, caused widespread damage and scores of fatalities. The banks' measures include lowering lending rates by 0.5% to 2% to new and existing borrowers until the end of 2024. The extent of the relief could vary according to the levels of damage incurred by the borrowers (see "Your Three Minutes In Vietnamese Banking: Typhoon Debt Relief Measures Could Crimp Profitability," Sept. 26, 2024).
Hong Kong Banks Will Withstand Commercial Real Estate Risk
High vacancy rates amid excess supply of office space and a spillover of weak sentiment from mainland China's property downturn will continue to weigh on the CRE sector in Hong Kong. Challenges from ongoing strains in the sector will remain manageable, especially for large banks. This is because the large banks we rate usually have healthy collateralization on their secured loan books, which we estimate comprise 60%-70% of their domestic CRE exposures. The portfolios also have an average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 50%-55%. While this provides some buffer against a significant drop in property prices, ongoing property revaluations could lead to some increase in the LTV ratios for banks (see "Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Hong Kong," Sept. 24, 2024).
Elsewhere, nonbanks in Korea will likely face another year or two of asset-quality strain from their real-estate project financing. Banks are less vulnerable to real estate pain. Their combined loan exposure to construction and real-estate project financing is about 3%-4% of total loans. Mutual savings banks are small. Credit cooperatives can use the financial resources available at their own federations, which function as a de-facto central bank (see "Will The Center Hold For Asia-Pacific Banks? Panelists Discuss Likely Catalysts For Change In 2025," Sept. 17, 2024.)
China's Latest Stimulus Measures Could Boost Credit Growth
The measures could boost consumer and homebuyer sentiment, and possibly loan growth toward our base-case forecast. The package could also lead to some upward revision in S&P Global Ratings' GDP forecasts for 2025. However, we do not think the move amounts to a big bang-style stimulus. The fresh initiatives aim to provide relief to local governments, rebuild market confidence, stabilize property prices, and encourage consumption.
The impact on loan growth and asset quality in general will depend on whether these programs boost economic growth. Expansion of relaxed loans renewal coverage could cloud transparency for reported nonperforming loans. But the stimulus has a limited impact on our broader nonperforming asset (NPA) assessment because this already captures unclassified problem loans.
In our base case, we forecast loan growth of about 9% annually over 2024-2026, versus 8.1% year on year in the first nine months of 2024 (see "Will China's Latest Stimulus Initiatives Achieve Lift-Off?," Oct. 25, 2024).
Australia's Unique Proposal Is Unlikely To Be Widely Replicated
The Australian regulatory proposal to phase out banks' additional tier 1 (AT1) capital should address the unique systemic risks posed by high retail investor exposure to Australian bank AT1 securities. Domestic retail investors hold about half of such instruments, a concentration that may prove problematic in the event of a banking crisis. Nonetheless, S&P Global Ratings thinks a phaseout has the potential to weaken stand-alone credit standings for some Australian banks.
On Sept. 10, 2024, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) released a discussion paper that proposes to replace AT1 capital, predominantly with tier 2 (T2) instruments. If the regulator's proposal were implemented without offsetting actions, many Australian banks' going-concern loss-absorbing capital would weaken. Specifically so, if the AT1 instruments are predominantly replaced with T2 instruments, which can only absorb losses when a bank is no longer viable.
This would be unlikely to affect issuer credit ratings on most banks but could lead us to lower ratings on some T2 instruments, including those issued by the four major Australian banks. Moreover, ratings on their instruments currently classified as AT1 could face offsetting positive and negative pressures. Any rating actions would be subject to certainty in relation to APRA's proposed changes as well as banks' responses (see "Phasing Out Bank AT1--An Australian Solution To An Australian Dilemma," Sept. 18, 2024).
Capital Ratios Are Likely To Normalize Over The Next Two Years
We expect the top 200 rated banks' risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratios will normalize over the next two years, after an increase in 2023. Despite the banking sector turmoil in the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Europe, most of the top 200 rated banks, ranked by their regulatory tier 1 capital, reported good earnings in 2023. Banks mainly benefited from higher net interest margins due to contractionary monetary policies globally. The increase in interest revenues mostly offset the rise in provisions and higher funding costs, while declining--albeit still positive--credit demand slowed the increase in S&P Global Ratings' risk-weighted assets. We think major banks adopted prudent capital management strategies, given economic concerns and upcoming regulatory changes (see "Top 200 Rated Banks' Capital Ratios Are On A Stable Trend," Oct. 21, 2024).
BICRA Changes
Over the past quarter (through Oct. 30, 2024), the following changes have been made to our Banking Industry Country Risk Assessments (BICRAs) in Asia-Pacific.
Malaysia:
We revised our assessment of industry risk to '3' from '4' for Malaysia. Operating conditions are improving for Malaysian banks. The risk of negative intervention from the government has reduced, in our view. Consequently, banks in the country should be better placed to adequately price risks, such that their revenues cover expenses, expected losses, and the cost of capital over an economic cycle without having to take excessive risks.
Mongolia:
We revised our assessment of economic risk to '8' from '9' for Mongolia and revised some scores on economic risk-related factors. We also revised our industry risk trend to positive from stable. Economic risks for Mongolian banks have diminished, in our view. The country has a promising economic outlook. We forecast its real GDP growth will average about 6% annually through 2027, backed by robust exports of commodities such as coal and copper. Moderating inflation and higher public sector wages have also increased household consumption. Mongolia's increased economic resilience should improve operating conditions for banks. Robust demand for credit as the economy expands and decreased volatility in banks' asset quality underpin our view. The industry risk trend of the banking sector is also improving. This is in view of Mongolia's evolving institutional framework, although the banking regulations in the country are relaxed compared with the international standards.
We have published the following comprehensive BICRA reports in the past quarter in Asia-Pacific.
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Cambodia, Oct. 29, 2024
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Thailand, Oct. 29, 2024
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Hong Kong, Sept. 24, 2024
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Malaysia, Sept. 10, 2024
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Philippines, Aug. 26, 2024
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: China, Aug. 19, 2024
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: India, Aug. 19, 2024
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Japan, July 31, 2024
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Taiwan, July 15, 2024
- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment: Vietnam, July 10, 2024
The table below presents S&P Global Ratings' views about key risks and risk trends for banking sectors in Asia-Pacific countries where we rate banks. For more detailed information, please refer to the latest BICRA on a given country. According to our methodology, BICRAs fall into groups from'1' to '10', ranging from what we view as the lowest-risk banking systems (group '1') to the highest-risk (group '10').
Table 1
| Real GDP forecast | ||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Change from prior forecast | ||||||||||||||||||
| (% year over year) | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | ||||||||||
| Australia | 2 | 1.1 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 0 | 0.1 | 0 | ||||||||||
| China | 5.2 | 4.6 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 4.5 | -0.2 | -0.3 | -0.1 | ||||||||||
| Hong Kong | 3.3 | 3.3 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 0.0 | -0.2 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| India | 8.2 | 6.8 | 6.9 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Indonesia | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Japan | 1.7 | 0.0 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 0.9 | -0.7 | 0.2 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Malaysia | 3.5 | 5.1 | 4.8 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 0.1 | ||||||||||
| New Zealand | 0.9 | 1.0 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 | -0.1 | -0.2 | -0.1 | ||||||||||
| Philippines | 5.5 | 5.7 | 6.2 | 6.4 | 6.5 | -0.1 | 0.1 | -0.1 | ||||||||||
| Singapore | 1.1 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| South Korea | 1.4 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | -0.3 | -0.4 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Taiwan | 1.3 | 4.2 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Thailand | 1.9 | 2.8 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 3.1 | -0.6 | -0.2 | -0.2 | ||||||||||
| Vietnam | 5.0 | 6.2 | 6.8 | 6.7 | 6.6 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 0.0 | ||||||||||
| Asia Pacific | 4.9 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.4 | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.1 | ||||||||||
| For India, 2023 = FY 2023 / 24, 2024 = FY 2024 / 25, 2025 = FY 2025 / 26, 2026 = FY 2026 / 27, 2027 = FY 2027 / 28. Source: S&P Global Ratings Economics. | ||||||||||||||||||
| Issuer credit ratings and component scores for the top 60 Asia-Pacific banks | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Institution | Opco L-T ICR/outlook | Anchor | Business position | Capital and earnings | Risk position | Funding and liquidity | Comparable rating analysis | SACP or group SACP | Type of support | No. of notches of support | Additional factor adjustment | |||||||||||||
| Australia | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | a- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Commonwealth Bank of Australia |
AA-/Stable | a- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Macquarie Bank Ltd. |
A+/Stable | a- | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
National Australia Bank Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | a- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Westpac Banking Corp. |
AA-/Stable | a- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| China | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Agricultural Bank of China Ltd. |
A/Stable | bb+ | Very Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Bank of China Ltd. |
A/Stable | bbb- | Very Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | GRE | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Bank of Communications Co. Ltd. |
A-/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Adequate | 0 | bbb- | GRE | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
China CITIC Bank Corp. Ltd. |
A-/Stable | bb+ | Adequate | Moderate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb+ | Group | 4 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
China Construction Bank Corp. |
A/Stable | bb+ | Very Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
China Merchants Bank Co. Ltd. |
A-/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Adequate | Strong | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
China Minsheng Banking Corp. Ltd. |
BBB-/Stable | bb+ | Adequate | Constrained | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Hua Xia Bank Co. Ltd. |
BBB-/Stable | bb+ | Adequate | Moderate | Moderate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd. |
A/Stable | bb+ | Very Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Postal Savings Bank Of China Co. Ltd. |
A/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb | GRE | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank Co. Ltd. |
BBB/Stable | bb+ | Adequate | Constrained | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb | GRE | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Hong Kong | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd. |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | (1) | |||||||||||||
|
Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd. |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Bank of East Asia Ltd. (The) |
A-/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bbb+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd. (The) |
AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a+ | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| India | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Axis Bank Ltd. |
BBB-/Positive | bbb- | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bbb | None | 0 | (1) | |||||||||||||
|
Kotak Mahindra Bank |
BBB-/Positive | bbb- | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | (1) | bbb- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
HDFC Bank Ltd. |
BBB-/Positive | bbb- | Strong | Strong | Strong | Adequate/ Strong | 0 | a- | None | 0 | (3) | |||||||||||||
|
ICICI Bank Ltd. § |
BBB-/Positive | bbb- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bbb+ | None | 0 | (2) | |||||||||||||
|
State Bank of India |
BBB-/Positive | bbb- | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb | None | 0 | (1) | |||||||||||||
| Indonesia | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Bank Mandiri (Persero) PT |
BBB/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Strong | Moderate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bbb- | GRE | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Persero) Tbk. PT |
BBB/Stable | bb+ | Strong | Strong | Moderate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bbb- | GRE | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Japan | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Chiba Bank Ltd. |
A-/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Strong | Adequate/Strong | 0 | a- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc.* |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Mizuho Financial Group Inc.* |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Moderate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Nomura Holdings Inc.* |
A-/Stable | bbb+ | Moderate | Strong | Moderate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bbb | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Norinchukin Bank |
A/Negative | bbb+ | Moderate | Strong | Moderate | Strong/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Resona Holdings* |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Shinkin Central Bank |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Strong | Moderate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bbb+ | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Shizuoka Bank Ltd. |
A-/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | a- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group Inc.* |
A/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Holdings* | A/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Moderate | Strong | Adequate/Strong | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Korea | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Industrial Bank of Korea |
AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bbb+ | GRE | 4 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
KEB Hana Bank |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Kookmin Bank |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Nonghyup Bank |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Adequate | 0 | a- | GRE | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Shinhan Bank |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Woori Bank |
A+/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Malaysia | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Public Bank Bhd. |
A-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Strong | Strong/Strong | (1) | a | None | 0 | (1) | |||||||||||||
|
Malayan Banking Bhd. |
A-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
CIMB Bank Bhd. |
A-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/Strong | 0 | a- | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| New Zealand | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
ANZ Bank New Zealand Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Group | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
ASB Bank Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Group | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Bank of New Zealand |
AA-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Group | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Westpac New Zealand Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Group | 3 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Philippines | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Bank of the Philippine Islands |
BBB+/ Stable | bbb- | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/ Strong | 0 | bbb+ | None | 0 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Singapore | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
DBS Bank Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Strong | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Strong | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
United Overseas Bank Ltd. |
AA-/Stable | bbb+ | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Strong | 0 | a | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Taiwan | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
CTBC Bank Co. Ltd. |
A/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 1 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Mega International Commercial Bank Co. Ltd. |
A+/Stable | bbb | Strong | Strong | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | a- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Thailand | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Bangkok Bank Public Co. Ltd. |
BBB+/Stable | bb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Strong/ Strong | 0 | bbb- | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
KASIKORNBANK PCL |
BBB/Stable | bb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bb+ | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Krung Thai Bank Public Co. Ltd. |
BBB-/Positive | bb | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Adequate | 0 | bb | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
|
Siam Commercial Bank Public Co. Ltd. |
BBB/Stable | bb | Strong | Adequate | Adequate | Adequate/Strong | 0 | bb+ | Sys. Imp. | 2 | 0 | |||||||||||||
| Data as of October 17, 2024. In "Type of Support" column, "None" includes some banks where ratings uplift because of support factors may be possible but none is currently included. (For example, this column includes some systemically important banks where systemic importance results in no rating uplift). *Holding company; the rating reflects that on the main operating company. §This ICR applies to the foreigncurrency Rating only. ICR--Issuer credit rating. GRE--Government-related entity. SACP--Stand-alone credit profile. Opco--Operating company. L-T--Long term. Sys. Imp.--Systemically important. ALAC--Additional loss-absorbing capacity. N/A--Not applicable. Sov --Capped by Sovereign Rating. Source: S&P Global Ratings. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
Table 3
| Recent rating actions: Asia-Pacific banks | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Release Date | Legal name | Country | From | To | ||||||
| October 15, 2024 |
Toronto Dominion (South East Asia) Ltd. |
Singapore | AA-/Negative/A-1+ | A+/Stable/A-1 | ||||||
| October 9, 2024 |
Trade and Development Bank JSC |
Mongolia | B/Stable/B | B+/Stable/B | ||||||
| October 9, 2024 |
Golomt Bank JSC |
Mongolia | B/Stable/B | B+/Stable/B | ||||||
| October 4, 2024 |
Development Bank of Mongolia LLC |
Mongolia | B/Stable/B | B+/Positive/B | ||||||
| August 27, 2024 |
Taishin International Bank Co. Ltd. |
Taiwan | BBB+/Stable/A-2 | BBB+/WatchDev/A-2/WatchDev | ||||||
| August 27, 2024 |
Taishin Financial Holding Co. Ltd. |
Taiwan | BBB/Stable/A-2 | BBB/WatchNeg/A-2/WatchNeg | ||||||
| August 27, 2024 |
Taiwan Shin Kong Commercial Bank Co. Ltd. |
Taiwan | BBB-/Negative/A-3 | BBB-/WatchDev/A-3/WatchDev | ||||||
| July 30, 2024 |
Norfina Ltd. |
Australia | A+/WatchPos/A-1/WatchPos | AA-/Stable/A-1+ | ||||||
| *Recent rating actions are for the period July 1, 2024 to October 17, 2024. The list refers to banks and bank holding companies (banks) where the rating has been upgraded or downgraded, or the outlook has been changed. Banks where the ratings have been affirmed or the outlooks have not been changed are not included in the list. | ||||||||||
Related Research
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Other Research
Please see Instant Insights: Key Takeaways From Our Research, published Oct. 16, 2024, which is a curated compilation of the key takeaways from our most up-to-date thought leadership.
Webcasts: Asia-Pacific Banking Insights
In the last quarter, we held the following webcasts to share our views on Asia-Pacific and other banking topics. The replays are available on
https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/events/webcast-replays/index#
- Nine Takeaways From European Banks' Results And The Future Role Of Central Bank Refinancings, Sept. 17, 2024
- What is Behind our BB- Rating on Muangthai Capital Public Co. Ltd., Sept. 16, 2024
- Asia-Pacific Financial Institutions Virtual Conference 2024: Emerging Risks—Emerging Opportunities, Sept. 11, 2024
- Alternative Investment Fund Subscription Lines, Sept. 9, 2024
- Australian Property Spotlight 2024, July 30, 2024
- Cyber Risk Insights: Through the APAC Lens, July 24, 2024
- Global Banks Midyear Outlook 2024 - APAC/EMEA Session, July 17, 2024
- 2024 Global Emerging Markets Virtual Conference: Is Emerging Asia Picking Up Steam?, July 3, 2024
This report does not constitute a rating action.
S&P Global Ratings Australia Pty Ltd holds Australian financial services license number 337565 under the Corporations Act 2001. S&P Global Ratings' credit ratings and related research are not intended for and must not be distributed to any person in Australia other than a wholesale client (as defined in Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act).
| Primary Credit Analyst: | Gavin J Gunning, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2092; gavin.gunning@spglobal.com |
| Secondary Contacts: | Ryan Tsang, CFA, Hong Kong + 852 2533 3532; ryan.tsang@spglobal.com |
| Geeta Chugh, Mumbai + 912233421910; geeta.chugh@spglobal.com | |
| Kensuke Sugihara, Tokyo + 81 3 4550 8475; kensuke.sugihara@spglobal.com | |
| Vera Chaplin, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2058; vera.chaplin@spglobal.com | |
| Susan Chu, Hong Kong (852) 2912-3055; susan.chu@spglobal.com | |
| Sharad Jain, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2077; sharad.jain@spglobal.com | |
| Peter Sikora, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2094; peter.sikora@spglobal.com | |
| Nico N DeLange, Sydney + 61 2 9255 9887; nico.delange@spglobal.com | |
| Lisa Barrett, Melbourne + 61 3 9631 2081; lisa.barrett@spglobal.com | |
| HongTaik Chung, CFA, Hong Kong + 852 2533 3597; hongtaik.chung@spglobal.com | |
| Daehyun Kim, CFA, Hong Kong + 852 2533 3508; daehyun.kim@spglobal.com | |
| Emily Yi, Hong Kong + 852 2532 8091; emily.yi@spglobal.com | |
| Chizuru Tateno, Tokyo + 81 3 4550 8578; chizuru.tateno@spglobal.com | |
| Ming Tan, CFA, Singapore + 65 6216 1095; ming.tan@spglobal.com | |
| Phyllis Liu, CFA, FRM, Hong Kong +852 2532 8036; phyllis.liu@spglobal.com | |
| Yiran Zhong, Hong Kong 25333582; yiran.zhong@spglobal.com | |
| Xi Cheng, Shanghai + 852 2533 3582; xi.cheng@spglobal.com | |
| Eunice Fan, Taipei +886-2-2175-6818; eunice.fan@spglobal.com | |
| YuHan Lan, Taipei +886-2-2175-6810; yuhan.lan@spglobal.com | |
| Andy Chang, CFA, FRM, Taipei +886-2-2175-6815; andy.chang@spglobal.com | |
| Research Assistant: | Priyal Shah, CFA, Mumbai |
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